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Abstract  
 
In 1999 New York enacted Kendra’s Law, in memory of Kendra Webdale, a young woman 
who was pushed to her death in front of an oncoming train by a man with untreated schizophrenia. 
Under Kendra’s Law a court can order a person with a mental illness to participate in an “assisted 
outpatient treatment” (AOT) program. Kendra’s Law includes a number of procedural due process 
protections including the right to a hearing and the right to counsel.  Still critics argue that people 
with mental illnesses are routinely ordered to participate in the AOT program based on no more 
than “a bare recital of the statutory criteria.” The first essay in this dissertation, Outpatient Commitment 
and Procedural Due Process, reports the findings from a study on procedural due process and assisted 
outpatient treatment hearings under Kendra’s Law.  Findings from this study suggest that despite 
the shift from a medical model of civil commitment to a judicial model in the late 1970s, by and 
large judges continue to accord great deference to clinical testimony.  A second paper, Rethinking 
Kendra’s Law, addresses the ethical dilemmas that arise when courts impose AOT over the patient’s 
objection.  
The third paper of this dissertation, Public Assistance, Drug Testing and the Law, addresses the 
Fourth Amendment questions that arise when states condition public assistance benefits on passing 
a suspicionless drug test.  To date eight states—including Florida, Georgia and Missouri—condition 
public assistance benefits on passing a drug test.  Proposals to condition public assistance on passing 
a drug test have also appeared in Congress.  However, without a genuine threat to public health or 
public safety, proposals to condition public assistance on passing a drug test without individualized 
suspicion of drug use are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Even if the Supreme Court iv 
 
were to recognize special needs beyond a genuine threat to public health or public safety, policies 
that result in withholding public assistance benefits from people who abuse illegal drugs are likely to 
make many social problems much worse.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
 
 
In 1999 the New York State Legislature enacted Kendra’s Law, in memory of Kendra 
Webdale, a young woman who was pushed to her death in front of an oncoming train by a man with 
untreated schizophrenia.
1  Under Kendra’s Law, a court can order a person with a mental illness to 
participate in an “assisted outpatient treatment” (AOT) program.  A typical AOT order includes a 
host of interventions designed to improve medication compliance in the community, among them—
periodic blood tests or urinalysis to determine compliance with prescribed medications; counseling 
and toxicology screens for patients with a history of substance abuse and day or partial day 
programming.
2
A large empirical literature on Kendra’s Law has assessed the impact of court ordered 
treatment on outcomes such as treatment adherence, psychiatric hospitalization and quality of life.
  For those who are not under a supervised housing requirement, courts will 
sometimes order an “ACT” or assertive community treatment team to visit the patient’s home.   
3
                                                 
1 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (2006). 
  
A smaller number of studies have also examined recipient perceptions of coercion and procedural 
justice in the AOT program.  For example, in a 2009 study of the AOT program, AOT recipients 
reported mostly positive attitudes about medication and low levels of coercion. When compared to 
 
 
2 Id. 
 
 
3 See, e.g., Martin S. Swartz, Henry J. Steadman, & John Monahan, NEW YORK STATE ASSISTED OUTPATIENT 
TREATMENT PROGRAM EVALUATION, http://www.omh.ny.gov (2009) (last visited Sept. 2, 2012); Henry J. Steadman et 
al., Assessing the New York City Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Pilot Program, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 330 (2001); Jo. C. 
Phelan, Effectiveness and Outcomes of Assisted Outpatient Treatment in New York State, 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 137 (2010); 
Alisa B. Busch, Changes in Guideline Recommended Medication Possession after Implementing Kendra’s Law in New York 61 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1000 (2010); Bruce G. Link et al., Arrest Outcomes Associated with Outpatient Commitment in New York 
State, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 504 (2011).  
 
 2 
 
their counterparts who had not recently participated in the AOT program, current AOT recipients 
also had more favorable perceptions of procedural justice.
4
Missing from these studies, however, is a better understanding of procedural due process 
under Kendra’s Law.  Kendra’s Law includes a number of due process protections including the 
right to a hearing and the right to counsel.  Still critics argue that people with mental illnesses are 
routinely ordered to participate in the assisted outpatient treatment program based on no more than 
“a bare recital of the statutory criteria” or the “vaguest allegation of a serious violent act.”
   
5 Moreover 
studies on procedural due process and inpatient civil commitment have shown that, for most people 
with mental illnesses, “the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding” may be “more illusory 
than real.”
6 Although patients are represented by counsel, attorneys rarely cross-examine clinicians, 
raise objections, argue for less restrictive alternatives to hospitalization, or investigate the facts 
alleged to justify civil commitment.
7  Judges routinely discourage attorneys from taking an active part 
in commitment proceedings and defer to psychiatrists on questions of mental illness and 
dangerousness.  As one observer said, “[m]any hearings give the impression of being merely a 
‘rubber stamp’ of the psychiatrist’s decision, and not a true adversary process.”
8
                                                 
4 See infra notes 116-122 and accompanying text.  
 
 
 
5 Dennis Feld & Kim L. Darrow, IOC in New York State: At What Price Refusal?, http://www.narpa.org (last visited 
April 23, 2013).  
 
 
6 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 610 (1979); See also Eric Turkheimer and Charles D. H. Parry, Why the Gap? Practice 
and Policy in Civil Commitment Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 646 (1992). 
 
 
7 See infra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.  
 
 
8 Mark A. Hart, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California: The Lanterman-Petris Short Act. 7 LOY. L. A. REV. 93 
(1974). 
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This paper reports the findings from a study of procedural due process and assisted 
outpatient treatment hearings under Kendra’s Law.  The study investigated four elements of 
procedural due process—the right to a hearing; the right to counsel; the standard of proof; and the 
right to a neutral factfinder.  The primary objective of this study was to learn more about how courts 
determine whether someone meets the criteria for AOT and how much they rely on clinical 
recommendations. This study also aimed to understand how judges define the term “clear and 
convincing evidence” and what constitutes clear and convincing evidence that someone meets the 
criteria for AOT as required by law. Moreover, how do defense attorneys understand their role in 
AOT hearings? How do they understand their professional obligations to their clients?   
Part I traces the evolution of procedural due process and civil commitment.  During the first 
half of the twentieth century, civil commitment decisions were predicated on the “best interests” of 
the patient and left in the hands of physicians or family members.  By the mid-1970s, courts began 
to prescribe greater procedural due process protections for civil commitment hearings.  Since that 
time the primary site of mental health care in the United States has shifted from large public 
hospitals to the community, with a particular focus on mandatory outpatient treatment for patients 
with severe and persistent mental illnesses.  However, the fundamental elements of procedural due 
process have remained the same across inpatient and outpatient settings.  Part I discusses Lessard v. 
Schmidt where a Wisconsin district court issued a seminal decision on procedural due process, and 
Addington v. Texas, where the Supreme Court discussed the standard of proof required for civil 
commitment proceedings.  Part I concludes with a review of empirical research on procedural due 
process and civil commitment.  Much of the available case law and empirical research on procedural 
due process concerns inpatient civil commitment.  Nonetheless, Part I will review this literature in 
detail.  The fundamental elements of procedural due process in outpatient commitment settings—
e.g. the right to a hearing and the right to counsel—derive from the law of inpatient civil 4 
 
commitment and these rights have been incorporated into the assisted outpatient treatment program 
by statute.   
Part II turns to the mechanics of Kendra’s Law, procedural due process challenges and the 
assisted outpatient treatment program.  Part III outlines the methods used in this study.  Much of 
the research for this paper comes from observing AOT hearings in New York City, as well as candid 
on-the-record conversations with judges and attorneys, who are involved in Kendra’s Law cases.  
Part IV describes the results.  In contrast to early studies on procedural due process and inpatient 
civil commitment, findings from this study suggest that assisted outpatient treatment hearings in 
New York City adhere to the basic requirements of procedural due process.  At the same time AOT 
hearings are not without their problems. Attorneys reported significant barriers to effective advocacy 
on behalf of their clients.  Further despite the shift from a medical model of civil commitment to a 
judicial model in the 1970s, by and large judges continue to accord great deference to clinical 
testimony.  As one judge put it, most judges are not “competent” to overrule clinical 
recommendations.  Nor do judges want to be known in the press as the judge who denied a request 
for supervised treatment, only to have that person injure or kill a member of the general public. Part 
V discusses the implications of these findings for the assisted outpatient treatment program.   
 
 
I.  PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS  
 
A.  CASE LAW  
 
Until the late 1960s, the most common form of civil commitment was the two physician 
certificate, whereby patients were hospitalized on the statement of one or two physicians that they 
were suffering from a mental disorder and in need of treatment.
9
                                                 
9 See e.g. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 31.27, 31.37, 31.39 (McKinney 1973); See also Robert Miller & Paul Fiddleman, 
Changes in North Carolina Civil Commitment Statutes: The Impact of Attorneys, 11 AM.  ACAD.  OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 43 (1983); 
  In most states, commitment could 5 
 
be achieved without a hearing, without counsel and without legal recourse, save for a writ of habeas 
corpus.
10  Whenever possible, commitment decisions were left in the hands of family members or 
physicians.
11 By the late 1950s, attitudes toward institutional psychiatry began to change.
12 In the 
years following World War II, a series of exposés called attention to deplorable conditions in state 
hospitals.
13 Labeling theorists and a small group of radical anti-psychiatrists insisted that psychiatric 
diagnoses were no more than convenient labels designed to suppress nonconforming behavior.
14 So 
labeled persons deemed mentally ill would in turn reproduce more disturbed behavior. As early as 
the late 1940s, studies found that psychiatric diagnoses had low rates of interrater reliability
15 and 
psychiatrists tend to overpredict dangerousness.
16
                                                                                                                                                             
Paul S. Appelbaum, The Evolution of Commitment Law in the Nineteenth Century: A Reinterpretation, 6 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 
314 (1982); Ellen Dwyer, Civil Commitment Laws in Nineteenth Century New York, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 79 (1989).  
  
 
 
10 Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 9 at 43. 
 
 
11 PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE LIMITS OF CHANGE 20 (1994). 
 
 
12 Id. at 4. 
 
 
13 APPELBAUM supra note 9, at 27-8.  
 
 
14 Id. at 4-7.  
 
 
15 See, e.g., Ash, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 44 J. ABN. & SOC. PSYCH. 272 (1949) (reporting interrater 
reliability rate of 21%); See also Bruce J. Ennis and Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping 
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974); John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Criminal Behavior: A 
Methodological Critique, in, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON 
CRIME RATES 250 (National Academy of Sciences 1978).  
 
 
16  One of the more influential studies was conducted by Henry Steadman and Joseph Cocozza following the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Baxstrom v. Herald, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). See Henry J. Steadman & Joseph J. Cocozza, 
CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: EXCESSIVE SOCIAL CONTROL OF DEVIANCE (1974)(Baxstrom resulted in the 
transfer of 966 psychiatric patients from maximum security hospitals to lower security hospitals or the community. After 
4 years Steadman and Cocozza found that only 20% of the Baxstrom patients were reconvicted, mostly for nonviolent 
offenses, calling the accuracy of dangerousness predictions into question); See also Cocozza & Henry Steadman, The 
Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 1084 (1976);  JOHN 
MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981)(concluding that “psychiatrists and 6 
 
A further critique of psychiatry arose from the civil rights movement.  After an initial focus 
on racial inequality, the postwar civil rights movement gradually expanded to include a concern for 
the rights of women, the poor and eventually, the civil liberties of people with mental illnesses.
17  
Civil rights organizations argued that inpatient commitment standards were vague, overbroad and 
void for failure to consider less restrictive alternatives to involuntary hospitalization.
18 The actual 
practice of civil commitment was also under fire.  In the late 1960s a small number of states revised 
their civil commitment statues to provide for the right to a hearing and the right to counsel.  
Nonetheless, a widely cited study conducted by students at the University of Arizona Law School 
documented problems at each stage of the civil commitment process, including the cursory nature 
of most civil commitment hearings averaging no more than 5 minutes and the tendency by both 
judges and attorneys to accept conclusory statements from psychiatrists at face value without 
exploring the facts.
19
  
   
 
1.  The Right to a Hearing  
 
In 1972, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin issued a landmark 
opinion on procedural due process and civil commitment in Lessard v. Schmidt.
 20
                                                                                                                                                             
psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior” among institutionalized 
patients). 
  Lessard began when 
 
 
17 GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: THE HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA’S MENTALLY ILL, 274 
(1994). 
 
 
18 Lessard v Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972); vacated 414 U.S. 473, remanded to 379 F. Supp. 1376 
(E.D. Wis. 1984), vacated Schmidt v. Lessard, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis 1976). 
 
 
19 David B. Wexler et al., The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 38 
(1971).   
 
 
20 Lessard, 349 F.Supp. at 1081.  7 
 
Alberta Lessard was picked up by two police officers in front of her home in West Allis, Wisconsin 
and taken to a mental health center where she was detained on an emergency basis.
21  Three days 
later the same police officers appeared before a judge and restated the allegations contained in their 
petition for emergency detention without Alberta Lessard.  Based on that ex parte proceeding, a 
Milwaukee county court issued an order extending the detention of Alberta Lessard for ten days.
22 
Sometime thereafter a psychiatrist diagnosed her with schizophrenia and the court appointed a 
guardian ad litem to represent her interests.  In the weeks that followed, the court extended her 
commitment order for 30 days, each month, for nearly a year.  On her own accord, Lessard obtained 
counsel and filed a class action in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, 
alleging that the Wisconsin civil commitment statute violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process of law.
23
The district court held that the statute was constitutionally defective insofar as it permitted 
civil commitment without a hearing and failed to afford persons alleged to be mentally ill with timely 
and effective notice of their right to a hearing.  The court held that notice of the hearing must be 
given in advance of the proceeding so that “[a] reasonable opportunity to prepare will be 
afforded.”
 
24
                                                 
21 Id. 
 Moreover, the right to notice  includes more than notice of the date, time and place of 
the scheduled hearing.  “The patient should be informed of the basis for his detention, his right to a 
jury trial, the standard upon which he may be detained, the names of examining physicians and all 
 
 
22 Id. at 1081.  
 
 
23 Id. at 1082. 
 
 
24 Id. at 1092.  
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other persons who may testify in favor of his continued detention, and the substance of their 
proposed testimony.”
25  Respondents in a civil commitment proceeding were also entitled to notice 
of the privilege against self-incrimination.  Nor does the state accord due process to persons facing 
civil commitment through an “ex parte  proceeding in which the individual has no meaningful 
opportunity to be heard either because of incapacity caused be medication or lack of counsel.”
26
As historian Paul Appelbaum writes, “Lessard reflects the ethos of its era.”
  
27 In a series of 
decisions beginning with Kent v. the United States
28 in 1966 and In re Gault
29 in 1967 the United States 
Supreme Court addressed the use of civil commitment in juvenile delinquency proceedings.  In both 
cases the Supreme Court considered and flatly rejected the state’s contention that the therapeutic 
goals of the juvenile justice system were sufficient to justify civil commitment without the 
procedural safeguards found in criminal proceedings.  Nor was the Supreme Court persuaded that 
officers in the juvenile justice system could make accurate decisions through informal proceedings. 
“Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in instances which 
might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of 
fact.”
30
 
 The Court continued:  
                                                 
25 Id. 
 
 
26 Id. 
 
 
27 APPELBAUM, supra, note 9, at 28. 
 
 
28 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 
 
29 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 
 
30 Id. at 19.  
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The history of American freedom is in no small measure, the history of 
procedure…[T]he procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality 
of due process are our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation of 
essential facts…It is these instruments of due process which enhance the possibility 
that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting 
data.31
 
   
Without the safeguards of a vigorous adversary system, civil commitment decisions risked 
arbitrariness and unfairness.  Nor was the Court persuaded that less stringent safeguards are required 
insofar as commitment proceedings are classified as “civil” rather than “criminal.”
32
In the same way Lessard underscored the stigma of involuntary hospitalization, the loss of 
basic civil liberties accompanying civil commitment and the virtues of an adversary system.  
Psychiatric patients lost the presumption of competence, the right to sue and be sued, the right to 
contract, the right to sit on a jury, the right to vote and the right to drive.
  Given the 
potential loss of liberty, the Supreme Court held that delinquency proceedings must comply with the 
requirements of due process.   
33  “It is obvious,” the court 
wrote “that the commitment adjudication carries with it an enormous and devastating effect on an 
individual’s civil rights.  In some respects, such as the limitation on holding a driver’s license, the 
civil deprivations which follow civil commitment are more serious than the deprivations which 
accompany a criminal conviction.”
34
                                                 
31 Id. at 21.  
 Given the loss of basic liberties, the court concluded that the 
individual interest in avoiding civil commitment was at least as serious as the interest in avoiding 
criminal conviction.  Therefore, civil commitment required the same rigorous procedural safeguards 
found in criminal proceedings.   
 
 
32 Id. at 23.  
 
 
33 Lessard v Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D. Wis. 1972). 
 
 
34 Id. 10 
 
2.  The Right to Counsel  
 
Lessard  held that persons facing civil commitment have a due process right to counsel, 
specifically adversary counsel, including appointed counsel if they are unable to afford one. The 
district court reasoned that “the right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”
35 The court also outlined the essential functions of 
counsel:  “The individual whose freedom is in jeopardy needs the assistance of counsel to cope with 
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, 
and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.”
36 The court rejected the 
state’s assertion that the appointment of a guardian ad litem should satisfy the requirement of defense 
counsel.
37
Notwithstanding the strong preference for adversary counsel expressed by the court in 
Lessard, whether attorneys should adopt an adversarial posture in civil commitment hearings remains 
a matter of some controversy.  Although attorneys are bound by the rules of professional ethics,  The 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide little guidance.
  The role of the guardian ad litem is to evaluate the “best interests” of his client for himself 
and present his evaluation to the court.  Lessard, by contrast, envisions an adversarial role for 
counsel.   
38
                                                 
35 Id. at 1097.  
  Rule 1.14(a) Client With Diminished 
Capacity, states that when a client’s capacity to make adequate decisions is diminished due to mental 
impairment, “the lawyer shall, as far as possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with 
the client,” meaning “a lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision concerning the objectives of 
 
 
36 Id. at 1098.  
 
 
37 Id. at 1099. 
 
 
38 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).  
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representation.”
39  Yet, as critics point out, Rule 1.14(b) largely vitiates the strength of Rule 1.14(a).
40  
Rule 1.14 (b) provides: “[w]hen the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity 
[and] is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot 
adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably protective action,” for 
example consulting with others who can protect the client or appointing a guardian ad litem.
41
 
  Thus 
while Rule 1.14(a) directs attorneys to maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship, Rule 1.14(b) 
suggests a best interests model and leaves attorneys to determine which approach is appropriate. 
 
3.  The Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence  
 
Prior to Lessard v. Schmidt, Wisconsin law permitted a judge or jury to order civil commitment 
if the court was satisfied that the person was mentally ill or infirm and “a proper subject for custody 
and treatment” based on a preponderance of the evidence.
42  Lessard held that the statute was 
unconstitutional insofar as it permitted civil commitment without proof of mental illness and 
dangerousness to self or others beyond a reasonable doubt.  In doing so, the district court drew on 
Humphrey v. Cady, where the Supreme Court intimated that civil commitment requires proof of harm 
to self or others and characterized civil commitment as “a massive curtailment of liberty.
43
                                                 
39 Id. at 227 
   
 
 
40See e.g. Susan Stefan, The Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 9 MPDLR 9, 230 (1985) . 
 
 
41 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 38 at 227.  
 
 
42 Lessard v Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078, 1093(E.D. Wis. 1972). 
 
 
43 Id at. 1093, citing 405 U.S. 472, 1052 (1972).  
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Several years later, the Supreme Court addressed the standard of proof required in civil 
commitment proceedings directly in Addington v. Texas.
44  Addington began when a jury found that 
Frank Addington was mentally ill and required hospitalization based “clear, unequivocal and 
convincing” evidence.
45
The Chief Justice noted significant differences between a civil commitment proceeding and a 
criminal prosecution.  Setting aside arguments to the contrary in Gault, the Chief Justice reasoned 
that in a civil proceeding states do not exercise their power punitively; therefore, the criminal law 
standard of proof is not required.  Second, even if an erroneous civil commitment is as undesirable 
as an erroneous conviction, “layers of professional review” as well as “the concern of family and 
friends generally will provide continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be 
corrected.”
 Addington appealed on the ground that civil commitment by less than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt violated his right to procedural due process.  In an opinion by Chief 
Justice Burger, the Supreme Court held that while the individual interest in the outcome of a civil 
commitment proceeding is of sufficient gravity to require more than a preponderance of the 
evidence, in a civil commitment proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment requires no more than 
“clear and convincing evidence.” Contrary to Lessard, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not 
constitutionally required.   
46  Third, the central inquiry in a civil commitment proceeding is very different from the 
central issue in a criminal prosecution.  In the latter, the central issue is a question of  fact, 
susceptible to objective proof—“did the accused commit the act alleged?”
47
                                                 
44 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979). 
 In a civil commitment 
 
 
45 Id. at 428.  
 
 
46 Id. at 428.  
 
 
47 Id. at 429. 13 
 
proceeding, the central inquiry involves the meaning of the alleged facts, which must be interpreted 
by psychiatrists.  Given the uncertainty of prediction and the fallibility of diagnosis, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt would impose a standard that states cannot meet.
48
As the Chief Justice explained, the purpose of a standard of proof is to allocate the risk of 
error between litigants and impress the importance of the decision upon the factfinder.  The 
standard of proof also “reflects the value society places on individual liberty.”
   
49
 
 At the same time, 
the Court conceded that at least, “to a degree,” the difference between a preponderance of the 
evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt may well be “largely 
an academic exercise.”  Moreover:  
We can probably assume…that the difference between a preponderance of the 
evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt…is better understood than either 
of them in relation to the intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence.50
 
   
Addington left the term clear and convincing evidence” undefined; however, lower courts in New 
York have defined clear and convincing evidence as evidence which makes the existence of a fact 
“highly probable,” or “much more probable than its falsity.”
51
  
    
4.  The Right to a Neutral Factfinder  
 
In Lessard v. Schmidt, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held 
that persons facing civil commitment have a due process right to a hearing before a neutral judge 
                                                 
48 Id. at 432. 
 
 
49 Id. at 425.  
 
 
50 Id. 
 
 
51 Ausch v. St Paul & Marine Ins. Co., 511 N.Y.S.2d. 919, 912-22 (2d Dep’t 1987)(approving jury instruction that 
used “highly probable” language to describe clear and convincing evidence); Chenango Mut. Ins. Co. v. Charles, 652 
N.Y.S. 2d 134 (3d Dep’t 1997)(clear and convincing evidence standard requires “high probability”). 
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within 48 hours of detention to determine probable cause for commitment.  In contrast to Lessard, 
however, the Supreme Court has said that while persons facing civil commitment are entitled to a 
hearing, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a formal hearing, 
nor does it require a judicial decisionmaker.    
In Parham v. J.R. the Supreme Court held that while the risk of error inherent in a parental 
decision to civilly commit a child is sufficiently great that “some kind of inquiry by a ‘neutral 
factfinder’ should be made,” a formal hearing is not required nor must a judicial officer make the 
decision.
52  The Court cited observational studies showing that most civil commitment hearings 
were exceedingly brief and informal on the order of 3.8 to 9.2 minutes.
53  To that end Chief Justice 
Burger remarked: “Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed 
protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for 
the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than real,” 
amounting to no more than “time-consuming procedural minuets” before the patient’s eventual 
admission.
54  Moreover, the requirements of procedural due process are “shaped by the risk of error 
inherent in the truth finding process.”
55
                                                 
52 442 U.S. 584, 610 (1977).  
 Although medical decisions are by no means error free, the 
Court was satisfied that the risk of error would not be reduced by a judicial decisionmaker or an 
 
 
53 Id. at 610, citing Dale A. Albes & Richard A. Pasewak, Involuntary Hospitalization: Surrender at the Courthouse, 2 AM. J. 
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 287, 288 (1974)(reporting an average hearing duration of 9.2 minutes); Dorothy Miller & 
Michael Swartz, County Lunacy Commission Hearings: Some Observations of Commitments to a State Mental Hospital, 14 SOC. 
PROBS. 401, 408 (1964)(average duration 3.8 minutes); Thomas Scheff, The Societal Reaction to Deviance: Ascriptive Elements 
in the Psychiatric Screening of Mental Patients in a Midwestern State, 11 SOC. PROBS. 401, 408 (1964)(average duration 9.2 
minutes).  
 
 
54 Parham, 442 U.S. at 610.  
 
 
55 Id. at 613.  
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adversarial  hearing.  Instead the Georgia civil commitment statute comported with the requirements 
of procedural due process insofar as admissions decisions were based on an independent medical 
decision followed by periodic review.
56
 
 
 
B.  EMPIRICAL STUDIES  
 
By the end of the 1970s, states revised their civil commitment laws to require clear and 
convincing evidence of mental illness and dangerousness to self or others.  States also incorporated 
greater procedural due process safeguards into civil commitment proceedings, including notice, the 
right to a hearing, the right to counsel, the right to call and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to 
an appeal.  An important purpose of these reforms was to ensure that needless deprivations of 
liberty were avoided; however, researchers reported that the actual practice of civil commitment 
proceedings departed from the standards set by courts and state legislatures.  Other studies found 
that adherence to procedural due process protections varied across jurisdictions.  
Part II.B. summarizes the second generation of studies on inpatient civil commitment 
hearings and procedural due process, ranging from the early 1970s through the mid-1980s.  Since 
that time research on procedural due process and inpatient commitment has waned considerably.  
Part II.B. concludes with a summary of recent findings.    
 
 
1.  The Right to a Hearing  
 
Given earlier empirical work on civil commitment hearings conducted pre-Lessard, the 
primary objective of subsequent research was to determine whether civil commitment hearings had 
become more robust, with a greater exercise of procedural due process rights in the intervening 
                                                 
56 Id.  
 
 16 
 
years.  A 1976 study on due process examined the implementation of Lessard in Milwaukee and 
Dane County, Wisconsin.
57 The study revealed two distinct models of civil commitment—a parens 
patriae ethos, characterized by judicial deference to mental health professionals in determining the 
best interests of the patient, and a police power or due process model, characterized by adversary 
proceedings.  The two models of civil commitment—the  parens patriae model embraced by the 
Milwaukee court and the police power model implemented in Dane County—appeared to influence 
the rate of civil commitment.  The percentage of persons civilly committed in Milwaukee was nearly 
four times higher than the percentage committed in Dane.
58
The nature of the proceedings also varied considerably. The average length of a civil 
commitment hearing in Milwaukee was 9 minutes, while the average length of a civil commitment 
hearing in Dane was 2 hours, with the shortest hearing lasting 45 minutes.
  
59  In contrast to 
Milwaukee, where petitioners for civil commitment were not represented by counsel, civil 
commitment hearings in Dane County began with the assistant district attorney presenting the case 
for the petitioner.
60
                                                 
57 Thomas Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 503 (1976); See also 
David Lelos, Courtroom Observation Study of Civil Commitment, in CIVIL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY: AN 
EVALUATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS MENTAL HEALTH REFORM ACT OF 1970 102 (1981); Carol Warren, Involuntary 
Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 629 (1977); 
Serena D. Steir & Kurt D. Stoebe, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 Legislation, 64 
IOWA L. REV. 1284 (1979).  
  The district attorney usually called witnesses to show that the defendant 
committed recent overt acts of violence or attempted substantial physical harm to himself or others.  
 
 
58 Zander, supra note 57 at 508.  
 
 
59 Id. at 518. 
 
 
60 Id. at 518.  
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In contrast to Milwaukee, attorneys in Dane usually cross-examined hospital psychiatrists regarding 
the necessity for involuntary hospitalization.
61
 
   
2.  The Right to Counsel  
 
Studies on procedural due process frequently reported that defense attorneys were young, 
inexperienced and inadequately prepared to defend their clients.  A Massachusetts study found that 
attorneys routinely avoided cross-examining hospital psychiatrists on crucial issues relating to mental 
illness and dangerousness.
62  When attorneys did ask questions, they tended to limit those questions 
to general inquiries regarding the patient’s progress to date, the type of medication administered or 
the patient’s willingness to follow the hospital routine.
63 A similar study, conducted by researchers in 
Iowa, identified structural and nonstructural barriers to effective legal representation.
64  The 
attorneys who volunteered for civil commitment hearings were usually among the least experienced 
members of the local bar, owing in large part to the low payment they could expect to receive.
65
                                                 
61 Id. at 519. 
  In 
 
 
62 David Lelos, Courtroom Observation Study of Civil Commitment, in CIVIL COMMITMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY: AN 
EVALUATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS MENTAL HEALTH REFORM ACT OF 1970 102 (1981).  
 
 
63 Id. at 114; See also Zander supra note 58 at 520 (describing civil commitment hearings in Milwaukee Wisconsin: 
“[t]here are seldom more than two or three questions on cross-examination and these questions seldom challenge the 
substance of the witnesses’ testimonies, but rather tend to reiterate aspects of the testimony least damaging to the 
defendant.”);  Carol Warren, Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short 
Act, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 629 (1977)(“In this court, most of the petitioners were represented by public defenders, who 
generally refrained from vigorous advocacy of their clients’ legal rights under LPS.”); See generally, Elliott Andalman & 
David L. Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey a Polemic and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 
(1974); Jan C. Costello, “Why Would I Need a Lawyer?” Legal Advocacy for People with Mental Disabilities, in LAW, MENTAL 
HEALTH AND MENTAL DISORDERS 15 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman eds. 1996). 
 
 
64 Serena D. Steir & Kurt D. Stoebe, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 
Legislation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1284 (1979). 
 
 
65 Id. at 1393.  
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most counties, attorneys were appointed on the day of the hearing, and in one-third of the cases 
surveyed, attorneys did not meet with their clients until immediately before the hearing.
66 Nor did 
attorneys investigate the facts alleged to justify commitment or seek alternatives to hospitalization.
67
A handful of studies also surveyed attorneys regarding the role of counsel during civil 
commitment proceedings.  Eighty-two percent of attorneys surveyed in Iowa indicated that the role 
of an attorney in a civil commitment proceeding is different from representing other kinds of clients 
since hospitalization might be in their client’s best interests (N=50).
  
68  In North Carolina, 65 percent 
of the attorneys surveyed agreed that their professional obligations in a civil commitment are unique 
since hospitalization may be in their client’s best interests (N=58).
69  In the same way, most 
attorneys felt that the role of an attorney in a civil commitment proceeding should not be the same 
as the role of an attorney in a criminal case, which would include securing the least restrictive 
alternative possible for the client and avoiding confinement.
70  Still, when asked whether the role of 
the attorney in the civil commitment process should be secondary to that of the psychiatrist, almost 
two-thirds of attorneys disagreed, indicating that at least in theory, they were unwilling to defer to 
psychiatrists.
71  In practice, however, researchers found that attorneys rarely challenged medical 
testimony regarding mental illness or dangerousness.
72
                                                 
66 Id. at 1395. 
   
 
 
67 Id.  
 
 
68 Stier & Stoebe, supra note 64 at 1397.  
 
 
69 Virginia Hiday, The Attorney’s Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (1981).  
 
 
70 Id. at 1037.  
 
 
71 Id. at 1038. 
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3.  The Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence  
 
A small number of observational studies collected data on the evidence presented during 
civil commitment proceedings.  For example, a study by Virginia Hiday and Stephen Markell 
analyzed 414 civil commitment hearings in North Carolina.
73  The authors found that threats of 
dangerous behavior (without action) were the most frequently reported dangerous behavior, 
followed by physical attacks, grave disablement and reports of property damage.  The authors also 
estimated the number of cases in which the petitioner established dangerousness to others.  If  
courts were to require proof of dangerousness based on an actual assault or a threat of assault, 
accompanied by action, then only 38.8 percent of the cases surveyed would meet the dangerousness 
requirement.  If courts were to require a recent act of violence, defined as an act or threat within 10 
days of the petition, only 23.9 percent of the cases surveyed would meet the dangerousness 
requirement.
74
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 In a subsequent analysis of the same data, lay examiners estimated the number of 
cases in which courts granted a request for inpatient commitment without at least a preponderance 
72 Id. at 1039. See also Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Representing Respondents under New Civil Commitment Statutes, 5 L & POL’Y. 
Q. 438 (1983); Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Are Lawyers Enemies of Psychiatrists? A Survey of Civil Commitment Counsel and Judges 140 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 323 (1983).  For a similar survey of judges in Wisconsin see Thomas Zander supra note 57.  
 
 
73 Virginia A. Hiday & Stephen J. Markell, Components of Dangerousness: Legal Standards in Civil Commitment, 3 INT’L J. L. 
& PSYCHIATRY 405 (1980); See also Virginia A. Hiday, Application of the Dangerousness Standard in Civil Commitment, 5 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV.  275 (1981).  
 
 
74 Id. at 413; See also Carol A.B. Warren, Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of California’s 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 11 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 629 (1976) (reporting data on evidence presented in civil 
commitment hearings under the Lanterman-Petris Short Act. Warren and her team found that while most patients were 
initially committed because they were a danger to themselves or others, the basis for commitment in habeas proceedings 
was usually “bargained down” to grave disablement.  Moreover the most common pieces of evidence used to 
demonstrate grave disability were prior hospitalization; prior instances of refusing medication;  a denial of mental illness 
and refusal to cooperate in the hospital.); CAROL WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT: MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE 
LAW (1982). 
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of the evidence.
75
 
 The authors selected the preponderance standard, rather than clear and convincing 
evidence, to yield a conservative appraisal of the evidence.  Of the 235 cases in which requests for 
inpatient commitment were granted, 16 of them (6.8 percent) were judged to be based on less than a 
preponderance of the evidence.   
 
4.  The Right to a Neutral Factfinder  
 
Scholars who observed civil commitment hearings in the late 1960s and 70s often described 
the proceedings as “perfunctory” or “a legal charade” in which judges abdicated the role as neutral 
factfinders to clinicians.
76 However, very few studies attempted to quantify judicial deference. In 
contrast to most researchers, an observational study of 454 civil commitment hearings conducted by 
Virginia Hiday reported that judges tended to act independently of clinical recommendations.
77
                                                 
75 Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Court Decisions in Civil Commitment: Independence or Deference? 4 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 159 
(1981). 
  
However as Hiday concedes, the study relied on conservative and somewhat crude measures of 
judicial deference—(i) a hearing lasting less than five minutes; (ii) failure, on the part of the judge, to 
question witnesses regarding mental illness and dangerousness when counsel did not; (iii) judicial 
acceptance of conclusory statements from psychiatrists with no supporting facts; and (iv) 
commitment without a preponderance of evidence, even though Addington  calls for clear and 
convincing evidence.  Commitment hearings were 9.4 minutes on average, longer than the 5 minute 
standard used in the study.  Judges asked at least one question of a witnesses in 16.5% of the cases 
observed when psychiatrists recommended commitment. According to the author, courts 
 
 
76 See, e.g., Fred Cohen, The Function of the Attorney in the Commitment of the Mentally Ill. 44 TEXAS L. REV. 424. (1966); 
Saleem A. Shah, Some Interactions of Law and Mental Health in the Handling of Social Deviance, 23 CATH. L. REV. 674 (1974).  
 
 
77 Virginia Aldigé Hiday, supra note 75. 
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committed respondents based on conclusory psychiatric testimony in less than 1% of cases, and less 
than 10% of civil commitments were based on less than a preponderance of the evidence.    
Other studies examined judicial decision-making by surveying judges and estimating the 
impact of patient characteristics on civil commitment decisions.
 For example a 1986 study by Harold 
Bursztajn and Thomas Gutheil required judges to fill out questionnaires immediately after every civil 
commitment proceeding over which they presided over a four month study period.
  78
The authors hypothesize that psychiatrists only petition for commitment when they are 
confident that success is almost certain.  Judges, in turn, “sense this preselection of committable 
patients, which thus dominates the decision-making process and forecloses the possibility of any 
outcomes other than commitment.”
 In Part 1, 
judges were asked to rate patients on 26 variables using a 7-point scale (e.g. 1=frightening, 7= not 
frightening).   In Part 2 judges weighed the importance of each factor.   In Part 3 judges rated the 
ease with which the decision was reached.  Thirty-five questionnaires were subjected to analysis.  
Judges reported three factors to have the greatest impact on their decisions—(i) whether the 
psychiatrist’s opinion was convincing; (ii) whether the patient would be a reliable outpatient (if not 
hospitalized); and (iii) whether the patient was able to take care of himself or herself.  Almost all of 
the petitions for civil commitment were granted and in most cases, judges reported that their 
decisions were not difficult.   
79
                                                 
78 Harold Bursztajn, Thomas Gutheil, et al., Process Analysis of Judges’ Commitment Decisions: A Preliminary Empirical 
Study, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 170 (1986).  
 Alternatively it may be that judges and psychiatrists rely on 
many of the same factors when making civil commitment decisions. A like-minded argument, 
 
 
79 Id. at 173. 
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advanced by Carol Warren, maintains that judges and psychiatrists share a “commonsense model” or 
“topos of mental illness.”
80
   
   She writes:  
Like the defense attorneys, the  judge of Metropolitan Court acquiesced to the 
topos of madness in his judgment that the persons processed through his court are 
indeed crazy and need help. He was therefore willing to facilitate their continued 
hospitalization when this appeared commonsensically necessary.81
 
  
In contrast to the personnel of Metropolitan Court, who were predominately white and middle to 
upper middle class, habeas petitioners seeking release from civil commitment were largely poor and 
African American or Hispanic. And, as Carol Warren writes, habeas petitioners were markedly 
different in their appearance.  “The woman who wants to be released looks incongruous among the 
business suits and dresses of the court’s center stage. She shuffles to the witness stand, a towel 
wrapped around her head, bedroom slippers flapping on the floor, an old chenille robe.”
82 Warren 
posits that the judge and psychiatrists in Metropolitan Court shared a commonsense model of 
mental illness built around similar indicia.  Moreover these indicia are part of our culture, and as 
labeling theorist Thomas Scheff writes, “later psychiatric or legal models of madness merely add to, 
and do not cancel out, commonsense concepts.”
83
 
   
 
B.  SUMMARY  
 
When Alberta Lessard was taken to a Milwaukee mental health center in October 1972, civil 
commitment decisions were predicated on the “best interests” of the patient.  In the years following 
                                                 
80 CAROL WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT: MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE LAW 138 (1982).  
 
 
81 Id. at 193-94.  
 
 
82 Id. at 13.  
 
 
83 Id. at 139, citing THOMAS SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 87 (1966).  
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Lessard state legislatures attempted to limit intrusions on civil liberties and curb past abuses by 
incorporating greater substantive and procedural due process safeguards into civil commitment 
proceedings. However, early studies on procedural due process found that civil commitment 
hearings were usually too perfunctory to permit more than a cursory weighing of the evidence.  Only 
a small number of studies on procedural due process have been conducted in recent years and most 
have reported similar results. A 1992 study of 100 initial commitment hearings and 183 
recommitment hearings in Virginia found that the average duration of an initial civil commitment 
hearing was 16.5 minutes.
84
In the forty years since Lessard v. Schmidt was decided, the delivery of mental health care in 
the United States has changed dramatically.  During the first half of the twentieth century, large state 
hospitals were the primary source of care for most people with mental illnesses.  By the mid-1950s, 
the emergence of antipsychotic medications and a rising civil libertarian ethos encouraged a shift 
toward community based care.  While some former inpatients did well in the community, many 
others did not.  Instead deinstitutionalization fostered a “revolving door syndrome.”  Patients were 
routinely stabilized in hospitals and released, only to stop taking their medications, decompensate in 
the community and once again require rehospitilization.  Part II turns to Kendra’s Law and the 
assisted outpatient treatment program. 
 The mean duration of a recommitment hearing was only 10.5 minutes. 
Attorneys were also less likely to cross-examine witnesses in recommitment hearings.   
 
II.  KENDRA’S LAW  
 
Kendra’s Law permits outpatient commitment largely on the ground that treatment 
noncompliance has lead to multiple hospitalizations and without a court order the person is likely to 
                                                 
84 Charles D. H. Parry et al., A Comparison of Commitment and Recommitment Hearings: Legal and Policy Implications, 15 
INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 25 (1992).  
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relapse becoming a danger to himself or others.  The result is that the subject of an AOT order can 
be required to comply with outpatient treatment, even though at present, he or she does not meet 
the criteria for inpatient civil commitment in New York—clear and convincing evidence of mental 
illness and “a substantial risk of physical harm to self or others.”
85
 
 When the State Legislature 
enacted Kendra’s Law in 1999, it created a host of procedural due process protections based in large 
part on challenges to inpatient civil commitment.  As a result, Kendra’s Law includes the right to a 
hearing and the right to counsel.  Respondents in AOT proceedings also have the right to be heard 
by a judge. Part II outlines the criteria for issuing AOT order, procedural due process challenges to 
Kendra’s Law and recent research on the AOT program.   
 
A.  MECHANICS  
 
The process for securing an AOT order under Kendra’s Law begins with filing a petition in 
the supreme court of the county in which the subject of the petition is present or believed to be 
present.
86  A valid petition must include an affirmation or an affidavit written by a physician (other 
than the petitioner) who has examined the subject of the petition (the respondent) no more than 10 
days before submitting the petition.
87 The petition must include a written treatment plan, and the 
treatment plan must include case management services or an assertive community treatment team to 
coordinate care.
88
                                                 
85 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.37(a)(1-2) (2006). 
  The treatment plan may include any of the following services—medication; 
periodic blood tests or urinalysis to determine compliance with prescribed medications; counseling 
 
 
86 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (2006). 
 
 
87 Id. § 9.60 (e)(3) (2006). 
 
 
88 Id. § 9.60 (i)(1) (2006).  
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and toxicology screens for patients with a history of substance abuse; individual or group therapy; 
day or partial day programming; educational or vocational training activities; or supervised living 
arrangements.
89 A court may order the respondent to self-administer psychotropic drugs, or accept 
the administration of such drugs by authorized personnel.
90
The petitioner must provide written notice of the petition to the respondent, the director of 
community services and the Mental Hygiene Legal Service.
  However, like most outpatient 
commitment statutes, Kendra’s Law does not authorize forced administration of medication over 
the person’s objection.   
91 The respondent has a right to be 
represented by the Mental Hygiene Legal Service or private counsel during all proceedings.
92  Upon 
receiving a petition, the court must set a date for the hearing within three days.
93
(1) he or she is 18 or older; and  
  The court may 
issue an AOT order if the petitioner provides clear and convincing evidence that the respondent 
meets all of the following criteria:  
(2) suffering from a mental illness; and  
(3) unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision, based on a 
clinical determination; and  
(4) has a history of treatment noncompliance that has:  
i.  been a significant factor leading to hospitalization at least twice 
within the last thirty-six months, or 
ii.  resulted in one or more acts of violent behavior toward self or others 
within the last forty-eight months, or at least a threat or attempt at 
                                                 
89 Id. § 9.60 (a)(1) (2006). 
 
 
90 Id. § 9.60 (h)(i) (2006). 
 
 
91 Id. § 9.60 (f) (2006). 
 
 
92 Id. § 9.60 (g) (2006). 
 
 
93 Id. § 9.60 (h)(1) (2006). 
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serious physical harm to self or others within the last forty-eight 
months; and  
(5) is, as a result of his or her mental illness, unlikely to participate in outpatient 
treatment voluntarily; and  
(6) in view of his or her treatment history and current behavior, is in need of 
assisted outpatient treatment to prevent a relapse or deterioration, which 
would be likely to result in serious harm to others; and  
(7) is likely to benefit from assisted outpatient treatment.
94
 
  
Assisted outpatient treatment must also be the least restrictive form of treatment available.
95 The 
physician who examined the respondent and recommended outpatient treatment must testify in 
person during the hearing.
96  If the subject of the petition meets the criteria for AOT, the court may 
order assisted outpatient treatment for up to one year.
97  No more than 30 days after the court has 
issued an AOT order, the respondent may petition the court for a rehearing and review by a judge or 
jury.
98  Thirty days prior to the expiration of an AOT order, the petitioner may seek continued 
assisted outpatient treatment for up to one year.
99 If an AOT recipient refuses to comply with any 
aspect of an AOT order, and a physician determines that he or she may be in need of involuntary 
hospitalization, the person may be removed from the community by a police officer and detained in 
a hospital for up to 72 hours to determine whether he or she meets the criteria for inpatient civil 
commitment.
100
                                                 
94 Id. § 9.60 (c)(1)–(7) (2006). 
  
 
 
95 Id. § 9.60 (h)(4) (2006).  
 
 
96 Id. § 9.60 (i) (2006).  
 
 
97 Id. § 9.60 (j)(2) (2006). 
 
 
98 Id. § 9.60 (m) (2006).  
 
 
99 Id. § 9.60 (k)(2) (2006).  
 
 
100 Id. § 9.60 (n) (2006).  27 
 
 
B.  DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES  
 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of outpatient commitment.  
However, in Matter of K.L. the highest court in New York held that Kendra’s Law does not violate 
the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution on substantive due process grounds.
101  K.L. 
argued that Kendra’s Law violates due process insofar as it does not require a finding of incapacity 
before a court can order someone to participate in an assisted outpatient treatment plan.  In doing 
so, K.L. relied on Rivers v. Katz, where the Court of Appeals held that a person must lack the capacity 
to make a reasoned treatment decision on his or her own before a court may order antipsychotic 
medications over a person’s objection.
102
K.L. also argued that Kendra’s Law violates procedural due process insofar as it allows a 
physician to remove noncompliant AOT recipients from the community and detain them in a 
hospital for up to 72 hours without notice or a hearing.  When determining whether additional 
procedural due process safeguards are constitutionally required, Matthews v. Eldridge directs courts to 
consider three factors—(i) the private interests that will be affected; (ii) the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (iii) the fiscal and administrative 
burden of additional requirements.
  However, Kendra’s Law does not authorize medication 
over a person’s objection.  Therefore the Court of Appeals held that evidence of incapacity is not 
required before issuing an AOT order.   
103
                                                 
101 In re K.L., 774 N.Y.S.2d 472 (N.Y. 2004). 
  In Matter of K.L. the Court of Appeals held that detention in a 
hospital for up to 72 hours constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty, however, the patient’s 
 
 
102 Id. at 484, citing 67 N.Y.2d. 485 (N.Y. 1986).  
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interests are outweighed by other factors under Matthews, foremost among them the low risk of error 
under the current statutory scheme.  Before a court can issue an AOT order, it must make several 
findings regarding the patient’s ability to survive safely in the community and his or her history of 
treatment noncompliance.  In language echoing Parham v. J.R., the Court of Appeals added: “[n]or is 
a court better situated than a physician to determine whether the grounds for detention—persistent 
noncompliance and the need for involuntary commitment—have been met. A pre-removal hearing 
would therefore not reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.”
104
Aside from the procedural claims raised in Matter of K.L., New York courts have only heard a 
few procedural due process challenges to Kendra’s Law.  Two cases concern the evidentiary 
requirements for issuing an AOT order, while a third concerns the right to assistance from an expert 
witness. In Matter of Jesus A. the respondent moved to dismiss a petition for assisted outpatient 
treatment on the ground that neither the AOT petition nor the physician’s affidavit contained facts 
sufficient to establish that he met the criteria for AOT.
 Finally, the state has a significant 
interest in removing noncompliant patients previously found to be at risk of harming themselves or 
others without treatment. A pre-removal hearing would only reduce the speed with which a 
noncompliant patient can be evaluated. 
105  In an affirmation, without supporting 
facts or documents, the physician stated “[the respondent] has a long history of noncompliance with 
aftercare and follow up medications which led to physically violent behavior” resulting in 
subsequent psychiatric hospitalizations and periods of incarceration.
106
                                                 
104 In re K.L., 774 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (N.Y. 2004). 
  In language drawn directly 
from the statute he added “[the respondent] has a history of lack of compliance with treatment that 
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has resulted in one or more acts of violent behavior toward self or others.”
107
 
 In a sharply worded 
opinion, the trial court held that the allegations contained in the physician’s affidavit were no more 
than conclusions, not facts, and therefore insufficient to state a claim under Kendra’s Law.  
Moreover, the cursory nature of the petition as well as the affirmation impeded the respondent’s 
right to procedural due process.   
The specificity in pleading required under Kendra’s Law is not to be taken 
lightly…. The statutory requirement that facts be alleged to support “petitioner’s 
belief that the person who is the subject of the petition meets each criterion” for 
assisted outpatient treatment speaks not only to due process rights, by such 
specificity enables the respondent to prepare and interpose a defense.108
 
  
The New York Court of Appeals heard a similar case several years later in Matter of Gail R.
109 The 
case began when the Director of Psychiatry at Elmhurst Hospital filed a petition for assisted 
outpatient treatment and the psychiatrist, who examined Gail R., appeared at the AOT hearing as 
the petitioner’s only witness.  Without asking any questions of the physician, the petitioner’s counsel 
rested on the record and the trial court issued the AOT order over the respondent’s objection.  The 
Court of Appeals held that by relying exclusively on the petition and affirmation of the physician 
who examined Gail R., the trial court effectively deprived Gail R. of her right to a hearing in which 
the psychiatrist’s credibility and reasons for recommending AOT could be assessed in court. As the 
Court of Appeals observed, petitions and affirmations are not evidence but rather pleadings which 
point to evidence.  Therefore neither can serve as evidence to authorize AOT.
110
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petitioner failed to elicit testimony from the psychiatrist who examined Gail R., and therefore failed 
to establish that AOT was required by clear and convincing evidence, the case should have been 
dismissed.
  
In a third case, Dolan v. K-W, the respondent moved to dismiss a petition for assisted 
outpatient treatment and asked the trial court to appoint an independent psychiatrist.
111 The case 
began when K.W. contested the renewal of an AOT order.  The respondent argued that even 
though Kendra’s Law does not provide for the appointment of an independent psychiatrist, courts 
have the authority to make that appointment under Section 35 of the Judiciary Law.  Moreover 
“fundamental fairness” requires courts to appoint an independent psychiatrist to be compensated by 
the state when an indigent respondent requests a psychiatrist in an AOT proceeding.
112
Like most outpatient commitment statutes, the procedural due process requirements in 
Kendra’s Law are based on the requirements for inpatient civil commitment.  Courts have yet to 
consider whether fewer procedural safeguards are required for outpatient commitment.    
  The trial 
court easily dismissed the claim on the ground that Section 35 of the Judiciary Law only provides for 
the appointment of a psychiatrist in civil commitment proceedings to commit or retain a person in a 
state institution as an inpatient.   
 
 
C.  PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION  
 
According to the New York State Office of Mental Health, courts have issued 10,733 AOT 
orders since the program began in November 1999.
113
                                                 
111 950 N.Y.S.2d. 419 (Sup. Ct. 2012).  
  Sixty-six percent of AOT recipients are male, 
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48 percent of AOT recipients are white, 21 percent are African American and 30 percent are 
Hispanic.
114  Three-quarters of AOT recipients have a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 19 percent have 
been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and 43 percent have a co-occurring alcohol or substance 
abuse disorder.
115
When the State Legislature reauthorized Kendra’s Law in 2005, it also commissioned an 
independent evaluation of the AOT program.  Researchers found that the majority of AOT cases 
(70 percent) are concentrated in New York City and the vast majority of AOT petitions (84 percent) 
are filed before the subject of the petition has been discharged from the hospital.
       
116  Key informant 
interviews revealed that hospitals in the New York City region tend to use the AOT program as a 
discharge plan for hospitalized patients and voluntary agreements as a pathway out of AOT, a 
pattern described by researchers as the “AOT First” model.
117
The reauthorization study also included reporting on regional variations in AOT hearings 
across the state.  In some counties one judge presided over all AOT hearings.  In other counties, 
  Hospitals usually cited liability 
concerns as an important rationale.  AOT recipients also have priority for housing and scarce mental 
health services.  In other counties, largely outside of New York City, enhanced voluntary agreements 
were used as a trial period before initiating a formal AOT order—the “EVS First” model.  In 
upstate New York, EVS First was thought to be the least restrictive alternative.  In downstate New 
York, the AOT First model was usually considered the least restrictive alternative. 
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http://bi.omh.state.ny.us/aot/characteristics (last visited April 23, 2013). 
 
 
115 Id.  
 
 
116 Martin S. Swartz, Henry J. Steadman, & John Monahan, NEW YORK STATE ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 
PROGRAM EVALUATION, 6, http://www.omh.ny.gov (2009) (last visited Sept. 2, 2012). 
 
 
117 Id. at 5.  
 
 32 
 
AOT hearings were rotated among several judges. Some counties reported that they do not require 
the treating psychiatrist to testify in court if the respondent does not contest the petition, even 
though the letter of Kendra’s Law clearly states that a physician who recommends AOT must testify 
in person, without distinction between contested and uncontested hearings.  Through interviews 
with MHLS attorneys, Pamela Robbins and colleagues found that perceptions of attorney role also 
appear to vary by region: “In some counties, the attorneys viewed AOT as the least restrictive 
alternative to hospitalization and as a gateway to receipt of needed community services.”
118 In other 
counties, “attorneys viewed their role as adversarial with respect to the AOT petitioners, 
representing their clients’ own wishes rather than the client’s ‘best interests’ per se, as defined by 
clinicians or family members.”
119
Researchers  surveyed 211 AOT recipients regarding their perceptions of coercion and 
procedural justice in the AOT program. The study measured coercion on 5-item scale, with 
responses ranging from 1 to 5, from strongly agree to strongly disagree.  Sample items included: “It 
was my idea to get treatment” and “I felt free to do what I wanted about getting treatment.”
 
120
                                                 
118 Pamela Clark Robbins, Regional Differences in New York’s Assisted Outpatient Treatment Program, 61 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 974 (2010).  
 AOT 
recipients reported moderate levels of coercion (M=2.76; SD=.96).  AOT recipients were also asked 
to report their perceptions of procedural justice on 6-item scale.  For example: “When you received 
the AOT court order, did you have enough opportunity to tell the court or treatment provider what 
you think they need to hear about your personal and legal situation?” “When you received the AOT 
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court order, did they treat you respectfully?”
121 “Are you satisfied with how they treat you and deal 
with your case?”
122
 
  Responses were measured on a 3-point scale—ranging from “not at all” to 
“somewhat” and “definitely”—with higher scores reflecting greater perceived procedural justice.  
When compared to their counterparts who had not recently participated in the AOT program, 
current AOT recipients had more favorable perceptions of procedural justice (M=1.96 vs. 
SD=1.80).   
D.  SUMMARY  
 
The 2005 reauthorization study provided valuable information on the assisted outpatient 
treatment program.  We know that most petitions for assisted outpatient treatment are concentrated 
in New York City and hospitals tend to use AOT as a discharge plan.  We also know that at least 
some AOT recipients perceive the program to be non-coercive, and at least when compared to their 
counterparts, AOT recipients have favorable perceptions of procedural justice, including perhaps a 
favorable perception of AOT hearings.   
While the reauthorization study greatly advanced our understanding of the AOT program, it 
also left other questions unanswered, for example—how do courts determine whether someone 
meets the criteria for AOT and how much do they rely on clinical recommendations? Moreover 
what constitutes “clear and convincing evidence” that a person meets the criteria for assisted 
outpatient treatment as required by law? The reauthorization study reported broad upstate-
downstate variations in perceptions of attorney role, although other researchers argue that even 
within the New York City region, attorneys who represent people with mental illnesses in AOT 
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proceedings have very different views of client advocacy.
 123
 
 In light of this controversy, this study 
surveyed MHLS attorneys in the First and Second Department on their perceptions of the AOT 
program, AOT hearings and their professional obligations to their clients.   
 
III.  METHODS  
 
A.  DATA COLLECTION  
 
1.  Courtroom Observation  
 
Data collection for this study began by observing AOT hearings in Manhattan, the Bronx, 
Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island.  Data collection included hearing location, hearing duration, 
arguments raised by the attorney for the petitioner, defenses raised by counsel for the respondent 
and the decision rendered by the judge.  All items were recorded on a 35-item checklist designed for 
the study (Appendix 1).  The checklist was pretested on 20 AOT hearings in the Bronx and revised 
before data collection began in June 2010.  One hundred eighty five hearings were observed by the 
author between June 2010 and September 2011.
124
 
   
2.  Participant Interviews  
 
Following the courtroom observation period, judges and attorneys were asked to participate 
in a semi-structured interview conducted by the author.  Interview participants were identified 
through courtroom observation, the New York State Office of Court Administration, the Mental 
Hygiene Legal Service, and snowball sampling.  Inclusion criteria for the study required judges and 
                                                 
123 Jeffrey Swanson, What Would Mary Douglass Do? A Commentary on Kahan et al., “Cultural Cognition and Public Policy: 
The Case of Outpatient Commitment Laws” 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 176 (2010).  
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attorneys to have participated in at least 10 AOT hearings in order to be eligible for an interview.  
All who responded were eligible.  Inclusion criteria were ascertained through self report.  
Interviews were conducted in person or by telephone if a face-to-meeting meeting was 
infeasible. Judge and attorney interview questions were pretested on 5 attorneys and revised before 
participant interviews began in October 2010. Interviews were conducted through November 2011 
and generally lasted 45 to 60 minutes. MHLS attorneys in the First and Second Department were 
asked to describe their preparation for AOT hearings, their perceptions of AOT hearings and their 
professional obligations to their clients.   Judges were asked to describe their preparation for AOT 
hearings, how they define clear and convincing evidence, and how they determine whether someone 
meets the criteria for AOT (Appendix 2).  Interviews were audio recorded with the consent of the 
participant and transcribed in full.  If participants declined to be recorded, the author took notes by 
hand, using quotation marks to identify verbatim responses.  AOT recipients and psychiatrists were 
not interviewed due to restrictions imposed by the New York City Health and Hospitals 
Corporation.  This study was approved by the Harvard University Committee on the Use of Human 
Subjects.   
 
B.  DATA ANALYSIS  
 
Interview transcripts and hearing observations were analyzed using thematic content 
analysis. Thematic content analysis enables researchers to translate qualitative information into 
quantitative data by identifying recurring patterns or “themes” within a qualitative data set.
125
                                                 
125 RICHARD E. BOYATZIS, TRANSFORMING QUALITATIVE INFORMATION, 14 (1998).  
 Data 
analysis began by developing a preliminary set of codes and coding a sample of AOT hearing 
observations.  After refining, adding, subtracting and splitting potential codes, the author developed 
a final coding manual and coded each AOT hearing observation.    
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AOT hearing observations were analyzed for patterns in the evidence presented by 
petitioners and arguments raised by defense attorneys.  In contrast to previous research in this area, 
this study did not attempt to determine the fraction of cases in which the petitioner presented clear 
and convincing evidence as determined by an external examiner.  Instead the study identified factors 
constitutive of clear and convincing evidence by isolating cases in which AOT petitions were 
granted and systematically identifying themes in the evidence presented by petitioners.   
 
 
IV.  RESULTS  
 
A.  AOT HEARINGS  
 
1.  Uncontested Hearings  
 
Of the 185 AOT hearings observed by the author, the majority were uncontested (73.5 
percent) (Table 1).  Uncontested hearings follow a predictable pattern.  On the day of the hearing, 
the petitioner will call the psychiatrist to the stand.  The petitioner will ask the respondent to 
stipulate to the psychiatrist’s qualifications as an expert in the field of psychiatry, and after laying a 
foundation, the petitioner will ask the court to admit the respondent’s medical records into evidence.  
The petitioner will then ask the psychiatrist a few simple questions: (1) “Are you familiar with the 
respondent?” (2) “Have you examined the respondent in connection with AOT?” (3)“In your 
opinion does the respondent meet the criteria for the assisted outpatient treatment program?” When 
hearings are uncontested, psychiatrists usually provide a simple yes or no to most questions and list 
the elements of the treatment plan for the record.   
In all of the hearings observed, an attorney from the Mental Hygiene Legal Service 
represented the respondent.  If the hearing was uncontested, the respondent’s attorney did not 
cross-examine the psychiatrist.  Instead he or she asked a few simple questions of the client on direct 
examination: (1) “Has the treatment plan been explained to you?” (2) “Do you understand what you 37 
 
are required to do?” (3) “Do  you understand what will happen if you do not comply with the plan?” 
Respondents  usually indicated that if they did not comply with treatment, they could be taken back 
to the hospital.  Respondents testified in 36 uncontested hearings (26.5 percent).  Across all 
boroughs the average duration of an uncontested hearing was 2.67 minutes (SD = 2.59) (Table 1).   
 
 
2.  Contested Hearings  
 
Of the 185 AOT hearings observed, 49 (26.5 percent) were contested (Table 1).  Of those 
contested hearings, 42 were renewal hearings (85.7 percent).  In 7 contested hearings, the petitioner 
presented an initial application for assisted outpatient treatment (14.2 percent). Across all boroughs, 
the average duration of a contested AOT hearing was 18.29 minutes (SD = 11.02) with the longest 
hearing lasting 49 minutes and the shortest contested hearing lasting only 4 minutes.  Respondents 
testified in 37 contested hearings (75.5 percent).  
 
a.  Evidence  
 
Table 2 describes the evidence presented in 48 hearings where a petition for assisted 
outpatient treatment was contested and granted.  The evidence presented in these cases suggests that 
courts are persuaded by the following factors: (1) a history of treatment noncompliance (2) clinical 
testimony regarding poor insight into mental illness or the need for treatment; (3) a history of harm 
to self or others; and (4) evidence of substance abuse.  Nothing in this study should be interpreted 
to suggest that evidence in each of these categories is necessary or sufficient to establish clear and 
convincing evidence.  Rather the tendency to provide evidence of this kind suggests that these facts 
tend to establish clear and convincing evidence in the mind of the factfinder.   
In a large majority of cases (75 percent) the AOT Team psychiatrist testified that the 
respondent either had not, or would not, comply with treatment, either because he or she failed to 
attend several days of a court ordered day program or refused to take one or more court ordered 38 
 
medications.  In a handful of cases, respondents simply stated that they would not take their 
medications. In other cases, psychiatrists testified that while the respondent had been compliant with 
his or her medications for a few weeks or a few months, the respondent also had a long history of 
treatment noncompliance.  A few weeks of compliance could not guarantee that the respondent 
would continue to do so in the future.   
In a little more than half of the  contested cases observed (52.1 percent) a psychiatrist 
testified that the respondent lacked insight into his or her mental illness or the need for treatment.  
Psychiatrists often testified that the respondent did not believe he has a mental illness, the 
respondent acknowledges the symptoms of a mental illness, but attributes them to something other 
than mental illness, or the respondent acknowledges the benefits of medication, but continues to 
believe that he does not have a mental illness.  In 41 percent of the cases observed, a psychiatrist 
testified that the respondent was at risk of harming himself or others.  Evidence in this category 
included a history of aggression, threats to harm others, suicide attempts and suicidal ideation.  In a 
sizeable number  of cases (27.1 percent) a psychiatrist testified that the respondent’s clinical 
presentation became worse in the presence of cannabis or alcohol.  Part IV.B.2 below discusses 
subjective factors influencing AOT decisions such as the credibility of an expert witness and the 
quality of the testimony from the respondent.   
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS: CONTESTED AND UNCONTESTED AOT HEARINGS (N=185) 
    * Missing Data 
 
 
 
 
 
   
MANHATTAN 
 
BRONX 
 
QUEENS 
 
BROOKLYN 
 
STATEN 
ISLAND 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
CONTESTED   
HEARINGS  
n  = 16 
 n     (%) 
n = 4 
n (%) 
n = 14 
n    (%) 
n = 12 
 n    (%) 
n = 3 
n (%) 
n = 49 
n   (%) 
             
No. of Hearings  
Observed   16   (32.7)  4    (8.2)  14  (28.6)  12    (24.5)  3   (6.1)  49 
             
Location              
    Hospital      16   (32.7)      4    (8.2)        0        0        0    20   (40.8) 
    Courthouse         0      0      14   (28.6)      12    (24.6)        3   (6.1)    29   (59.2) 
             
Initial Hearing         1    (2.0)      1    (2)        2   (4.1)        3    (6.1)        0     7    (14.3) 
Renewal Hearing       14*   (93.8)      3    (75)      12   (85.7)        9    (75)        3   (100)   41    (84.7) 
                 
Decision       15   (93.8)      4    (100)      14   (100)      12    (100)        3   (100)   48    (98) 
Grant        5    (31.3)      2    (50)        3   (21.4)        0        0     8    (16.3) 
   With revisions      10    (62.5)      3    (75)      11   (78.6)      12    (100)        3   (100)   40    (81.6) 
   Without    
   revisions  
     1    (6.3)      0        0        0        0     1    (2.0) 
Deny        5    (31.3)      0        2   (14.3)      12    (100)        0   19    (38.8) 
Basis Stated       5    (31.3)      2    (50)        2   (14.3)      12    (100)        0   21    (42.9) 
             
Hearing Duration 
 
      14.69 
(SD =11.03) 
      20.75 
(SD =19.72) 
        19.07 
   (SD =9.56) 
      21.67 
(SD =12.37) 
        17 
(SD =12.37) 
     18.29 
(SD =11.02) 
             
 
UNCONTESTED  
HEARINGS  
n  = 66 
n (%) 
n = 31 
n (%) 
n = 8 
n (%) 
n = 30 
n (%) 
n = 1 
n (%) 
n = 136 
n (%) 
             
No. of Hearings  
Observed   66   (48.5)  31   (22.8)  8   (5.9)  30   (22.1)  1   (0.7)  136 
             
Location              
   Hospital    66    (100)    31   (100)        5   (62.5)        0        0   102   (75) 
   Courthouse       0      0        3   (37.5)      30   (100)        1   (100)     34   (25) 
             
Initial Hearing       7    (10.6)      1   (3.2)        5   (62.5)        2   (6.7)        0     15   (11) 
Renewal Hearing     21    (31.8)    20   (64.5)        3   (37.5)      14   (46.7)        1   (100)     59   (43.4) 
Not Specified     34    (56)    10   (32.2)        0      14   (46.7)        0     61   (44.9) 
Not Recorded      4    (6.0)      0        0        2   (6.7)        0       1   (0.73) 
   
Decision  
           
    Grant              
     With revisions    66    (100)    31   (100)        8   (100)      30    (100)        1   (100)    136  (100) 
     Without    
     revisions  
   0      0        0        0        0        0 
    Deny      0      0        0        0        0        0 
Basis Stated     0      0        0      30    (100)        0      30  (22.6) 
             
Hearing Duration        1.88 
(SD = 1.60) 
      2.81 
(SD=1.45) 
       4.75 
  (SD=1.04) 
        3.70 
   (SD=4.31) 
        6.00 
  (SD=4.31) 
      2.67 
 (SD=2.59) 40 
 
TABLE 2. EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN CONTESTED AOT HEARINGS 
WHERE ORDER WAS GRANTED (N=48) 
 
 
a.  Defense Counsel Activity  
 
Table 3 summarizes defense counsel activity in 49 hearings where a petition for assisted 
outpatient treatment was either granted or denied.  Very few attorneys argued that their clients were 
not mentally ill (8.16 percent).  Instead attorneys were more likely to challenge the petitioner’s 
assertion that their clients were unlikely to participate in outpatient treatment voluntarily (61.2 
 
 
 
MANHATTAN 
 
BRONX  
 
  QUEENS 
 
BROOKLYN 
 
STATEN 
ISLAND 
TOTAL 
 
EVIDENCE FOR AOT  n  = 15 
n    (%) 
n = 4 
n (%) 
n = 14 
n (%) 
n = 12 
n (%) 
n = 3 
n (%) 
n = 48 
n (%) 
Diagnosis              
Schizophrenia        8    (53)      1   (25)     6   (42.9)     3   (25)     2   (66.7)   20   (40.8) 
Schizoaffective Disorder       3    (20.0)      1   (25)     6   (42.9)     4   (33.3)     1   (33.3)   15   (30.6) 
Substance Abuse Disorder       0      1   (25)     6   (42.9)     4   (33.3)     0   11   (22.4) 
Bipolar Disorder       2    (13.0)      0     2   (12.3)     5   (41.7)     0     9   (18.8) 
Depression        1    (6.7)      2   (50)     0     0     0     0 
Personality Disorder        0      0     1   (7.14)     0     0     1   (2.08) 
             
Risk Factors Indicating 
Need for AOT 
           
Lacks stable residence        3    (20.0)      0     1   (7.14)     0     2   (66.7)    6    (12.5) 
Poor self care        1    (6.7)      0     1   (7.14)     0     0    2    (4.2) 
Poor insight        7    (46.7)      1   (25)     4   (28.6)   10   (83.3)     2   (66.7)   25   (52.1) 
Substance abuse        2    (13.3)      1   (25)     4   (28.6)     4   (33.3)     2   (66.7)   13   (27.1) 
Medication noncompliant      10    (66.7)      4   (100)   12   (85.7)     7   (58.3)     3   (100)   36   (75) 
Removal order        1    (6.7)      0     2   (12.3)     1   (8.3)     0     5   (10.4) 
Hospitalization during AOT        2    (13.0)      0     5   (35.7)     0     0     7   (14.6) 
Harm to others        4    (26.7)      3   (75)     3   (21.4)     2   (16.7)     1   (33.3)   13   (27.1) 
Harm to self        3    (20.0)      0     2   (12.3)     2   (16.7)     0     7   (25) 
              
Likely Benefit              
Previous benefit        5    (33.3)      1   (25)     4   (28.6)     4   (33.3)     0   15   (31.3) 
Maintain respondent in the 
community   
     1    (6.7)      0     5   (35.7)     2   (16.7)     0     8   (16.7) 
Improve treatment compliance        4    (26.7)      2   (50)     5   (35.7)     5   (41.7)     0   16   (33.3) 
Improve coping skills        0      0     0     4   (33.3)     0     4   (8.3) 
Improve insight       0      0     0     6   (50)     0     6   (12.5) 
Witness affirms without stating  
facts  
   10    (66.7)      1   (25)     6   (42.9)     3   (25)     3   (100)   23   (47.1) 
                 
Least Restrictive   
    Alternative  
           
Maintain respondent in the   
   community   
     0      0     3   (21.4)     0     0     3   (6.25) 
Witness affirms without 
  stating facts  
   15    (100)      4   (100)     7   (50)   12  (100)     3  (100)   41   (85.4) 
             
Other Testimony               
Mostly compliant with AOT       3   (20)      0     1   (7.14)    2   (16.7)     0     6   (12.5) 41 
 
percent).  To that end, attorneys cross-examined psychiatrists with questions designed to elicit 
evidence that their clients were compliant with court orders, except perhaps for a few missed doses 
of  medication or  a few missed appointments with their treatment team (14.3 percent).  Nor was it 
uncommon for attorneys to point to the side effects of a particular medication as a reason for 
noncompliance (18.4 percent).  
 
TABLE 3. DEFENSE COUNSEL ACTIVITY CONTESTED AOT HEARINGS (N=49) 
                           
 
In almost half of the contested cases observed, attorneys challenged the petitioner’s claim 
that their clients were unlikely to survive safely in the community (40.8 percent) or needed AOT in 
order to prevent a relapse which would be likely to result in serious harm to others (53.1 percent).  
Attorneys usually presented evidence that their clients were able to stay out of the hospital, work or 
attend school.  In 56.4 percent of the cases observed, a psychiatrist testified that the respondent 
 
 
MANHATTAN  
n  = 16  
n (%) 
 
BRONX  
n = 4 
n (%) 
 
QUEENS  
n = 14 
n (%) 
 
BROOKLYN  
n = 12 
n (%) 
 
STATEN 
ISLAND 
n = 3 
n (%) 
 
TOTAL 
n = 49 
n (%) 
 
 
AOT CRITERIA              
Mental illness          0   1   (25)   2   (14.3)   1   (14.3)  0    4   (8.16) 
Unlikely to survive safely 
   in the community         5    (31.25)   4   (100)   6   (42.9)   5   (41.7)  0  20   (40.8) 
Noncompliance led to 2 or  
   more hospitalizations          1    (6.25)  0  0  0  0    1   (2) 
Noncompliance led to 1 or  
   more acts of violence          0  0  0  0  0    0 
 Unlikely to participate in 
    treatment voluntarily          9    (56.25)   1   (25)   7   (50)   11   (91.7)  2  (66.7)  30   (61.2) 
Needs AOT to prevent  
    relapse or deterioration        10    (62.5)   3   (75)   6   (42.9)     6   (50)  1  (33.3)  26   (53.1) 
Likely benefit          1    (6.25)   2   (50)   4   (28.6)          0  0    7   (14.3) 
Least restrictive alternative          3    (18.8)        0   4   (28.6)     5   (41.7)  0  12   (24.5) 
             
OTHER ARGUMENTS               
Compliant with AOT          2    (12.5)        0   2   (50)     3   (25)  0    7   (14.3) 
Evidence of good mental    
    health           0   1   (25)   5   (35.7)     1   (14.3)  0    7   (14.3) 
Medication side effects          3    (18.8)        0   2   (50)     4   (33.3)  0    9   (18.4) 
Medication adjustment          2    (12.5)        0   0     2   (16.7)  0    4   (8.16) 
Insufficient evaluation          0        0   1   (7.14)     1   (14.3)  0    2   (4.08) 
AOT interferes with 
   work or school          0  1   (25)   0     1  (14.3)  0    2   (4.08) 42 
 
lacked insight into his or her mental illness or the need for treatment.  In most of those cases, 
attorneys responded by asking their clients to describe the symptoms of their illness and their plans 
to continue treatment.  For example:  
 
ATTORNEY: Do you believe you have a mental illness?  
RESPONDENT: Yes.  
ATTORNEY: And what is the diagnosis that you have been given?  
RESPONDENT: Well, schizophrenia and they say bipolar disorder… 
ATTORNEY: Okay. What sort of symptoms do you suffer from when you  
  are not well?  
RESPONDENT: Well, I get shaky. I get frustrated. Sometimes I get  
  agitated. I start to walk out of the house and start to, you know, wander  
  around… I just stop being myself.  I start thinking differently…. 
ATTORNEY: When you are having problems with the medications, do you  
  ever just stop taking them now?  
      RESPONDENT: No. I talk to my counselor.  I talk to my ICM worker.…126
 
  
 
b.  Disposition  
 
Courts granted the petitioner’s request for assisted outpatient treatment in 48 of the 49 
contested cases observed (98 percent).  In 9 of the 48 cases, courts granted the petitioner’s request, 
but reduced the duration of the treatment order by 56 percent from 6 months to 3.3 months on 
average.  Judges reduced the length of an AOT order for a few reasons—(i) aside from an 
unauthorized absence or an unauthorized disappearance, the respondent had been compliant with 
treatment, (ii) the respondent acknowledged his or her mental illness, but disliked his or her 
psychiatrist or objected to visits from a case manager; and (iii) the respondent complained about the 
side effects of his or her medications—including substantial weight gain, nausea, and fatigue—and 
the side effects of these medications interfered with work or school.    
In 1 of the 49 contested AOT cases observed, the court denied the AOT petition outright.   
The petitioner asked the court to renew the respondent’s AOT order for an additional 6 months.  
                                                 
126 Transcript of AOT Hearing (August 4, 2010)(on file with author).  
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According to the psychiatrist, the respondent told him that he does not have a mental illness.  In his 
opinion, the respondent would not take his medications without a court order, although he had 
done well in the AOT program.  Without AOT, the respondent’s prognosis would be poor due to 
bipolar disorder.  The respondent was able to clarify his statements in court.  As he spoke, the judge 
nodded sympathetically:  
 
RESPONDENT:   He asked me, “why are you taking lithium?” I said that it’s part  
    of the court order. If you had asked me “do I have a problem?” I  
    would have said “yeah.”  
 
During her cross-examination of the psychiatrist, defense counsel was also able to elicit 
favorable testimony on her client’s behalf.  The respondent was able to stay out of the hospital for 
12 months, even though he was not taking his medications.  The respondent also added that he 
would take his medications without a court order: “The people I live with would make sure I take it. 
I don’t think I need AOT.” 
 
 
B. INTERVIEWS  
 
When participant interviews began in October 2010, approximately 35 judges presided over 
AOT hearings in Manhattan, the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island and 30 attorneys from 
the Mental Hygiene Legal Service (MHLS) represented the respondents. All were invited to 
participate in an interview.  Of them 13 judges (37 percent) and 20 attorneys (66 percent) met the 
inclusion criteria for the study and agreed to be interviewed. The study sample included 10 MHLS 
attorneys and 7 judges from the First Judicial Department and 10 MHLS attorneys and 6 judges 
from the Second Judicial Department. Defense attorneys were predominately white and female with 
5.9 years of experience representing people in AOT hearings on average. Judges were predominately 
white and male with 4.4 years of presiding over AOT hearings on average.  Part IV.B.1. below 
presents key themes emerging attorney interviews followed by interviews with judges in Part IV.B.2. 44 
 
1.  Attorneys  
 
Defense attorneys underscored their professional obligation to advocate for their clients 
zealously and to the full extent of the law.  However, attorneys also reported that AOT hearings can 
be hard to win for a few reasons, ranging from facts adverse to their clients to a dearth of favorable 
expert testimony and judicial attitudes toward the mentally ill.  
 
 
a.  Impediments to Effective Advocacy  
 
i.  History of Treatment Noncompliance  
 
AOT Recipients tend to have a long history of treatment noncompliance.  According to the 
New York State Office of Mental Health, the vast majority of AOT recipients have had at least one 
psychiatric hospitalization prior to AOT (70 percent) with 3.4 psychiatric hospitalizations on 
average.
127  A smaller fraction have also been incarcerated (15 percent) or homeless (18 percent).
128
                                                 
127NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT REPORTS, 
http://bi.omh.state.ny.us/aot/statistics (last visited April 23, 2013). 
  
According to some attorneys courts tend to assume that if their clients are doing well, and he or she 
has not been hospitalized for a year, AOT must be the reason.  A principal attorney in the Second 
Department remarked: “The attitude is ‘this program is working.  See? The person was hospitalized 
five times and now AOT comes in and they haven’t been hospitalized since, so obviously they need 
AOT.’ That’s how the connection is drawn” (Attorney 4).  The same attorney explained that his 
office spends a lot of time trying to break that connection by demonstrating that their clients have 
developed insight into the seriousness of their mental illness and the need for treatment.  “Really, 
practically, the only way you can expect to win a hearing is if your client is going to get up and testify 
 
 
128 Id. 
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with insight that they know they have a mental illness and they know they need the medication” 
(Attorney 4).  
 
 
ii.  Expert Testimony  
 
Many attorneys (5 of 19) noted that AOT hearings are particularly difficult to win without 
expert testimony.  Part of the problem stems from the criteria for issuing an AOT order. For 
example, section 9.60(5) of Kendra’s Law requires clear and convincing evidence that “as a result of 
his or her mental illness” the respondent is unlikely to participate in outpatient treatment 
voluntarily.
129  Section 9.60(1) requires evidence that the respondent is “unlikely to survive safely in 
the community.”
130
                                                 
129 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(5) (2006). 
  As one attorney remarked “That’s pure opinion. There’s no fact…[Judge X] is 
always going to side with the doctor and that’s part of the problem” (Attorney 4).  Attorney 4 
explained that the only way to win an AOT hearing before Judge X is to win on a technicality, for 
example, the patient was hospitalized three times in the past three years, but not within the required 
time frame.  In other boroughs, attorneys doubted that expert testimony would help, since 
independent clinical witnesses are also reluctant to release people with mental illnesses into the 
community without supervision. Although in theory, defense attorneys could invite a court-
appointed psychiatrist to testify for them, appointed psychiatrists are employed by the Office of 
Court Administration with a professional responsibilities to the court, rather than MHLS clients.  
And as one attorney put it, “[y]ou can’t doctor shop” (Attorney 10).  Instead MHLS attorneys are 
required to select expert witnesses from a list, whether that particular clinician would be a good fit 
for their client or not. 
 
 
130 Id. § 9.60(1) (2006).  
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Attorneys also indicated that judicial reliance on expert testimony may be faulty in one 
further respect—in most cases, the psychiatrist who has been designated to testify on behalf of the 
AOT Team has not provided services to the respondent and has had no other interaction with the 
respondent aside from the AOT evaluation. The average AOT evaluation lasts from 15 or 30 
minutes to an hour.  AOT evaluations are also few and far between—once before AOT recipients 
are discharged from the hospital into the community and again when the Director of Community 
Services requests a renewal order.  As a result, at least some attorneys (4 of 20) felt that testifying 
psychiatrists don’t always know as much as they should about their clients, how they have fared in 
the community since the initial court order or the day to day requirements of the treatment plan.   
 
   
iii.  Judicial Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill  
 
Many attorneys (5 of 20) indicated that judicial attitudes toward people with mental illnesses 
and the assisted outpatient treatment program also make it difficult to win cases.  As one attorney 
said, judges tend to think that people with mental illnesses are all “crazy” and “nuts” because “every 
once in a while some guy goes on a rampage and does something terrible” (Attorney 1).  Nor do 
judges see much downside in granting AOTs.  “They figure. What is the harm? The person is going 
to be provided with services.  It’s protecting the community should anything happen” (Attorney 13).   
A handful of attorneys in both Judicial Departments also reported that judges do not credit 
their client’s testimony (3 of 20):  
 
ATTORNEY: One of the other major problems with AOT is that the client’s testimony 
means nothing. It’s not given any credit or any weight.   
 
INTERVIEWER: How can you tell that the judge is not taking that into account?  
 
ATTORNEY: Because they’ll say things off the record about it which you don’t see in the 
transcripts or after they’ll ask us. “Did that really happen?” or “Is what they’re saying 
really true?… I mean we see the same judge every week so we’re friendly with them, you 
know?...[A] hearing is not necessarily always the real deal.  Like it’s not always what 
really happened because it’s about fighting as to what evidence gets in or not.  So judges 47 
 
know that they’re not hearing the whole story most of the time.  Usually they’ll ask you 
after “What really happened?” 
 
 
iv.  Medicalization of Deviance  
 
Some attorneys felt that their clients are held to a high standard since the people around 
them—usually family members or providers—are likely to interpret any problems they might have  
as a symptom of mental illness. “If a sibling gets into a fight with another sibling, that can be 
deemed a symptom of decompensation,” one attorney said (Attorney 7).  Moreover “it’s not unusual 
for people to carry weapons or feel the need to carry weapons because of gang violence,” but if 
someone in the AOT program is carrying a weapon, “red flags go up” (Attorney 7).   In the same 
way, attorneys noted that families sometimes call 911 inappropriately.   
 
 
b.  Attorney Role: Zealous Advocacy or Best Interests?  
 
The vast majority of petitions for assisted outpatient treatment are uncontested, but when 
their clients ask them to challenge AOT, attorneys uniformly underscored their professional 
obligation to do so zealously and without taking the position that AOT is in their client’s “best 
interests” (20 of 20). “For myself and I know most of the people at MHLS, I mean our belief is that 
we’re representing what our client wants regardless of whether we might personally feel that 
something else might be better for them” (Attorney 19).  Nor were there noticeable differences 
across boroughs.   
When their clients object to AOT, attorneys also reported that an important part of their job 
involves counseling their clients on the likelihood of success and negotiating a compromise with the 
AOT Team.  
I’m very honest with my clients.  I try to work with them.  I will meet with them 
alone and say “This is your history. This is all going to come out in court…If you 
feel strongly that the medication doesn’t work for you, we’ll tell the judge” But I 
work with them. We go through it—the pros and the cons…Sometimes Dr. [X] 48 
 
wants 12 months. They don’t want anything.  When we meet in the AOT exams we 
negotiate. (Attorney 10).   
 
Attorneys felt strongly that they have a professional obligation to advance the best possible 
arguments on behalf of their clients, although a small number conceded they are more restrained in 
their arguments when the facts are not on their side (3 of 20).  As one attorney said “I need to 
maintain my credibility for the one million other clients I handle” (Attorney 5).  Others are 
demoralized by the daily toll of arguing zealously for their clients, knowing full well that the judge 
almost never rules in their favor: “I just feel it’s a losing battle and I’m there as a shadow, my client’s 
shadow” (Attorney 9).    
 
 
2.  JUDGES  
 
a.  Deciding AOT Hearings  
 
By law a person seeking assisted outpatient treatment must submit a petition to the supreme 
court of the county in which the respondent is located or believed to be located.  However, nearly all 
judges (12 of 13) reported that they usually do not read AOT petitions before the hearing.  Judges 
stated that they usually don’t read petitions in advance for a few reasons—(i) most of the petition is 
a pro forma recitation of the criteria for AOT; (ii) AOT attorneys usually elicit pertinent facts from 
their witnesses on direct examination; (iii) if the respondent does not appear in court, the hearing 
may be adjourned; and (iv) by law the date of the hearing must be no more than 3 days from the day 
the petition was received by the court, leaving judges with little time for reading.  Instead judges 
usually read petitions on the bench while listening to testimony.   
Judges also indicated that AOT decisions are largely based on evidence presented during the 
hearing.  Reported influences on AOT decision-making were centered around four themes—(i) the 
heavy weight attached to expert testimony; (ii) the possibility of harm to others; (iii) the endless 
revolving door of hospital admissions; and (iv) the liberty interests of AOT recipients.   49 
 
 
i.  Expert Testimony  
 
Many judges reported that they rely on clinical recommendations particularly when the 
clinician has appeared before them in prior hearings and established a reputation for credibility.  
“This is a field, and I’d like to think all the other judges have said this too, or admitted this, that 
quite honestly, it’s heavily weighted in favor of medical testimony,” one judge explained (Judge 8).  
To that end expert witnesses generally perform two functions during AOT hearings.  The first is 
simply to educate the court on unfamiliar diagnoses and medications.  The second is to provide a 
clinical recommendation regarding the necessity of assisted outpatient treatment.  In doing so judges 
are particularly attuned to how doctors answer questions on cross examination and whether their 
answers are credible.  As one judge commented: “I rely heavily on what the doctor says, meaning 
everything the  doctor says, so if this is a contested AOT obviously that includes the doctor’s 
responses to cross-examination questions” (Judge 8).   
Some judges (3 of 13) explained that while they are willing to modify AOT orders based on 
the “legitimate concerns” of AOT patients, they are reluctant to deny an AOT petition outright 
unless an expert testifies on his or her behalf.  As one judge put it:   
 
I am not a mental health professional so if a mental health professional testifies that 
this is what is needed I have  no basis to say “No.” When I actually get a 
presentation from the other side I take it seriously…But I need a basis (Judge 9).   
 
When asked whether testimony from the respondent would provide such a basis, the judge 
responded: “It rarely makes a difference.  Sometimes it does and sometimes what I’ve done is 
modify the proposed order to meet the legitimate concerns of the patient” if, for example, an AOT 
patient raises a reasonable concern regarding the side effects of a medication or a particular provider 
(Judge 9).  Or as another judge remarked, “If the patient happens to testify, there may be elements in 
what the doctor says, but I really rely very, very heavily on what the doctor says” (Judge 8).   50 
 
 
ii.  Harm to Others  
 
Without expert testimony, judges were unwilling to deny a petition for AOT owing in large 
part to their fear that AOT recipients would harm themselves or importantly, harm others.  “You 
don’t want to have something where a person well-meaning is out there and loses it and does 
something that will harm himself or God forbid, harm someone else” (Judge 11).  Or as another 
judge said: “Reality? Do you know what the judge’s priority criterion is? They don’t want to be on 
the front page of tomorrow’s newspaper—Judge Releases Madman Who Slays 29 People” (Judge 2). 
In the same way judges frequently referred to the violent origins of Kendra’s Law (5 of 20).  As one 
judge remarked, in reference to Andrew Goldstein, the man who pushed Kendra Webdale in front 
of a train, the Office of Mental Health allowed “someone that’s arguably a loaded gun into the 
population” (Judge 13).  Or as another judge said, referring to the AOT program, “the only 
justification is public safety.  You don’t want somebody pushed off the subway platform again” 
(Judge 9).   
   
iii.  The Revolving Door of Hospital Admissions  
 
When patients argue that they no longer need AOT, judges also suspected that the 
symptoms of mental illness might prevent the person from recognizing the need for treatment.  
Quite often their perceptions were based on their experience with AOT cases as well as non-AOT 
cases, for example—guardianships, retention hearings, and applications for medication over 
objection.  
 
I’ve learned from many years of sitting at these hearings including the hearings of 
people who have to be rehospitalized and retained, that when people take their 
medication they start to feel well.  They start to function and then they believe “I’m 
well. I don’t have to take the medication anymore,” and they end up back 
warehoused in the hospital retained for sometimes months at a time (Judge 11).  
 51 
 
In the same way, a handful of judges (3 of 13) recounted instances in which they released a person 
from the hospital only to find out that the person had been rehospitalized.  As one judge said: “I 
might get them out and you see the history, back in and out and there are several commitments in 
between.  So it’s a frustration. I don’t have  any easy answer.  I’m not a doctor.  I’m not a 
psychiatrist.  I just don’t have an easy answer” (Judge 6).  A sizeable number of judges (4 of 13) 
wondered whether hospitals were discharging people with mental illnesses prematurely.  
Others felt that after years in and out of the mental health system, the respondent “knows 
what to say at the appropriate time” notwithstanding his or her mental illness, making it enormously 
difficult for judges to determine whether respondents are being truthful when they declare their 
intention to continue outpatient treatment voluntarily (Judge 7).  In other instances the respondent’s 
medical history and incoherent testimony corroborates the need for AOT.   
 
 
iv.  Liberty Interests  
 
To a lesser extent judges also voiced concerns  regarding the liberty interests of AOT 
recipients (3 of 13).  For example some judges noted that while compulsory outpatient treatment is 
certainly less onerous than hospitalization, the program imposes a substantial restriction on the 
liberty interests of AOT recipients since most are required to participate in court ordered programs 
at least once or twice a week.  In the same way, another judge wondered whether patients actually 
benefit from long term participation in the AOT program.  The same judge felt that the assisted 
outpatient treatment program was designed to protect hospitals from a lawsuit should a former 
inpatient injure a member of the public.  Treatment plans, designed without due attention to the 
needs of the patient, and prom forma petitions in which petitioners merely “plug in” facts  reflect 
the  “c.y.a.” origin of the program (Judge 7).   
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b.  Clear and Convincing Evidence  
 
The standard of proof for an assisted outpatient treatment order is clear and convincing 
evidence.  New York courts have defined clear and convincing evidence as evidence which makes 
the existence of a fact “highly probable.”
 131
 
 Only a few judges defined clear and convincing evidence 
in similar terms (2 of 13).  Most defined clear and convincing evidence broadly as more than a 
preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt (11 of 13).  Others 
suggested that, in practice, the important question in AOT cases is whether the respondent would 
benefit from the AOT program and whether the treatment plan makes sense.  Judge 9: “It’s mostly 
evidence that shows this person has a problem and would benefit from AOT.”  Judge 11: “I listen to 
what they have to say and I go with what makes the most sense.” Judge 3: “I do what I think is 
right.” Judge 2: “Judges will do what they feel is the right thing.” 
 
c.  Attorney Role: Zealous Advocacy or Best Interests?  
 
Attorneys consistently expressed a strong professional obligation to advocate zealously for 
AOT clients, just as they would in any other legal proceeding.  By contrast judges were less 
consistent in their perceptions of the defense attorney’s role.  A small number of judges (3 of 13) felt 
that attorneys do a disservice to their clients when they object to hearsay or argue too zealously on 
their behalf, without considering the consequences.  As one judge said: “knowing that this person 
may have an illness and may need certain things, it’s better not to be totally zealous in your position 
but be reasonable and try to test whether or not AOT is necessary for this person” (Judge 2).  He 
continued: “Try to impress upon the judge why this or that should or shouldn’t be, but again, not to 
                                                 
131 Ausch v. St Paul & Marine Ins. Co., 511 N.Y.S.2d. 919, 912-22 (2d Dep’t 1987) (approving jury instruction that 
used “highly probable” language to describe clear and convincing evidence); Chenango Mut. Ins. Co. v. Charles, 652 
N.Y.S. 2d 134 (3d Dep’t 1997)(clear and convincing evidence standard requires “high probability”). 
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the extent that you know, a win at all costs. That could happen and that’s a pyrrhic victory.  You let 
somebody out and they need services and they’re going to be back in the hospital” (Judge 2).   
 
 
V.  DISCUSSION  
 
This study explored four elements of procedural due process under Kendra’s Law—the right 
to a hearing, the right to counsel, the standard of proof and the right to a neutral  factfinder.  
Findings from this study suggest that AOT hearings adhere to the fundamental requirements of 
procedural due process. Contested AOT hearings were approximately 20 minutes on average, 
affording respondents a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  In contrast to earlier studies on 
inpatient civil commitment, attorneys usually attacked the most important aspects of the petitioner’s 
testimony.   For example, attorneys frequently challenged the petitioner’s assertion that their clients 
were unlikely to participate in outpatient treatment voluntarily.  In almost half of the contested cases 
observed, attorneys challenged the petitioner’s claim that their clients were unlikely to survive safely 
in the community or needed AOT to prevent harm to others. 
Defense attorneys also underscored their professional obligations to represent their clients 
zealously and to the full extent of the law.  Prior studies on the assisted outpatient program have 
reported broad upstate-downstate differences in perceptions of attorney role among attorneys in the 
AOT program.  Others have argued that even within the New York City region, MHLS attorneys in 
the First and Second Judicial Department have very different views of client advocacy.  In contrast 
to these authors, this study found no noticeable differences in perceptions of attorney role across 
boroughs or between judicial departments.   
This study also aimed to understand how judges define the term “clear and convincing 
evidence” and what constitutes clear and convincing evidence that someone meets the criteria for 
AOT as required by law.  In a large majority of cases an AOT Team psychiatrist testified that the 54 
 
respondent was unlikely to comply with outpatient treatment voluntarily because the respondent 
failed to attend one or more days of a court ordered outpatient treatment program.  In almost half 
of the contested cases observed a psychiatrist testified that the respondent lacked insight into his or 
her illness; or without a court order, the respondent would discontinue medications, and in doing so, 
present a risk of harm to self or others.  In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court conceded that the 
difference between a preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
probably better understood than the meaning of clear and convincing evidence.
132
In lengthy and surprisingly candid interviews, many judges reported that they rely heavily on 
clinical recommendations particularly when the clinician has appeared before them in prior hearings 
and established a reputation for credibility.  What do these findings imply for the respondent’s right 
to be heard by a neutral factfinder? Scholars who observed civil commitment hearings in the 1960s 
and 70s frequently described the proceedings as “a legal charade” in which judges rubber stamped 
medial recommendations and abdicated their role as neutral factfinders to clinicians.
  In the same way, 
judges often defined “clear and convincing evidence” broadly, as something between a 
preponderance and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, while a sizeable number conceded that in 
practice, the important question is whether outpatient commitment is in the respondent’s “best 
interests” or otherwise makes sense.     
133  Yet, at least 
since Parham, the Supreme Court has expressed a decided preference for medical rather than judicial 
decision-making in cases concerning the involuntary treatment of people with mental illnesses.
134
                                                 
132 See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.   
  
 
 
133 See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 
 
134 See Parham v. J.R 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1977) (“[t]he mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not 
the business of judges.”); See also Washington v. Harper 494 U.S. 210, 211-212 (1990) (while mentally ill inmates have a 
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted psychiatric medications, “an inmate’s interests are adequately protected, and 
perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by a medical professionals rather than a judge.”). 55 
 
Heavy reliance on credible recommendations may be troubling in some respects, but it is certainly 
consistent with the respondent’s right to a neutral factfinder under the Fourteenth Amendment.   
Policymakers should consider educating judges on the strengths and weaknesses of clinical 
testimony.  For example we know that mental health professionals tend to overestimate the risk of 
violence.
135  The Office of Mental Health should encourage psychiatrists to use actuarial methods 
based on a standardized list of validated risk factors, such as age, gender and past history of violence, 
rather than unstructured judgments based on clinical experience.  Most studies have shown that 
actuarial methods tend to be more accurate than clinical predictions.
136
A small but substantial number of judges also stated that testimony from respondents 
regarding their plans to continue taking medication without a court order has little, if any, impact on 
their rulings.  Others felt that without expert testimony they had no “basis” to rule in favor of a 
person who is objecting to AOT.  Michael Perlin has written extensively on the corrosive effects of 
“sanism” and “pretextuality” in mental health law.
   
137  As Perlin writes, “sanism is an irrational 
prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected 
in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethic bigotry.”
138
                                                                                                                                                             
 
  Sanism is based 
on myths and stereotypes regarding people with mental illnesses and it is sustained by our reliance 
135 See, e.g., Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1007 (1993). 
 
 
136 See, e.g., William Gardner, Charles Lidz et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Predictions of Violence in Patients with Mental 
Illnesses, 64 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 602 (1996); See also William M. Groove & Paul Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of 
Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293 (1996). 
 
 
137 See generally Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of “Ordinary Common Sense,” Heuristic 
Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991); Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 
S.M.U.L. Rev. 373, 374 (1992).  
 
 
138 Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth” Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law 
Developed as It Did, J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 4 (1999).  
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on heuristic reasoning, or simply put, alleged “ordinary commonsense.”
139 What’s more the pretext 
of careful consideration “breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law,” “demeans participants,” and 
promotes “blasé judging.” 
140
To some extent Perlin is right.  Very few judges explained their rulings.  In some courtrooms 
judges simply restated the criteria for issuing an AOT order and inserted the petitioner’s facts for the 
record, without addressing any of the respondent’s arguments.  In most courtrooms judges declined 
to render their judgments in front of AOT recipients for fear that doing so would provoke an 
outburst or worse.  Judges frequently stated, and perhaps overstated, the possibility that without a 
court order AOT recipients, might present a substantial risk of harm to others.  The tendency to 
refer to the violent origins of Kendra’s Law as a justification for issuing an AOT order raises an 
important question about how legislatures frame mental health laws and how those framing effects 
influence judicial decision-making.  On the other hand, to interpret these findings as evidence of 
unmitigated sanism would be a mistake.  The central question in most AOT hearings is whether the 
respondent will continue to participate in outpatient treatment voluntarily, without a court order.  
AOT recipients who testify that they will continue taking their medications without a court order, 
when their most recent history is one of noncompliance, usually lack credibility.   
 
Of the 185 hearings observed by the author, 49 were contested and courts granted the 
petitioner’s request for assisted outpatient treatment in 48 of the 49 contested cases observed. Given 
the high rate at which AOT petitions were granted, findings from this study suggest that an 
important direction for future research is to understand how clinicians decide whether to petition 
courts for assisted outpatient treatment.  What distinguishes patients who are the subject of petitions 
                                                 
139 Id. at 14.  
 
 
140 Id. at 4.  
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for AOT from those who are not? What factors are most important to their decisions? According to 
the New York State Office of Mental Health, 7,657 petitions for assisted outpatient treatment have 
been filed since the program began in November 1999.  Of them, 7,463 petitions have been granted 
(97 percent) and only 194 petitions have been denied (3 percent).
141
In this study 49 petitions for assisted outpatient treatment were contested, 48 were granted 
(98 percent) and only 1 petition was denied (2 percent).  How different was that case from all the 
others? The psychiatrist testified that in his opinion the respondent’s prognosis without AOT would 
be poor since he denied having a mental illness and stated that he only takes medications “because 
he has to.” Moreover the respondent failed to take his medications consistently during the AOT 
order.  The respondent testified that he was misunderstood.  He would take his medications and his 
family would make sure that he takes his medications, therefore he didn’t need AOT.  What made 
the difference? Members of the respondent’s family appeared in court to testify on his behalf, 
however that was not unusual.  On the other hand, the case was decided by a judge who is known 
for occasionally denying AOT petitions. Three-quarters of AOT recipients have a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, although the respondent in this case had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, a far 
less stigmatized mental disorder.  Further research is need to understand what distinguishes the vast 
majority of cases in which AOT petitions are granted from those that are not, and whether those 
factors are germane to the criteria for issuing an AOT order.   
  
The methods used in this study were subject to limitations.  The rate at which AOT hearings 
are contested in each borough is unknown; therefore, the number of contested hearings observed in 
each borough may not reflect the actual distribution contested AOT hearings in New York City.  
Second, in contrast to other research in this area, only one observer recorded data on AOT hearings.  
                                                 
141 NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT REPORTS, 
http://bi.omh.state.ny.us/aot/statistics (last visited April 23, 2013). 
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Third, hearing observations were limited to testimony and did not include a review of AOT 
petitions, due to legal restrictions on access to court records. Fourth, responses to questions 
regarding the professional obligations of attorneys and how AOT hearings are decided may reflect a 
response bias toward socially desirable attitudes.  Data collection for this study was also limited to 
the five boroughs of New York City and therefore, findings from this study may not be 
generalizable to other areas of New York State.  Finally, conclusions regarding clear and convincing 
evidence in this study rest on the assumption that AOT attorneys present evidence on matters of 
importance to the factfinder.  Nothing in this study should be interpreted to suggest that evidence in 
these categories is necessary to establish clear and convincing, or that this evidence ought to establish 
clear and convincing evidence.  
Even so, this study provides a valuable contribution to our understanding of Kendra’s Law.  
Most AOT decisions are not published, therefore, we know very little about how AOT cases are 
decided.  Findings from this study also suggest room for improvement, for example—encouraging 
judges to explain their rulings so that AOT recipients understand why they are under a court order 
and how future orders can be avoided.  Legislators should also consider funding for expert witnesses 
to be employed  by the Mental Hygiene Legal Service, rather than the Office of Court 
Administration.  Even if Dolan v. K-W was correctly decided and respondents in AOT proceedings 
are not entitled to an expert witness as a matter of law, in order to reach an accurate decision, courts 
need to hear a more complete set of facts than the statute currently requires.   
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CHAPTER 2  
 
RETHINKING KENDRA’S LAW: 
THE ETHICS OF ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 
 
 
In the wake of deinstitutionalization and its failures, one of the most important questions in 
mental health policy may be this: how can we care for psychiatric patients in the community who 
require care, but resist treatment nonetheless? Left to their own devices, so called “revolving door 
patients” will stop taking their medications and decompensate in the community, cycling between 
hospitals, jails and homelessness. Eventually, revolving door patients will deteriorate in the 
community and meet the criteria for inpatient civil commitment—clear and convincing evidence of 
both mental illness and dangerousness to self or others. However, preventive outpatient 
commitment has emerged as a tool to authorize court ordered community treatment for people who 
do not yet meet the criteria for inpatient commitment, but who are expected to deteriorate 
substantially in the future. 
In 1999 New York enacted Kendra’s Law, in memory of Kendra Webdale, a young woman 
who was pushed to her death in front of an oncoming train by Andrew Goldstein, a man with 
untreated schizophrenia.   Under Kendra’s Law, a court can order a person with a mental illness to 
participate in an “assisted outpatient treatment” (AOT) program.  A typical AOT order will include 
a host of interventions designed to improve medication compliance in the community, among 
them—periodic blood tests or urinalysis to determine compliance with prescribed medications; 
counseling and toxicology screens for patients with a history of substance abuse; group therapy for 
several hours a day, several days a week; day or partial day programming; and supervised living 
arrangements.
142
                                                 
142 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (a)(1)(2006). 
  For those who are not under a supervised housing requirement, courts will 
sometimes order an “ACT” or assertive community treatment team to visit the patient’s home.   60 
 
Recent empirical work suggests that participation in the AOT program is associated with 
significant benefits for people with mental illnesses. A 2009 study found that when compared to 
their counterparts in voluntary treatment, participants in the assisted outpatient treatment program 
were more likely to receive appropriate medications, less likely to be hospitalized, and less likely to 
be arrested.
143  Although the effectiveness of outpatient commitment remains a matter of some 
controversy, this paper will assume that under the right circumstances AOT can lead to significant 
reductions in the revolving door problem.
144
However effective, court-ordered participation in outpatient treatment remains something of 
an anomaly in public health.  Proponents of Kendra’s Law will rest the justification for outpatient 
commitment on the harm that untreated mental illness poses to oneself and others.  Yet by itself, 
harm fails to provide a principled distinction between people with mental illnesses and others who 
might also refuse treatment.  Consider the alcoholic who persists in driving drunk.  We could easily 
imagine a Kendra’s Law for people with substance abuse disorders—replete with weekly AA 
meetings, toxicology tests and home visits where ACT teams conduct “bottle checks” instead of pill 
checks.  Such a regime would pay dividends in preventable death, and yet we don’t have one.  Even 
the most outspoken supporter of Kendra’s Law must concede that the risk posed by untreated 
 
                                                 
143 Martin S. Swartz, Henry J. Steadman, & John Monahan, NEW YORK STATE ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 
PROGRAM EVALUATION, http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/resources/publications/aot_program_evaluation/ (last 
visited Sept. 2, 2012).  
 
 
144 See Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Outpatient Commitment: The State of Empirical Research on Its Outcomes, 92 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 8 (2003) (for an overview of empirical studies on outpatient commitment); see also Marvin S. Swartz et al., 
Can Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Hospital Recidivism? 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1968, 1973 (1999) (finding that 
study subjects who underwent sustained periods of outpatient commitment for 6 months or more had 57% fewer 
readmissions or 20 fewer hospital days when compared to control subjects. Among study participants with 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or an another form of psychosis, sustained outpatient commitment was 
associated with a 72% reduction in hospital admissions or 28 fewer hospital days); see also Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., 
Involuntary Out-Patient Commitment and Reduction of Violent Behaviour in Persons With Severe Mental Illness, 176 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 224, 228-29 (2000) (finding a lower incidence of violence among study subjects who were required to 
participate in 6 months of outpatient commitment or more); But see Henry J. Steadman et al., Assessing the New York City 
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Pilot Program, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES (2001) (finding no statistically significant 
differences between the control and experimental group on all major outcomes).    
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mental illness is distinguishable from tuberculosis and other forms of communicable disease for 
which there is an established precedent for preventive intervention.  In that sense, Kendra’s Law 
raises a longstanding question in law, ethics and public health—what’s so special about mental 
illness?
145
Resting the argument for assisted outpatient treatment on harm to self seems equally 
problematic.  We do not require people with diabetes to take medications that have the power to 
prevent blindness, amputation, coma and death.  Nor do we require smokers to stop smoking any 
more than we require people with cardiovascular disease or high cholesterol to participate in classes 
on the dangers of inactivity and a fatty diet.  As a general matter, courts do not intervene in self-
regarding treatment decisions, without a finding of incompetence, no matter how grave the potential 
harm.  One might think that court ordered participation in an AOT program under Kendra’s Law is 
justified by virtue of the fact that unlike people with general medical conditions, people with mental 
illnesses lack the capacity to make treatment decisions on their own.  Absent capacity, courts may 
step in and order treatment for them.   However, not all people with mental illnesses are unable to 
make competent treatment decisions and Kendra’s Law does not require a judicial finding of 
incompetence.
   
146  Indeed in upholding Kendra’s Law against constitutional attack, the New York 
State Court of Appeals noted that Kendra’s Law expressly contemplates the possibility that patients 
will have the capacity to participate in decisions regarding their treatment plan.
147
                                                 
145 See e.g. JOEL FEINBERG, What’s So Special About Mental Illness? in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY 
OF RESPONSIBILITY, 272 (1974) (for a classic discussion); see also ELLEN SAKS, FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS 
OF THE MENTALLY ILL 44-84 (2002). 
 
 
 
146 See. e.g. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Mental Illness and Competence to 
Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM BEHAV. 105 (1995) (finding that most people who have been hospitalized for serious 
mental illness have similar abilities to make treatment decisions, when compared to people without a major mental 
illness). 
 
 
147 In re K.L., 774 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).  
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Instead, supporters of Kendra’s Law will argue that quite unlike people with diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease and high cholesterol, many people with major mental illnesses like 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and depression lack insight into their illnesses, and when combined 
with a substantial risk of harm to self or others, this lack of insight provides sufficient justification 
for court ordered treatment.  However, this paper will recommend that we reject an impaired insight 
standard, and only order participation in outpatient treatment for those who are unable to make 
competent treatment decisions on their own.   
Part I provides a brief history of deinstitutionalization and its pitfalls.  Part II provides an 
overview of Kendra’s Law.  Part III examines justifications for assisted outpatient treatment based 
on the harm that untreated mental illness presents to others, while Part IV considers justifications 
for AOT based on harm to oneself.  Part V will pay close attention to impaired insight as a 
principled distinction between people with mental illnesses and others.  Although Kendra’s Law was 
enacted in response to an act of violence, more often than not, our primary concern will be that 
without outpatient treatment, most candidates for assisted outpatient treatment will stop taking their 
medications, and in the absence of family or other social supports, many will find it difficult to meet 
their needs for food, clothing and shelter.  When our primary concern is one of self-regarding harm, 
Part V contends that a court order to participate in outpatient treatment may be appropriate, but 
only for people with mental illnesses who are unable to make competent treatment decisions on 
their own.  At times, we will also worry that a decision to refuse outpatient treatment could not only 
result in harm to oneself, but harm to others. When our primary concern is one of other-regarding 
harm, Part VI contends that courts should limit assisted outpatient treatment to people with mental 
illnesses who are unlikely to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or those who lack the 
capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.   
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I.  DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: PITFALLS AND PROMISES 
 
By the mid-1950s, when the number of institutionalized psychiatric patients reached its peak, 
more than 550,000 inpatients resided in state mental hospitals.
148 By the mid-1980s, however, fewer 
than 120,000 psychiatric patients resided in state hospitals.
149  Several factors encouraged a shift 
toward community-based care.  By the late 1950s, attitudes toward institutional psychiatry began to 
change.
150 Labeling theorists and small group of radical anti-psychiatrists insisted that psychiatric 
diagnoses were no more than convenient labels designed to suppress nonconforming behavior.
151 So 
labeled, persons deemed mentally ill would in turn reproduce more disturbed behavior.  A second 
critique of psychiatry concerned the benefits of long-term hospitalization.  In the years following 
World War II, a series of exposés called attention to deplorable conditions in state hospitals.
152  For 
the first time, the emergence of psychotropic medications also offered the possibility of treating 
people with mental illnesses in the community.
153
A further critique of psychiatry came from the civil rights movement.  After an initial focus 
on racial inequality, the postwar civil rights movement gradually expanded to include a concern for 
the rights of women, the poor and eventually, the civil liberties of people with mental illnesses.
 
154
                                                 
148 DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: PROBLEMS AND PROMISE 5 (Richard H. Lamb & Linda Weinberger eds., 2001).  
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Civil rights organizations argued that inpatient commitment standards were vague, overbroad and 
void for failure to consider less restrictive alternatives to involuntary hospitalization.
155 State hospital 
closures also accelerated rapidly in the late 1960s with introduction of Medicare and Medicaid.  
When Congress passed Medicaid in 1965, the federal government excluded Medicaid payments for 
psychiatric services rendered in state hospitals. In response, states discharged large numbers of 
former inpatients to nursing  homes and other congregate care arrangements where Medicaid 
reimbursement was available.
156
While some former inpatients did well in the community, many others did not.  Far fewer 
community mental health centers were created than anticipated, making it difficult for former 
inpatients to access care.
  
157  Some former patients refused treatment owing to the symptoms of their 
mental illness, while others refused treatment owing to the side effects of their medications and a 
longstanding distrust of the mental health system.
158  Yet, even when the need for treatment was 
clear, by the late 1970s, in most states involuntary hospitalization required clear and convincing 
evidence of dangerousness to self or others.
159
                                                 
155 Lessard v Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972).  
  With the introduction of managed care, the 
combination  of shorter hospital stays and stricter commitment laws fostered a revolving door 
syndrome.  Patients were routinely stabilized in hospitals and released, only to stop taking their 
medications, decompensate in the community and once again require rehospitilization.   
 
 
156 GROB supra note 154, at 289-91; see also APPELBAUM, supra note 150, at 50-1. 
 
 
157 GROB supra note 154, at 283-87. 
 
 
158 Howard Telson et al., REPORT OF THE BELLEVUE HOSPITAL CENTER OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT PILOT 
PROGRAM. Department of Psychiatry, Bellevue Hospital, New York (1999).  
 
 
159 APPELBAUM supra note 150, at 27-8. 
 
 65 
 
In New York, “Billie Boggs” and Larry Hogue came to symbolize the failures of the public 
mental health system.  Boggs first appeared on the streets of Manhattan in 1987.
160   For almost a 
year, Billie Boggs lived on the corner of Second Avenue and 65th Street, urinating and defecating on 
the sidewalk, burning dollar bills, and screaming obscenities when assistance was offered.
161  In 
October 1987, Boggs was picked up by a local program designed to remove people with mental 
illnesses from the streets when their lives were threatened by severe weather and hypothermia.
162  
When the program attempted to hospitalize her, Boggs sued and won her freedom with the help of 
the New York Civil Liberties Union.
163  According to a psychiatrist, although Boggs suffered from 
paranoid schizophrenia, she understood the risks and benefits of treatment; therefore, the hospital 
could not medicate her against her will.
164  As a result, the hospital agreed to her release.  After her 
discharge, Boggs enjoyed a brief stint as a national celebrity.  She appeared on “60 minutes” and 
“Donahue,” and in February 1988, she appeared as a guest speaker at Harvard Law School.
165  Yet, 
only a few weeks later, the symptoms of her psychosis reappeared and Boggs was once again 
panhandling on the streets of Manhattan.
166
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Several years later, Larry Hogue gained notoriety among New Yorkers as “the Wild Man of 
96th Street.”
167  For years, Hogue terrorized New Yorkers on Manhattan’s Upper West Side by 
siphoning gasoline from parked cars, igniting newspapers soaked with gas and then stuffing them 
into tailpipes.
168  Over the years, witnesses also observed Hogue jumping into oncoming traffic and 
threatening people on the street with a nail-studded club.
169  In 1989, Hogue was convicted of 
reckless endangerment for pushing a teenage girl in front of an oncoming truck.
170  Yet because 
these incidents never resulted in serious injury, Hogue never spent more than a year in jail.
171  As a 
patient at Creedmoor Hospital, Hogue was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, crack addiction and a 
traumatic brain injury.
172  According to his doctors, when Hogue was hospitalized and no longer 
abusing drugs, he was calm and amiable. Yet, inevitably following his release, Hogue would stop 
taking his medications and revert to using drugs, leading him to behave in ways that once again 
rendered him a danger to himself and others.
173
By the early 1990s, the idea for an outpatient commitment law was already well underway in 
the New York State Legislature.  In 1994, the Legislature established a pilot outpatient commitment 
   
                                                 
167 Leigh Remizowski et al., The Wild Man of 96
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program at Bellevue Hospital in lower Manhattan.
174  In a twist of fate, Andrew Goldstein visited the 
psychiatric emergency room of Bellevue Hospital on at least two occasions in 1998, during the 
tenure of the pilot program, complaining of auditory hallucinations and sleep deprivation.
175  After a 
few days in the hospital, Goldstein was released.
176  A subsequent investigation into the quality of 
care Andrew Goldstein received found that Goldstein repeatedly sought help for hallucinations and 
delusions.
177  In the two year period between early 1997 and January 1999, Goldstein voluntarily 
admitted himself to state hospitals no less than 13 times.
178  On more than one occasion, Goldstein 
requested long-term hospitalization at Creedmoor.
179
  Several months later, in January 1999, Andrew Goldstein pushed Kendra Webdale in front 
of an oncoming subway train.  In Albany, former Attorney General Elliot Spitzer seized the 
opportunity to create a permanent outpatient commitment program in New York.  In a statement to 
the press, Spitzer alluded to the problems associated with deinstitutionalization:  
  More often than not, he was turned down.  
Under tremendous pressure to cut costs and reduce the number of inpatients, the hospital could do 
little more than place Goldstein on a waiting list.   
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It is clear that the law must be changed to protect both the public and the mentally 
ill from danger….The movement to deinstitutionalize has proven to be a double-
edged sword.  Most individuals can and do function well in society, but others with 
severe mental illness who are not taking their prescribed medication can be a 
serious threat to themselves and the public.180
 
  
Three months later Julio Perez, a homeless man suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, pushed 
Edgar Rivera into the path of an oncoming train, severing both of his legs.
181 According to his 
attorney, Perez harbored a delusional belief that a conspiratorial network of Mexican assassins was 
trying to kill him.  Perez pushed Rivera, believing Rivera to be part of that network.
182
In December 2012, after years of intermittent contact with mental health and law 
enforcement, Erika Mendez pushed Sunando Sen onto the tracks of a subway station in Queens.
   
183  
In a tragic incident that shocked the world, Adam Lanza, a 20 year-old man believed to have 
Asperger’s Syndrome, shot and killed 26 elementary schoolchildren and their teachers in Newtown, 
Connecticut.
184  In New York, public outrage, following the shooting in Newtown—as well as the 
death of Sunando Sen—has lead a renewed interest in compulsory treatment.
185
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II.  KENDRA’S LAW  
 
In addition to Kendra’s Law, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have outpatient 
commitment laws.
186
Kendra’s Law authorizes preventive outpatient commitment for people with mental illnesses 
who do not meet the criteria for inpatient civil commitment in New York.   Under Kendra’s Law a 
court may order a person who is 18 or older to comply with an assisted outpatient treatment plan if 
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the subject of the treatment plan meets the 
following criteria.  He or she must be suffering from a mental illness and “unlikely to survive safely 
in the community without supervision, based on a clinical determination.”
  Kendra’s Law is only one of at least there are three types of outpatient 
commitment.  The first, conditional release, applies to patients who have been hospitalized and 
released on the condition that they comply with a treatment plan in the community.  Outpatient 
commitment might also be used as a less restrictive alternative to hospitalization for patients who 
meet the criteria for inpatient commitment, but who can be treated safely in the community 
nonetheless. A third, and far more controversial form of commitment, preventive outpatient 
commitment, applies to individuals who do not yet meet the criteria for inpatient commitment, but 
who are expected to deteriorate substantially in the future.
  
187
                                                 
186 See ALA.CODE § 22-52-10.2 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-540(2011); ARK. CODE. ANN. §20-47-
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STAT. ANN. §7304 (1976); R.I. GEN LAWS § 40.1-5-8(j)(1993); S.C. CODE ANN 1976 §44-17-580(2005); S.D. Laws 27A-9-
10.1 (2000); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §574.034(b)(1997); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 §62A-12-234(10)(2012); 
VA. CODE ANN. §37.1-67.3(2009); WASH. REV. CODE §71.05.240 (2009); W. VA. CODE §27-1-9 (2010); WYO. STAT. 
ANN.1977 §25-10-110(j)(2010).  
  The court must also 
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find that a history of treatment noncompliance has either: (i) been a significant factor leading to 
hospitalization at least twice within the last thirty-six months, or (ii) resulted in one or more acts of 
violent behavior toward self or others within the last forty-eight months, or at least a threat or 
attempt at serious physical harm to self or others within the last forty-eight months.
188  In addition, 
the petitioner must provide clear and convincing evidence that the subject of the petition is unlikely 
to participate in outpatient treatment voluntarily “as a result of his or her mental illness.”
189 Assisted 
outpatient treatment must be necessary to prevent a relapse or deterioration, “which would be likely 
to result in serious harm to the person or others.”
190  Finally, the person must be likely to benefit 
from treatment, and assisted outpatient treatment must be the least restrictive form of treatment 
available.
191
In New York, involuntary hospitalization requires a finding that the subject of a petition for 
inpatient commitment presents “a substantial risk of physical harm” to self or others.
   
192
                                                 
188 Id. § 9.60 (c)(2)(4)(i) – (ii) (2006).  
  By contrast, 
Kendra’s Law permits outpatient commitment, largely on the ground that treatment noncompliance 
has lead to multiple hospitalizations and without outpatient commitment, the person is likely to 
decompensate, becoming a danger to himself or others.  The result is that the subject of an AOT 
petition can be ordered to comply with treatment, even though at present, he or she does not  
present a substantial risk of physical harm to self or others.   If the subject of the petition meets the 
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criteria for AOT, the court may order assisted outpatient treatment for up to six months.
193  Thirty 
days prior to the expiration of an AOT order, the petitioner may seek continued assisted outpatient 
treatment for up to one year.
194
Under Kendra’s Law, a court may order a person to self-administer psychotropic drugs, or 
accept the administration of such drugs by authorized personnel.
 
195  However, like most outpatient 
commitment statutes, Kendra’s Law does not authorize forced administration of medication over 
the patient’s objection.  If a patient refuses to comply with any aspect of the AOT order, and a 
physician determines that the patient may be in need of involuntary hospitalization, patients may be 
removed from the community and detained in a hospital where they can be held for up to 72 hours 
to determine whether they meet the criteria for inpatient civil commitment.
196
 
  
III.  HARM TO OTHERS  
 
What moral justifications can we offer for outpatient commitment? Ken Kress, a strong 
supporter of outpatient commitment has argued that in many cases of actual or threatened violence 
by a person with a mental illness, the perpetrator was either not being treated for his or her mental 
                                                 
193 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (k)(2006). 
 
 
194 Id. 
 
 
195 Id. §9.60(h)(i) (2006). 
 
 
196 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (o)(2006); See also NY Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement (SAFE) 
ACT, 2013 N.Y. Laws 1. (In addition to strengthening state gun control laws, the SAFE Act: (i) extends Kendra’s Law 
for two years from its original sunset date of June 30, 2015 to June 30, 2017; (ii) extends the maximum duration of an 
initial AOT order from 6 months to 1 year; (iii) mandates a review by the local director of community services within 30 
days prior to the expiration of an AOT order; (iv) authorizes AOT treatment order across county lines; and (v) requires a 
clinical assessment for an inmate committed to a state correctional facility from a psychiatric hospital prior to discharge). 
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disorder, or not taking prescribed medications.
197  Moreover, most of these incidents, many of them 
homicides, could have been prevented if there were laws in place to insist that people with mental 
illnesses participate in treatment whether they want to or not.
198
What should we make of these claims? Part III will review empirical studies on the 
relationship between mental illness and violence.  Although support for outpatient commitment 
stems from high profile acts of violence committed by people with mental illnesses, most violent 
crimes are not committed by people with mental illnesses, and most people with mental illnesses are 
no more violent than anyone else.  A second argument concedes that most people with mental 
illnesses are no more dangerous than members of the general population, but insists that a subgroup 
of people with mental illnesses are more dangerous.
   
199  To that end, Kendra’s Law is necessary to 
prevent tragedies, like the Webdale incident, from happening again.
200
As the remainder of Part III asserts, the problem with this argument is twofold.  First, using 
Kendra’s Law to prevent tragedies, such as the Webdale incident, from happening again presumes 
that we have a reasonably reliable way to identify people with mental illnesses who are likely to be 
violent and distinguish them from those who are not.  However, clinical predictions of violence are 
only slightly better than chance.  Second, even if we were able to identify people with mental 
illnesses who are likely to be violent, we can identify statistically significant associations between 
  Call this the preventable 
tragedies argument.   
                                                 
197 Ken Kress, An Argument for Assisted Outpatient Treatment for People with Serious Mental Illness Illustrated with Reference to 
a Proposed Statute for Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1283 (2000). 
 
 
198 Id. 
 
 
199 See e.g. E. Fuller Torrey, Violent Behavior by Individuals with Serious Mental Illness, in INSIGHT AND PSYCHOSIS 269 
(Xavier Amador & Anthony S. David eds., 1998).  
 
 
200 Ilissa L. Watnick, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s Law: New York’s Solution for Treatment of the 
Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2001).  73 
 
violence and any number of risk factors—age and violence, gender and violence, income and 
violence, educational attainment and violence.  However, as a general matter, the other-regarding 
harms we aim to prevent through outpatient commitment are addressed retrospectively, through the 
criminal justice system.  Even if we were able to identify a subgroup of the population as very likely 
to engage in violence, courts will not impose limits on their freedom in order to prevent the very 
serious crimes that they are likely to commit.  Proponents of the preventable tragedies argument will 
need to explain why people with mental illnesses should be treated differently.   
 
 
A.  VIOLENCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS  
 
i.  COMMUNITY SURVEYS  
 
Several epidemiological studies have found at least a modest association between mental 
illness and violence.  In a seminal study on violence and mental disorder, Jeffery Swanson and 
colleagues analyzed data drawn from the Epidemiological Catchment Area Study conducted by the 
National Institute of Mental Health.
201  As part of the study, 10,000 randomly chosen adults were 
interviewed to establish the prevalence of mental disorder.  Study participants were also asked to 
self-report violent behaviors during the past year (e.g. injuring a spouse or partner, getting into 
physical fights, or using a weapon).  The study found that schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and major 
depression were associated with a fourfold increase in the odds of violence within one year, after 
controlling for sociodemographic variables such as age, gender, socioeconomic status, ethnicity and 
race.  However, the study also found that substance abuse was associated with a far greater risk of 
violence (odds ratio = 16.8).
202
                                                 
201 Jeffery W. Swanson, Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse, and Community Violence, an Epidemiological Approach, in 
VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER 101 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994). 
   
 
 
202 Id. at 130. 74 
 
To put these numbers in perspective the authors also estimated the attributable risk violence 
associated with mental disorder.  Since serious mental illnesses are rare, people with a diagnosis of 
mental disorder alone only accounted for about 4 to 5 percent of the total violence in the population 
over the course of one year.  By contrast, since violence was more common among drug and alcohol 
abusers, and since there were more substance abusers in the community, the attributable risk of 
violence among substance abusers was considerably higher, on the order of 27 percent.
203
Findings from the landmark MacArthur Study on Risk Assessment and Violence also 
underscore the relationship between mental illness, substance abuse and violence.
 
204  The MacArthur 
Study followed 951 psychiatric patients for one year after they were discharged from acute 
psychiatric units.  In contrast to the Catchment Area Study, researchers used three sources of 
information to determine the prevalence of violence—interviews with patients, interviews with 
collateral informants (usually a family member) as well as hospital and arrest records.  In the 
MacArthur study, “violence” included battery that resulted in a physical injury, sexual assault, assault 
with a weapon or threats with a weapon.  Consistent with prior research in this area, substance abuse 
emerged as an important risk factor for violence.  Among patients with both an Axis I mental 
disorder—e.g. schizophrenia, major depression, or bipolar disorder—and a substance abuse disorder 
the 1-year prevalence of violence was 31.1%, compared to 17.9% among patients without a 
substance abuse disorder.
205
                                                 
203 Id. at 118; See also Heather Stuart & Julio E. Arboleda-Florez, A Public Health Perspective on Violent Offenses Among 
Persons with Mental Illness, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 654 (2001) (finding that approximately 3 percent of violent offenses 
could be attributed to individuals who had a principal diagnosis of any non-substance abuse related mental disorder). 
    
 
 
204 Henry Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Facilities and by Others in The Same 
Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY.  393 (1998). 
 
 
205 Id. at 399. 
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Focusing on one study site, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, researchers then compared violence 
among discharged psychiatric patients to the prevalence of violence among others living  in the same 
neighborhood.  Once again, substance abuse emerged as a significant risk factor for violence.  The 
study found that discharged psychiatric patients without a substance abuse problem were no more 
likely to engage in violence than other people living in the same neighborhood without a substance 
abuse problem.  However, the presence of a substance abuse problem raised the prevalence of 
violence in both groups, particularly among people with a mental disorder.  After 1 year, discharged 
patients with a  substance abuse problem were more than twice as likely to report violence, when 
compared to others in their neighborhood who also had a substance abuse problem.  Discharged 
patients were also more likely to report drug and alcohol abuse than community controls.
206
 
   
ii.  PSYCHOSIS AND VIOLENCE  
 
Subsequent studies have asked whether particular symptoms of psychosis might be 
associated with violence.   In a 1992 study, Bruce Link and colleagues compared arrest rates and self-
reported acts of violence among psychiatric patients, residing in the Washington Heights area of 
New York City, to people who had never received mental health treatment, residing in the same 
neighborhood.
207
                                                 
206 Id. at 400; see also Eric B. Elbogen & Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link between Violence and Mental Disorder, 66 
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 152 (2009) (finding that incidence of violence was higher for people with severe mental 
illnesses but only significantly so for people with a co-occurring substance abuse or substance dependence disorder); E. 
Fuller Torrey, Jonathan Stanley, John Monahan, Henry J. Steadman and the MacArthur Study Group, The MacArthur 
Violence Risk Assessment Study Revisited: Two Views Ten Years After Its Initial Publication, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 147 
(2008) (debating design of the MacArthur Study); Sally Satel & D.J. Jaffe, Violent Fantasies, 52 NAT’L. REV. 62 (1998) (for 
a critique of the MacArthur Study).  
  The study found that 15 percent of the community sample who had never 
received treatment from a mental health professional reported fighting within the last 5 years, 
 
 
207 Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Reconsidered, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 275 (1992). 
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compared to 29 percent of repeat psychiatric patients.  Link and colleagues then controlled for 
psychotic symptoms using a scale derived from the Psychiatric Epidemiology Research Interview 
(PERI).  After controlling for psychotic symptoms, the study found that being a repeat psychiatric 
patient was no longer a statistically significant predictor of violence.  Instead, much of the difference 
between psychiatric patients and community controls could be explained by the level of psychotic 
symptoms.
208
In further analyses Link and colleagues found that three symptoms of psychosis termed 
“threat/ control-override” symptoms were associated with significant increases in violent behavior, 
even after controlling for sociodemographic variables and other psychotic symptoms.
  Moreover, even among residents who had never been treated for a psychiatric 
disorder, psychotic symptoms were associated with violence.    
209  The 
symptoms included feeling that your mind has been dominated by forces beyond your control, that 
thoughts put into your head were not your own, and that people wished to do you harm.
210 Similarly, 
using data from the Epidemiological Catchment Area Study, Jeffery Swanson and colleagues found 
that respondents who reported one or more threat/control-override symptoms were more than 
twice as likely to report violence during the previous year, compared to respondents who reported 
other psychotic symptoms, and six times more likely to report violence compared to people without 
a mental disorder.
211
                                                 
208 Id. at 288. 
 
 
 
209 Bruce G. Link & Ann Stueve, Psychotic Symptoms and the Violent/Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Compared to 
Community Controls, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER 137 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994). 
 
 
210 Id. at 143; see also Bruce Link & Ann Stueve, Psychotic Symptoms and Violent Behaviors: Probing the Components of the 
“Threat/Control-Override” Symptoms, 33 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY S55 (1998)(finding that both 
threat and control-override delusions predicted were independently associated with violent behavior).  
 
 
211 Jeffery W. Swanson et al., Psychotic Symptoms and Disorders and The Risk of Violent Behavior in The Community, 6 CRIM. 
BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 309 (1996). 
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However, as Link and colleagues caution, when compared to the risk of violence associated 
with age, gender and socioeconomic status, the risk of violence associated with psychotic 
symptomatology is relatively modest.
212 For example, gender was far more predictive of arrests, 
fighting, and ever hurting someone badly than status as a former or repeat psychiatric patient.
213 
Moreover, not all studies have found an association between psychotic symptoms and violence.  
Some studies, including analyses using ECA data, have not found an association between TCO 
symptoms and violence when controlling for the effects of treatment noncompliance or the 
presence of a substance abuse disorder.
214 Using data from the MacArthur Study, Paul Appelbaum 
and colleagues found that delusions were not associated with an increased risk of violent behavior, 
nor were particular threat/control-override (TCO) symptoms associated with a greater risk of 
violence.
215
                                                 
212 Link et al., supra note 
  To the contrary, the study found that patients with threat/control-override delusions 
were significantly less likely to engage in violence than patients without similar delusions. 
Appelbaum and colleagues note that people who experience chronic psychosis also tend to 
experience social withdrawal and smaller social networks.  The authors hypothesize that with smaller 
207, at 290.  
 
 
213 See also Eric B. Elbogen & Sally Johnson, The Intricate Link between Violence and Mental Disorder, 66 ARCHIVES OF 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 152 (2009) (finding that mental illness alone did not predict alone did not predict future violence; 
however, age, gender, having less than a high school education, a history of violence, and juvenile detention, accounted 
for one quarter of the variance in violent behavior ). 
 
 
214 Jeffery Swanson et al., Violence and Severe Mental Disorder in Clinical and Community Populations: The Effects of Psychotic 
Symptoms, Comorbidity, and Lack of Treatment, 60 PSYCHIATRY 1 (1997).  
 
 
215 Paul Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. OF 
PSYCHIATRY 566 (2000); see also Thomas Stompe et al., Schizophrenia, Delusional Symptoms, and Violence: The Threat/Control-
Override Concept Reexamined, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN 31 (2004) (finding that threat/control-override symptoms 
were not associated with violence in a retrospective study of male offenders with schizophrenia).   
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social networks, people who experience chronic psychosis might have fewer interpersonal 
interactions, and thus fewer relationships that might lead to violence.
216
 
    
B.  RISK ASSESSMENT AND VIOLENCE  
 
Most studies suggest that by itself mental illness is at best a poor predictor of violence.  
Instead, situational and demographic factors such as being young, male and unemployed with a 
history of violence appear to be better predictors.
217  Even then, predictions of violence are 
notoriously difficult.  Owing to the low base rate of violent crime, even the best methods will 
produce a large number of false positives.  For example, a well known study on risk assessment and 
violence, conducted by Charles Lidz and colleagues, found that clinical predictions of violence were 
only slightly better than chance.
218
                                                 
216 See also Sue Estroff et al., The Influence of Social Networks and Social Support on Violence by Persons with Serious Mental 
Illness, 45 HOSP & COMMUNITY PSYCH. 669 (finding that respondents with larger networks, and those whose networks 
primarily consisted of relatives, were more likely to threaten violence). For more on the relationship between command 
hallucinations and violence see Louise G. Braham et al., Acting on Command Hallucinations and Dangerous Behavior: A Critique 
of the Major Findings in the Last Decade, 24 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 513 (2003). We often think that when people with 
mental illnesses, like schizophrenia, experience a command hallucination they tend to comply, unthinkingly in lockstep; 
however, the relationship between command hallucinations and violence appears to be a complicated one, mediated by 
multiple psychological processes, including—beliefs about the about the voice, the content of the command, and the 
consequences of noncompliance.  
  The research team recruited psychiatric patients from the 
emergency room of a metropolitan hospital.  Researchers then asked clinicians to assess the 
likelihood that patients would be violent toward others during a 6 month follow up period in the 
 
 
217 See Jeffery Swanson et al. Violent Behavior Preceding Hospitalization Among Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 23 LAW & 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 185 (while clinical diagnosis and symptom variables were not significantly associated with violence, 
violent behavior among revolving door patients was associated with substance abuse, young age, a history of 
victimization); See also  Jeffery Swanson, Marvin Swartz et al., The Social-Environmental Context of Violent Behavior in Persons 
Treated for Severe Mental Illness, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1523 (2002) (“psychopathology per se seldom leads to 
assaultiveness,” but may converge with other risk factors such as violent victimization and exposure to violence to 
increase the risk of violent behavior); Virginia Hiday, The Social Context of Mental Illness and Violence, 36 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAVIOR 122 (1995); Sue Estroff et al. The Influence of Social Networks and Social Support on Violence by Persons with Serious 
Mental Illness, 45 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 669 (1994). 
 
 
218 Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1007 (1993). 
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community.  Clinicians accurately identified 60% of patients who turned out to be violent and 58% 
of patients who turned out to be nonviolent.
219  As a result, the study reported a considerable 
number of false negatives and false positives.  One hundred ninety patients who were not predicted 
to be violent were in fact violent, and one hundred sixty-seven patients who were predicted to be 
violent during the study period did not engage in violence.
220
  A second approach to risk assessment uses statistical or actuarial methods to assess the risk 
of violence.  While clinical approaches to risk assessment depend on a clinician to estimate the risk 
of violence based on his or her clinical judgment, actuarial methods are based on a standardized list 
of validated risk factors, such as age, gender and past history of violence.  Most studies have shown 
that actuarial methods tend to be more accurate than clinical predictions.
  
221  For example, using data 
from the Lidz study, William Gardner and colleagues found that actuarial methods had lower false 
positive rates and lower false negative rates when compared to clinical prediction.
222  Actuarial 
predictions based only on the patient’s history of violence were also more accurate than clinical 
predictions of violence.  Using only the patient’s history of violence, an actuarial model was able to 
identify 71% of patients who were violent, while clinical methods only identified 62% of patients 
who engaged in violence.
223
                                                 
219 Id. at 1009. 
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  What do these findings imply for Kendra’s Law and assisted outpatient treatment? First, 
although several studies have shown that actuarial risk assessments tend to be more accurate than 
clinical predictions, Kendra’s Law does not require an actuarial assessment, nor are actuarial 
methods often used, since they can be time-consuming and cumbersome.
224  Second, as David 
Cooke and Christine Michie argue, “it is a statistical truism that “the mean of a distribution tells us 
about everyone and no one.”
225  Actuarial assessments estimate the likelihood of future violence 
based on the behavior of a group.  However, any significant social, psychological or environmental 
differences between the individual and the group can increase or decrease the likelihood of 
violence.
226  Third, studies consistently show that a history of violence, and in particular, a recent 
overt act of violence, are among the best predictors of future violence.
227  However, Kendra’s Law 
does not require a recent act of violence.  Under Kendra’s Law, a court may order outpatient 
commitment if, in addition to proof on all other elements, a history of treatment noncompliance has 
resulted in one of more acts of violence toward others within the last forty-eight months, or even a 
threat or attempt at serious physical harm toward others within the last forty-eight months.
228
For people with serious and persistent mental illnesses, being misclassified as dangerous can 
have serious consequences.  Even when participation in an assisted outpatient treatment program 
   
                                                 
224 John Monahan et al. Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for Assessing Violence Risk, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 
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offers a less restrictive alternative to hospitalization, a court order to participate in group therapy for 
several hours a day, several days a week, burdens the liberty interests of persons who are predicted 
to be violent, but in fact, not violent.  Courts will sometimes order an assertive community 
treatment teams to visit the patient’s home, further burdening the patient’s interest in privacy.  There 
are also system wide costs.  With an overemphasis on dangerousness, states risk diverting limited 
resources toward programs for people with mental illnesses who are thought to be dangerous, and 
away from the majority of people with mental illnesses who are not dangerous.
229
 
   
C.  THE CRIMINAL CIVIL DISTINCTION  
 
Suppose, however, that at least when combined with a substance abuse disorder, mental 
illness gives us good reason to suspect a heightened risk of violence.  In addition, we are able to 
predict violence to a reasonable degree of certainty.  What justifies assisted outpatient treatment 
based on our suspicion that, at some point in the future, the subject of a court order might harm 
others before he has actually done so?  As a general matter the other-regarding harms we aim to 
prevent through outpatient commitment are addressed through the deterrent and retributive 
functions of the criminal justice system.     
The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutionality of outpatient commitment.  
However, in a series of sex offender cases—Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane—the Court 
addressed an analogous problem that arises when states use civil commitment to detain sex 
offenders, beyond the expiration of their sentences, on the ground that they suffer from a mental 
abnormality and they present a serious danger to others.
230
                                                 
229 Jeffery W. Swanson, et al., Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: Did New York State’s Outpatient Commitment Program Crowd Out 
Voluntary Services? 61 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 988 (2010).  
  In both cases, the Court narrowed the 
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class of offenders eligible for civil commitment to those whose “mental abnormality” rendered them 
dangerous beyond their control.  Writing for the Court in Crane, Justice Breyer put it this way:  
 
It is enough to say that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature 
of the psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must 
be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental 
illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the 
dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.231
 
  
Echoing  Hendricks, Justice Breyer added that the distinction is a necessary one “lest civil 
commitment [should] become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence—functions 
properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment.”
232
In both Hendricks and Crane, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the criminal justice system as the 
preferred approach to garden variety criminal conduct.  The underlying assumption of the criminal 
law is that most of us have at least a normal capacity to understand what the law requires, and most 
of us have at least a normal capacity to order our conduct within the wide boundaries set by legal 
norms.  When culpable agents breach legal norms of their own volition, we speak of “crime” and 
“punishment,” rather than “breach” and “liability.”
 What should we make of the holdings in 
Hendricks and Crane? What do they imply for outpatient commitment?  
233
                                                 
231 Crane, 534 U.S. at 413.  
 In doing so, we communicate reprobation for 
wrongdoing, while also addressing the offender as a moral agent.  By contrast, the moral legitimacy 
of civil commitment rests on its limitation to persons who lack the capacities for moral 
responsibility. As Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock write, “[i]f the dangerous mentally ill are 
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justifiably treated differently, it must be because they are not capable of responsibly controlling their 
behavior that is dangerous to others as required by criminal prohibitions.”
234
In the same way, the Supreme Court limited sex offender commitments to those whose 
mental abnormalities rendered them unable to control their behavior.  Even so, critics argue that the 
Court’s inability-to-control formulation is vastly overbroad and unworkable. As Christopher 
Slobogin writes, “evidence that the impulses experienced by addicts, sexual offenders and people 
with psychosis are stronger than those that lead people to commit typical crime is hard to come by; 
burglars recidivate at least as much as sex offenders, and white collar criminals are probably just as 
‘driven’ by urges, albeit for things like wealth, fame or power rather than (or perhaps in addition to) 
drugs or sex.”
  
235  To that end, a second approach rejects the volitional impairment approach entirely.  
Adherents to this view, foremost among them, Eric Janus, Robert Schopp and Stephen Morse, argue 
that police power commitments are appropriate, but only for those who are, in essence, “too sick to 
deserve punishment.”
236  As Stephen Morse writes, “[f]or reasons much studied and theorized about, 
but in fact not very well understood, some unfortunate people are so irrational, so grossly out of 
touch with reality, that ascribing responsibility to them is a travesty according to any but the most 
extravagantly libertarian account of human agency.”
237
                                                 
234 ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION 
MAKING 329 (1990). 
 If under the grip of delusional beliefs such an 
 
235 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESSES OF LIFE 
AND LIBERTY, 131 (2006).  
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agent were to strike out at a perceived threatener, she would not be morally responsible for her 
actions, and therefore not deserving of legal punishment. 
My own view, to be developed in Part VI, rests on a combination of both approaches.  
Under certain circumstances, outpatient commitment may be appropriate for people with mental 
illnesses who are irrational in the way Morse suggests. Alternatively, outpatient commitment might 
be appropriate for people with mental illnesses who are unable to control their behavior.  Before 
offering an alternative approach to assisted outpatient treatment determinations, Part IV will 
consider further justifications for outpatient commitment.   
 
 
IV.  HARM TO SELF  
 
A more promising line of argument rests the justification for outpatient commitment on the 
harm that untreated mental illness presents to oneself.  Ordinarily, when we speak of harms 
associated untreated mental illnesses, we are concerned with harms to welfare interests.  On any 
given night in the United States roughly 600,000 people are homeless and 2 million are homeless at 
some point during the year. According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, between one quarter and one third of them have a serious mental illness, primarily 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or severe depression.
238  Studies have also shown that for people 
with severe and persistent mental illnesses, the failure to comply with prescribed medications can 
increase the risk of homelessness.
239
                                                 
238SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN., BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: ENDING CHRONIC 
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Services Admin., 2003). 
 For others, treatment noncompliance will lead predictably to 
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incarceration.  Of the nearly 2 million inmates held in jails and prisons, an estimated 300,000 suffer 
from a major mental illness.
240 Left untreated people with severe and persistent mental illnesses are 
also much more likely to commit suicide.
241
A second line of argument concerns harms related to the ultimate goals or aspirations of 
people with mental illnesses.  For example, the legislative findings for Kendra’s Law note that while 
there are some people with mental illnesses who are capable of living safely in the community with 
the help of family and friends, there are others who “without routine care and treatment, may 
relapse and become violent or suicidal, or require rehospitilization.”
   
242   Therefore an important goal 
of the assisted outpatient treatment program is to “restore patients’ dignity” and “enable mentally ill 
persons to lead more productive and satisfying lives.”
243  In the same way proponents of Kendra’s 
Law argue that court ordered outpatient treatment is justifiable to the extent that it allows revolving 
door patients “to actualise their positive liberty.”
244
                                                 
240 Fred E. Markowitz, Mental Illness, Crime and Violence: Risk, Context and Social Control, 16 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT 
BEHAV. 36 (2011); See also Paula M. Dittion, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE TREATMENT OF INMATES AND 
PROBATIONERS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: A SPECIAL REPORT (1999). 
 Where negative liberty refers to the right to be 
left alone, or freedom from undue interference, in these accounts, positive liberty refers to the 
capacity for self-governance, and the ability to set goals and meet them without being dominated by 
internal constraints. What should we make of these claims? 
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In 2005 John Dawson and colleagues interviewed a small group of psychiatric patients in 
New Zealand.
245 For some, involuntary treatment marked an important, albeit paradoxical, step 
toward freedom. While community treatment orders were associated with decreases in negative 
liberty, for some patients, community treatment also appeared to improve positive liberty.  Patients 
reported that treatment orders facilitated independence from the hospital and generally brought 
them back into society where they were able to do the things that mattered to them—hold down a 
decent job, be a better husband or a “normal Dad.”
246
Efforts to rest the justification for outpatient commitment on retrospective endorsements of 
treatment are not without their problems.  Empirical studies on so-called “thank you theories” of 
civil commitment have produced mixed results.  A large randomized controlled trial of outpatient 
commitment in North Carolina found little evidence to support a retrospective endorsement 
theory.
 When a person’s capacity for self-governance 
is seriously diminished by mental illness, Dawson argues that involuntary outpatient commitment 
might be justifiable to the extent that it yields improvements in positive liberty.  
247
                                                 
245 John Dawson, Concepts of Liberty in Mental Health, 12 OTAGO L. REV. 23 (2009). 
  Instead, as the authors note, most study participants did not endorse the benefits of 
outpatient treatment either because they did not believe that outpatient commitment was effective, 
or because they refused to believe that they needed treatment, or both. Moreover, in pressing these 
arguments, supporters of outpatient commitment overlook the paradox of positive liberty that Isaiah 
Berlin describes.  The paradox rests on the idea of a divided self—a dominant self identified with 
reason, my ideal, myself at its best, and an empirical self—“swept by every gust of desire and passion 
 
246 Id; see also Harold Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Patients’ Attitudes After Involuntary 
Medication, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1049 (1988) (arguing that for most patients, the decision to refuse 
medications is a manifestation of their illness and does not reflect autonomous decision making).  
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needing to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to the full height of its ‘real’ nature.”
248  With this 
division in mind, we may come to think of ourselves as merely assisting others in pursuit of their 
ideal self, in furtherance of their own interest, and for their own sake, not our own.  “Once I take 
this position,” Berlin writes, “I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men…to bully, 
oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf of their ‘real’ selves.”
249
 
   
 
V.  IMPAIRED INSIGHT  
 
One might think that court ordered participation in an AOT program under Kendra’s Law is 
justified by virtue of the fact that unlike people with general medical conditions, people with mental 
illnesses lack the capacity to make treatment decisions on their own.  Therefore courts may order 
outpatient treatment for them. However, not all people with mental illnesses are unable to make 
competent treatment decisions and Kendra’s Law does not require evidence of incompetence.
250 
Instead supporters of Kendra’s Law argue that outpatient commitment should be considered for 
anyone with a severe psychiatric disorder who lacks insight into his or her illness, and is at risk of 
harming themselves or others.
251
 In psychiatry, the term “insight” generally refers to the patient’s awareness that he or she is 
suffering from an illness.  In an early and influential paper on the psychopathology of insight, 
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SERVICES 337 (2001). 
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Aubrey Lewis described insight as “a correct attitude toward morbid change in oneself.”
252 Modern 
approaches describe insight along similar dimensions: (i) the patient’s recognition that he or she has 
a mental illness; (ii) the ability to relabel unusual events, such as delusions and hallucinations, as 
pathological; and (iii) compliance with treatment.
  253
We argue that outpatient commitment is needed because many individuals with 
severe psychiatric illness lack awareness of their illness. This deficit is biologically 
based and is not the same thing as psychological denial. Both schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder affect the prefrontal cortex, which is used for insight and 
understanding one’s needs.  When this area of the brain is damaged, the person 
loses self-awareness.
  In the debate surrounding Kendra’s Law, 
evidence regarding the biological basis of impaired insight has played an important role in the 
justification for assisted outpatient treatment.  E. Fuller Torrey and Mary Zdanowicz write: 
254
 
   
Torrey and Zdanowicz are outspoken proponents of Kendra’s Law.  Torrey and Zdanowicz argue 
that impaired illness awareness, common among patients with schizophrenia, resembles anosognosia 
among patients with neurological disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease, or patients who have 
suffered a stroke.  In classic cases of anosognosia, paraplegic patients who have suffered damage to 
the right hemisphere of the brain will deny that they are paralyzed on the left side of the body. When 
confronted with the affected limb, anosognostic patients may insist that the limb is not their own or 
express indifference in response to their paralysis.
255
                                                 
252 Aubrey Lewis, The Psychopathology of Insight, 14 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 333 (1934). See also, Anthony S. David, “To See 
Ourselves as Others See Us,” 175 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 210 (1999). 
   In the same way, it is not uncommon for 
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patients with schizophrenia to deny the symptoms of mental illness.  A study by Xavier Amador and 
colleagues assessed more than 400 patients with psychotic disorder and found that nearly 60% of 
patients with schizophrenia were unaware of having a mental illness.  When asked whether they had 
any mental, psychiatric or emotional problems, most patients answered an emphatic “no.”
 256
Torrey and Zdanowicz further argue that impaired illness awareness is biologically based, 
and therefore distinguishable from mere psychological denial.  For Torrey and Zdanowicz, the 
neurobiological basis of impaired illness awareness furnishes a critical distinction between people 
with mental illnesses and other people with general medical conditions who sometimes refuse 
treatment.  As the authors write: we can assume that when people with heart disease or arthritis 
refuse treatment, “their cognitive functioning and awareness of their illness are intact,” however, 
“one cannot make this assumption about an individual who has a severe psychiatric disorder.”
  When 
compared to patients with bipolar disorder or schizoaffective disorder, patients with schizophrenia 
were also less likely to acknowledge specific symptoms of mental disorder, including delusions, 
hallucinations, thought disorder and blunted affect.   
257  In 
the same way, other supporters of outpatient commitment argue that community treatment orders 
are justified for those whose “brain disorders prevent them from making an informed decision.”
258
Although plausible, arguments along these lines are not without their problems.  While 
several studies have found a significant correlation between impaired insight and poor performance 
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on tests of frontal lobe function, these correlations tend to be relatively modest.
259  Moreover, while 
many studies have found an association between poor insight and impaired frontal lobe function, 
many others have not.
260  Instead, studies suggest that there are multiple pathways to impaired 
insight, and many of them have little to do with neuropsychological impairment.  In some instances, 
a denial of mental illness may result from psychological denial regarding the severity of symptoms.
261  
In other instances, a person might deny that he has a mental illness because he believes that he has 
been wrongly diagnosed with a mental illness or at the very least misdiagnosed.  For the same 
reasons, a person might deny the benefits of treatment or understate the consequences of refusing 
treatment because in his experience he has been overmedicated or inappropriately medicated.  We 
know that African American men—who are often the subject of court ordered outpatient 
treatment—are significantly more likely to be misdiagnosed with schizophrenia, giving them good 
reason to challenge their diagnoses and the benefits of treatment in court.
262
Even when a person is prepared to acknowledge troubling or distressing symptoms to 
himself, the stigma surrounding the term “mental illness” can sometimes cause a person to deny that 
his experience is properly classified as a mental illness.  For others, a denial of mental illness will 
   
                                                 
259 See IVANA MARKOVÁ, INSIGHT IN PSYCHIATRY 103-09 (2005) (for a review of the empirical literature on insight 
and psychosis).  
 
260 See e.g. Alisa Mintz et al., Insight in Early Psychosis: A 1-Year Follow-Up, 61 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 75 (2004) (finding 
no association between insight and cognition at baseline or at follow up); see also Luca Arduini et al., Insight and 
Neuropsychological Function in Patients with Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder with Psychotic Features, 48 CANADIAN J. 
PSYCHIATRY 338 (2003) (finding no association between insight and cognitive variables).  
 
261 Michael Startup, Awareness of One’s Own and Others’ Schizophrenic Illness, 26 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 203; See also 
Lysaker et al., Patterns of Neurocognitive Deficits and Unawareness of Illness in Schizophrenia, 191 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL 
DISEASE 38 (2003) (positing that subgroups of patients with poor insight may show poor insight for different reasons 
including poor cognition and poor reality testing as well as a tendency to deny unpleasant things). 
 
262 See Arnold Barnes, Race and Hospital Diagnoses of Schizophrenia and Mood Disorders, 53 SOC. WORK 77 (2008); See 
generally JONATHAN MENZEL, THE PROTEST PSYCHOSIS: HOW SCHIZOPHRENIA BECAME A BLACK DISEASE (2011). 
 
 91 
 
stem from fundamental differences of opinion about what it means to have an “illness.” Whether a 
person understands himself as ill will depend on his experience of what it means to be ill, the 
meaning of the term “illness” in the world around him, and his observation of others who have been 
classified as ill.  
Evidence regarding impaired insight often plays a key role in assisted outpatient treatment 
hearings. Although Kendra’s Law does not use the term “insight,” court ordered outpatient 
treatment requires evidence that “as a result of his or her mental illness,” the subject of a petition for 
AOT is unlikely to participate in outpatient treatment voluntarily.
263  To that end, it is not 
uncommon for clinicians to reference poor insight as evidence that the person is unlikely to 
cooperate with outpatient treatment absent court ordered supervision.  However, clinical judgments 
regarding the patient’s level of insight may be extraordinarily difficult to challenge in court since 
patients’ accounts of their own illness are routinely discounted.
264   Judgments about insight may also 
depend on the patient’s attitudes toward treatment and whether patients agree with their diagnosis.  
During an interview, an attorney for the Mental Hygiene Legal Service expressed her frustration: 
When respondents are asked whether they have a mental illness, “doctors are looking for a very 
specific answer to that question” even though many of her clients would prefer to describe their 
symptoms as the product of a “chemical imbalance,” or anything other than a mental illness.
265
The same attorney wondered whether her clients would  ever be able to verbalize the 
symptoms of their mental illnesses in a way that would convince the court of their insightfulness.  It 
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may be that we underestimate what it would require to enter a courtroom, sit before a judge and 
make an oral argument on one’s own behalf.  The ideal respondent would describe her symptoms in 
detail, eloquently remarking on the textbook definition of her illness, and her particular illness 
experience.  However, when respondents fall short of this standard, what are we really hearing?  
How much of their lack luster testimony is the result of poor education, lack of preparation, anxiety, 
or the foreignness of the forum and the foreignness of the task itself? Instead the attorney felt that 
what should matter in these proceedings is whether her clients are actually complying with 
treatment.  However, even if insight were a function of the respondent’s behavior, during an AOT 
renewal hearing it would be incredibly difficult for the respondent to convince the court that a 
period of treatment compliance during the proceeding AOT order was the result of greater insight.  
The problem for the court is simple—how can a judge know whether a period of treatment 
compliance was the product of greater insight or the threat of a 72 hour hospitalization?  In Part VI 
I argue that we should reject impaired insight as a measure of diminished mental capacity and 
instead limit assisted outpatient treatment to people with mental illnesses who are unable to make 
competent treatment decisions on their own.   
 
 
 
VI.  COMPETENCE TO REFUSE TREATMENT  
 
 
As Alan Buchanan and Dan Brock have observed, competence is always competence “to do 
something,” at a particular time, under particular circumstances; therefore, the appropriate concept 
of competence is a decision-relative and a variable one.
266
                                                 
266 ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION 
MAKING 18 (1990).  
  Second, as Buchanan and Brock rightly 
argue, settling on an appropriate competence standard is not simply a matter of settling on the 
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correct test, but rather a process of balancing competing values and guarding against two kinds of 
error.  The first error (Type I or false positive) results from choosing a standard of competence that 
is too low, and failing to protect the person from the harmful consequences of his or her decisions, 
when those decisions stem from serious defects in the capacity to decide.  The second error (Type II 
or false negative) results when we choose a threshold for competence that is too high and we fail to 
allow a person to make her own choices when she is able to do so.
267
For the person whose competence is being assessed, the right to accept or refuse outpatient 
treatment will often hold a combination of instrumental and non-instrumental value.  As Brock and 
Buchanan write, although the physician brings her knowledge of medicine and health to the doctor 
patient relationship, “health is only one value among many.”
 
268 Once the physician has informed me 
of the risks and benefits associated with a particular treatment, I am in the best position to 
determine “which intervention, if any, best serves my wellbeing, as I conceive it.”
269 Thus the right 
to make important treatment decisions may be instrumentally valuable in the promotion of 
wellbeing.  However, even when others are in a better position to make choices for us, most people 
want to make important choices about their own lives.  Often our choices, ranging from the 
mundane and everyday, to important choices about how to live our lives, have both instrumental 
and non-instrumental value. For example, choices about medical treatment are likely to have 
considerable symbolic value.
270
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 Most people who are competent to make decisions about medical 
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treatment are permitted to do so.  Therefore, I may value choice because without it, I will feel that 
the absence of choice is degrading.  If I am a person of faith, I may value choices regarding medical 
treatment—including the choice to forego treatment—because it matters to me that I am able to 
incorporate elements of my faith into healing.  In these moments, my choices about treatment may 
have considerable demonstrative value. 
Like most authors on competence, I agree that competence to refuse treatment requires the 
ability to understand key facts involved in a decision to refuse treatment, the ability to engage in 
basic reasoning about those facts, the ability to reach a decision and the ability to communicate a 
stable choice.  However, in contrast to other authors on competence, I argue that an emphasis on 
appreciation or insight as a measure of competence is misplaced.
271
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  Instead in Part VI.A I argue for 
a cognitive approach to assessing competence.  When our primary concern is one of self-regarding 
harm, our only question should be whether the person is competent to refuse treatment. However, 
Part VI.B. goes on to address a further concern—at times we will worry that refusing outpatient 
treatment could result in harm to others, not merely in harm to oneself.  For reasons similar to those 
raised by the Court in Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane, Part VI.B. asserts that when our 
primary concern is one of other-regarding harm, a court order to participate in assisted outpatient 
treatment may be appropriate, but only for people with mental illnesses who are unlikely to 
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appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct, or those who lack the capacity to conform their 
conduct to the requirements of the law.    
 
A.  HARM TO SELF  
 
i.  MODEL RULE: HARM TO SELF   
 
(a)  A person who is competent to refuse outpatient treatment, as defined in section 
(b) of this rule, shall not be ordered to participate in an assisted outpatient 
treatment program on the ground that refusing treatment is likely to result in 
harm to himself.   
 
(b) A person is competent to refuse outpatient treatment if:  
 
(1) he understands the proposed treatment plan and the consequences of 
refusing treatment;  
(2) he is able to reason through relevant information; and 
(3) he is able to communicate a choice.  
 
 
 
1.  UNDERSTANDING  
 
A person who is competent to refuse treatment must possess at least a rudimentary 
understanding of the basic features of his illness and the proposed treatment plan.  Whether he 
believes he has an illness or not, and whether he believes that treatment will help him or not, he 
must at least understand that his physician believes he has an illness and that his physician believes 
that the recommended treatment could help him.  Any less and we would worry that the person is 
too impaired or too disoriented for us to view his treatment decisions as competent.  
As to this element of competence, it should be enough that the person understands his 
decision in this basic factual sense:  he is aware of his medical diagnosis, he can explain it in lay 
terms, and he understands the proposed treatment plan, as well as the primary risks and benefits 
associated with treatment.  However, most authors on competence think that understanding should 96 
 
also incorporate a notion of understanding as appreciation or insight.
272  For example, Louis 
Charland writes: “[a]ppreciation consists in an individual’s ability to apply his or her current 
understanding of a given medical condition to him or herself.  It is one thing to understand what 
schizophrenia is, but quite another to recognise that this information applies to you.”
273
Approaches to competence that require some degree of “appreciation” will fail to account 
for instances of reasonable disagreement.  At times, clinicians and patients may agree on most 
aspects of a case, yet fail to agree on a diagnosis.  For example, a person might acknowledge feelings 
of sadness, fatigue and loss of energy for most of the day, for more than two weeks—and indeed, 
acknowledge the recurrence of these feelings over time—yet express some ambivalence about 
whether he has a mental illness.  Clinicians and patients will sometimes disagree over whether 
feelings of sadness and depression are pathological, or merely a normal reaction to external 
circumstances.  Others may feel that their symptoms do not rise to the level of an illness.   
 Charland 
and I are in agreement here, but only in a weak sense.  In order to meet the understanding prong of 
a competence test, it should be enough for a person to understand that a psychiatric assessment is 
an assessment of him, not some hypothetical person.  Charland, however, intends something more.  
By “recognise” I take Charland to mean “agree” so that a person must agree that he has an illness 
called schizophrenia.  However on the view of competence I am proposing to require agreement on 
diagnosis would require too much.   
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Consider a person who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Schizophrenia is a psychotic 
disorder, characterized by hallucinations, delusions, disorganized speech, and disorganized behavior.  
Although symptoms of psychosis frequently accompany schizophrenia, a wide variety of medical 
conditions can include psychotic symptoms, including substance-induced psychosis, delusional 
disorder and bipolar disorder.
274  The positive symptoms of schizophrenia—delusions, 
hallucinations and paranoia—resemble the symptoms of a mania, while the negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia—flattened affect, emotional withdrawal  and social isolation—can resemble 
depression, leading clinicians to confuse schizophrenia with bipolar disorder, or vice versa.
275  For 
example, as I noted above African American men tend to be overrepresented among patients who 
have been diagnosed with schizophrenia and underrepresented among patients who have been 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression.
276 However, large epidemiological surveys designed 
to measure the prevalence of mental disorders have shown that the prevalence of schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder and depression does not vary by ethnicity.  The clinical tendency to overdiagnose 
schizophrenia among African Americans might arise for any number of reasons, ranging from 
cultural differences in the expression of symptomatology to “the cultural distance” between clinician 
and patient.
277
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  The result, however, is that a reasonable person might “recognise” that a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia applies to him, yet insist that he has been wrongly diagnosed nonetheless.   
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2. REASONING AND COMMUNICATION 
 
Competence also requires an ability to reason about treatment and the ability to 
communicate a choice. What is required here is not perfect rationality, but rather at least a basic 
ability to reach conclusions that are logically consistent with starting premises.
278  Doing so will 
require an ability to weigh the risks and benefits of treatment against one’s values, as well as at least a 
basic understanding of probabilities.  For example, a person who is competent to refuse a 
recommended course of treatment should understand what it would mean for an outcome to be 
more likely than not.
279
Most authors on competence agree that an assessment of competence should focus on the 
quality of the reasoning process, rather than the rationality or reasonableness of the outcome.
 
280 Our 
focus on the quality of the reasoning process should also include limits on the kinds of reasons that 
are permitted to factor into a competent decision.  The problem, of course, lies in determining 
which reasons to exclude.  Some reasons are irrelevant as obvious non-sequiturs and provide ready 
grounds for exclusion: I am refusing treatment because today is Tuesday.
281  Other reasons are, to 
use Elyn Saks’ term, “patently and demonstrably false”—Zyprexa is made of green cheese; my 
psychiatrist is an alien.
282
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the most superficial reading of the data will indicate their falsity.”
283 Patently false beliefs are also 
distinguishable from simple delusions.  To borrow her example, consider a patient who suffers from 
depression and believes she is a bad person, although others think she is a very good person.
284
Still, not all of the reasons one might offer for refusing treatment are obviously irrelevant or 
susceptible to ready proof as patently and demonstrably false.  In the first category are factual 
questions that are susceptible to proof.  In the second category are reasons based on beliefs, the 
most challenging of which may be reasons for treatment refusal based on religious beliefs.  Consider 
the Jehovah’s Witness who refuses a blood transfusion owing to his belief that the Bible prohibits 
ingesting blood and contains the word of God.  We can neither prove nor disprove the existence of 
God, and yet our commitment to religious pluralism necessitates some allowance for reasons of this 
kind to factor into treatment decisions.   
  Her 
belief may be false and it may be a delusion, but it is not patently or indisputably false.  If, on the 
other hand, she were to believe that she is an evil person because she committed mass murder, even 
though she had not, such a belief would be patently and demonstrably false.  When a person harbors 
patently false beliefs despite evidence to the contrary, we have good reason to believe that he or she 
is incapacitated and unable to make competent treatment decisions.   
And yet if we accept faith as a legitimate reason for treatment refusal in these circumstances, 
how can we distinguish the Jehovah’s Witness from the person who refuses treatment, not owing to 
his belief in God, but owing to his belief that he is God? The Jesus delusion is the most common of 
all psychiatric delusions, combining both delusions of grandeur and persecution.
285
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frequently encounter patients who believe they are Jesus, the  Virgin Mary, or other figures of 
religious or historical importance, and a claim to be any one of them is virtually certain to result in a 
diagnosis of serious psychopathology.
286 For some, the Jesus delusion results from a confusion of 
similarities and identities—Jesus was a man with a blondish beard. I am a man with a blondish 
beard; therefore, I am Jesus.
287
When confronted with this question, clinicians will ordinarily ask whether the patient’s 
beliefs predate the treatment decision, whether the patient has previously behaved in ways that are 
consistent with those beliefs and whether the patient’s beliefs are reflective of religious views held by 
others.
  We can imagine circumstances in which persons come to see 
themselves as Jesus in a merely metaphorical sense that can be clarified in conversation.  In these 
circumstances, by itself the Jesus delusion would not be sufficient grounds to conclude that a person 
is incompetent to make treatment decisions. However, I think we want to say that a person who 
persists in his belief that he is in fact the risen son of God is not competent to make treatment 
decisions.  
288
                                                 
286 Id at 132. 
  Insofar as we are interested in determining whether the patient’s reasons for refusing 
treatment reflect genuine religious beliefs, the thought here is that if the beliefs are unconventional 
or idiosyncratic to the patient, they are more likely to indicate psychopathology.  However, in 
contrast to the dominant medical view, Elyn Saks argues that a normatively desirable standard would 
afford considerable protection to unconventional or idiosyncratic beliefs.  Saks writes that while 
there may be some limits on what patients can believe, “limits that are too stringent severely curtail 
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that patients’ freedom to be unconventional in their pursuit of truth.”
289 Since many people hold 
distorted beliefs, we risk “discriminating against the mentally ill if we disable them based on their 
distortions.”
290
 
 Instead Saks draws the line at patently false beliefs, asserting that only patently false 
beliefs should disqualify a person from competence.  How should we think about this?  Consider the 
following case study, involving Ricardo Jesus B.:   
Several months before he came to us with a diagnosis of paranoid psychosis, 
Ricardo Jesus experienced a series of severe epileptic seizures. When the seizures 
ended, Ricardo developed a psychotic condition.  His delusion consisted of the 
following—during the seizure, epileptic Ricardo died and Jesus B. survived. He, 
Ricardo, now Jesus B., had been in heaven seated at the right hand of the Father.  
The sick person, Ricardo who everyone in the village laughed at is dead. In his 
place Jesus B. survives.  Jesus B. is not identical to Jesus Christ, but close to him 
since they bear the same name. In the hospital, Ricardo was always in a good mood 
and respected by other patients. One day he asked for a certificate of discharge so 
politely and with such irreproachable behavior, that we let him leave.  He came 
back to us twice—always glad, emanating a naïve saintliness and telling anyone who 
wanted to hear him how happy he was to no longer be an epileptic at whom 
everyone laughed, and how happy he was to spread the good news to mortals, first 
to his neighbors in the little mountain village where he cares for his goats, and then 
to anyone else who is willing to receive it.291
 
  
The case study comes from Ottor Doerr and Óscar Velásquez, in the Department of Psychiatry, 
University of Chile.  I think most of us would say that the doctors who released Ricardo B. were 
right to do so. With little or no risk of harm to himself, there is no reason to keep him in a hospital.  
Suppose, however, that instead of spreading the good news to his neighbors, in a little mountain 
village in Chile, Ricardo B. lives in New York City.  He continues to believe that at least in some 
way, he has been reincarnated as the son of God. Only now, Ricardo B. believes that, like Jesus, 
God has called upon him to live a life of suffering.  So he huddles in abandoned buildings for 
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warmth with no money, no food and nowhere to go. If we were to accept Elyn Saks’ view, then 
despite a diagnosis of psychosis and despite the obvious risk of harm to himself, courts would have 
no authority to insist that Ricardo B. participate in treatment, since his sincere belief that he is the 
son God is neither irrelevant, nor patently and demonstrably false.  
By drawing the line at patently false beliefs, Saks protects the right to hold idiosyncratic 
ideas.  However in doing so she also overvalues the interest in autonomy.  Autonomy matters—the 
right to hold idiosyncratic beliefs matters—but it’s not the only thing that matters.  Settling on the 
appropriate standard for competence to refuse psychiatric treatment involves a process of balancing 
competing and at times conflicting values.  On the one hand, there are Ricardo B.’s interests in 
making  his own choices about outpatient treatment.  On the other hand, we also have an interest in 
protecting would-be patients from the harmful consequences of their decisions when those 
decisions stem from serious defects in the capacity to decide.  Religious delusions also reside in an 
ambiguous territory between psychopathology and a merely unusual religious belief.  Given the 
severity of the harm and our uncertainty, a court might reasonably err on the side of caution and 
order outpatient commitment.  
 
B.  HARM TO OTHERS  
 
What should we say about a person who presents a substantial risk of harm to others by 
virtue of mental illness, but who is competent to refuse treatment nonetheless?  
 
Following a fight with his mother, during which he “accidentally” pushed her to 
the ground, Gary, a 30-year-old man, was admitted to a psychiatric hospital with a 
diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. According to hospital records, Gary was 
“malodorous,” and “experiencing bizarre delusions,” including a delusional belief 
that he was growing extra body parts and being controlled by “Larry,” who “likes 
to eat people’s organs with a knife and fork.” During an inpatient therapy session, 
Gary threw a psychiatrist against a wall and struck a resident with his fists, claiming 
that he was “unable to control his arms.” After a few weeks in the hospital, the 
symptoms of psychosis improve and Gary files a petition to be released from the 
hospital.  During the hearing, Gary’s mother testifies to Gary’s history of assault, 
treatment noncompliance and substance abuse following his release from 103 
 
psychiatric hospitals.  Doctors petition the court for assisted outpatient treatment 
in an effort to prevent a relapse of psychosis that would be likely to result in serious 
harm to others.  Gary, however, refuses to participate in the program.292
 
   
 
What should we do? Suppose Gary is competent to refuse treatment. He understands the basic 
features of his illness and the proposed treatment plan. By all accounts his reasons for refusing 
treatment are neither irrelevant nor demonstrably false, and he is able to communicate a stable 
choice.  Still, I think a fair outpatient commitment program could order Gary to participate in 
outpatient treatment, notwithstanding a finding of competence.  Our challenge, however, will be to 
distinguish Gary—subject to preventive outpatient commitment—from others whose dangerous 
behaviors are more appropriately addressed through the criminal justice system.  
In both Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane, the Supreme Court affirmed the deterrent and 
retributive functions of the criminal justice system as the preferred approach to handling garden 
variety criminal conduct.  And in both cases, the Court held that states may use civil commitment to 
detain sex offenders beyond the expiration of their sentences when a mental abnormality makes it 
“difficult, if not impossible for the person to control his behavior.” 
293  Yet as I noted above, critics 
argue that the Court’s impaired control standard is at best confused and overbroad.  Instead police 
power commitments are only appropriate for persons who are grossly irrational by virtue of mental 
illness or in essence, “too sick to deserve punishment.”
294
                                                 
292 Case study based on Andrew Goldstein, See CHARLES EWING, INSANITY, MURDER, MADNESS AND THE LAW 114 
– 127 (2008); IN THE MATTER OF DAVID DIX, supra note 36.  
 By retooling the insanity defense, Part VI 
develops the intuition that persons who are appropriate candidates for outpatient commitment do 
not qualify for criminal punishment either because they are grossly irrational as Stephen Morse 
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argues, or because they are unable to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law. Part VI 
provides a brief overview of the insanity defense and proposes a model rule.  
 
i.  THE INSANITY DEFENSE  
 
The earliest and best known test of criminal insanity is the McNaghten Rule.  Daniel 
M’Naghten suffered from a delusional belief that he was being persecuted by the Prime Minister of 
Great Britain, Sir Robert Peel.
295  Believing Peel’s assistant Edward Drummond to be Sir Robert 
Peel, M’Naghten shot and killed Drummond on January 20, 1843.  M’Naghten was acquitted by 
reason of insanity, and in response to the public outrage the House of Lords formulated the 
McNaghten Rule.  Under the McNaghten Rule, a person has an insanity defense if, at the time of 
committing the act, “the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of 
the mind” as not to know “the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or as not to know that 
what he was doing was wrong.”
  296 The McNaghten Rule was soon criticized for focusing too 
narrowly on the ability to distinguish right from wrong conduct and overlooking control 
impairments due to mental disease or defect.
297  As a result some jurisdictions supplemented the 
McNaghten Rule with an “irresistible impulse” test.  Under the McNaghten-plus-irresistible-impulse 
test, a person has an insanity defense if—(i) he satisfies the McNaghten Rule; or (ii) he has “lost the 
power to choose between right and wrong,” by reason of mental disease or defect, and the alleged 
crime was so connected to such mental disease or defect as to have been the product of it.
298
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  In 1965 the American Law Institute published the Model Penal Code (MPC).  Section 4.01, 
Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility, combines elements of the irresistible impulse 
test and the McNaghten Rule. Under the MPC test:  
 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a  
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate 
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.299
 
  
In contrast to the McNaghten Rule and the irresistible impulse test, the Model Penal Code relieves 
the defendant of criminal responsibility if, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacks 
“substantial capacity” to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  The McNaghten Rule and the irresistible impulse test, on the other hand, 
appear to require total impairment in the ability to know that one’s conduct was wrong or a total 
loss in the ability to choose between right and wrong.   
The Model Penal Code also allows the defendant to prevail on an insanity defense if he 
failed to appreciate the “criminality” or “wrongfulness” of his conduct.  According to the drafters of 
the Model Code, “[a]n individual’s failure to appreciate the criminality of his conduct may consist in 
a lack of awareness of what he is doing or a misapprehension of material circumstances, or a failure 
to apprehend the significance of his actions in some deeper sense.”
300 Given the seriousness of most 
cases in which defendants assert an insanity defense, the difference between criminality and 
wrongfulness is unlikely to arise in most situations with only two exceptions.
301
                                                 
299 Model Penal Code § 4.01 (1985).  
  The difference in 
wording might matter if the defendant understood an action to be legally prohibited but 
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commanded by God or morally justified nonetheless.
302  Second, and less likely, it may be that 
defendant grasps the difference between right and wrong, but as a result of a mental defect, fails to 
understand the concept of a crime or government prohibition.
303
The Model Penal Code has been widely adopted in the United States.  Twelve states and the 
District of Columbia have adopted the Model Penal Code formulation in its entirety; and nine states, 
including New York, have adopted the cognitive prong of the Model Penal Code test.
 
304  As a result, 
a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity in New York bears the burden of proving by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he lacked the substantial capacity to know or appreciate either 
the nature and consequences of such conduct or that such conduct was wrong.
305
In crafting a model outpatient commitment rule, we need not be hamstrung by New York 
law.  Given the interest in public safety, limiting outpatient commitment to persons who are unable 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct would be too narrow.  Consider the following rule 
combining Kendra’s Law with the Model Penal Code:  
 In contrast to the 
Model Penal Code, New York does not allow for the possibility that a person might be not guilty by 
reason insanity if he lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the law.   
 
ii.  MODEL RULE: HARM TO OTHERS  
 
(a)  A person who is competent to refuse treatment may be ordered to participate in 
an outpatient treatment program if, in view of his history or current behavior, he 
is likely to harm others as defined in section (b) of this article; and  
   
                                                 
302 Id. at 170.  
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304 See ROBINSON, supra, note 156, at 369.  
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(1) as a result of mental illness, he is unlikely to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct; or  
 
(2) as a result of mental illness, he lacks the capacity to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law.  
 
(b) As used in this article the words “likely to harm” shall mean a substantial risk of 
serious physical harm as manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior.   
 
 
 
1.  COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT 
 
Under part (a)(1) of the proposed rule, a person who is competent to refuse treatment may 
be ordered to participate in outpatient treatment if, in view of his history or current behavior, he is 
likely to harm others, and as a result of a mental illness, he is unlikely to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct.  Following the Model Penal Code we can say that a person may be unlikely to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct if, in the past, he has failed to apprehend material 
circumstances as a result of a mental illness, or failed to apprehend the significance of his conduct in 
some deeper sense.  Suppose the fight that landed Gary in the hospital was not an “accident.”  
Instead, Gary pushed his mother to the ground based on a delusional belief that his family was 
plotting against him and, indeed, trying to kill him.  During an outpatient commitment hearing, 
Gary’s sister testifies that her brother’s delusional beliefs about their family are longstanding and all-
encompassing.  On several occasions Gary has choked her and thrown her to the ground. During 
the worst incident, he held a knife to her throat.  On the stand his sister sobbed: “When I asked him, 
Gary, why?” he said “You’re the devil.  You came here to hurt me.  Didn’t you?”  
In its jurisprudence on preventive detention, mental illness and violence,  the Supreme Court 
has often said: “[i]n our society, liberty is the norm.”
306
                                                 
306 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85 (1992); See also U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).  
  However that liberty rests on certain 
fundamental presuppositions—foremost among them that, for the most part, our rational faculties 
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are intact.  A person who believes that his sister is the devil is no longer competent to answer to the 
retributive functions of the criminal law.  If Gary were to harm his sister, he would likely prevail on 
the cognitive arm of an insanity defense.  However, the same cognitive impairments that exempt 
him from criminal punishment also identify him as an appropriate candidate for outpatient civil 
commitment. The more difficult question is this—what constitutes clear and convincing evidence 
that, as a result of a mental illness, a person is unlikely to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct? By definition, insanity defenses are necessarily backward looking and driven by conduct 
that has already taken place.  Although risk assessments are necessarily fraught, as I mentioned 
above, a past history of violence is one of the best predictors of violence.  The fact that Gary has a 
long history of violent assault connected to his delusional beliefs, suggests that without supervised 
medical treatment, he is likely to engage in similarly assaultive behavior.   
 
2.  VOLITIONAL IMPAIRMENT  
 
Alternatively, under part (a)(2) of the proposed rule, a person who is competent to refuse 
treatment may be ordered to participate in outpatient treatment if he is likely to harm others, and as 
a result of a mental illness, he lacks the capacity to conform his conduct to the law.  Consistent with 
the Model Penal Code formulation, what is required here is not that the person manifests a total 
inability to conform his conduct to the law, but only that his impairment is not insubstantial.
307
 
  
Consider the following statement from Andrew Goldstein. When questioned by the police, 
Goldstein attributed his actions to an “overwhelming urge.”  
I walked to the far end of the platform…. As I’m walking I felt a sensation like 
something was entering me like a ghost or a spirit or something like that.  While I 
was walking it fell out of me.  When I have the sensation that something is entering 
me, I get the urge to push, shove or sidekick.  As the train was coming—it—the 
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feeling disappeared and came back several times….As I was standing on the 
platform, there was a woman standing waiting for the train.  She was facing the 
incoming train and I was standing behind her.  I got the urge to push, kick or 
punch….I feel like an aura, or a sensation like you’re losing control of your motor 
systems.  And then, you lose control of your senses and everything.  And then you 
feel like something’s entering you.  Like you’re being inhabited.  I don’t know.  
But—and then, it’s like an overwhelming urge to strike out or push or punch…308
 
 
Stephen Morse has long argued that courts should reject the notion of an “uncontrollable urge” or 
any other purported loss of control as a justifiable predicate for civil commitment.
309
Without canvassing all of his arguments, below I want to challenge some of the more 
important ones, and in doing so suggest that we have reason to reconsider the use of a volitional 
impairment standard for outpatient civil commitment. Morse rests his arguments on a thin 
conception of moral responsibility.  Morse takes the capacity for rationality to be the defining—and 
indeed the singular—feature of moral responsibility.  But why should that be the case? In various 
places, Morse writes that our capacity for reason distinguishes human beings from the rest of the 
natural world.
  Along with 
Robert Schopp, Morse starts from the premise that civil commitment amounts to a massive 
curtailment of liberty, one that can only be justified by limiting its use to people who are not morally 
responsible for their conduct.  On the other hand, Morse thinks that only a defect in the capacity for 
rationality can work as a coherent non-responsibility criterion.   
310
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  Moreover, it is our capacity for rationality that explains why, as a general matter, 
our society does not confine for dangerousness alone, but instead treats human actors as moral 
agents who are capable of evaluating their conduct and responding to the law’s commands.  Yet 
such a narrow conception of moral responsibility seems strangely lacking.   
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Suppose you invite me to a dinner party.  Reluctantly, I accept.  As dinner drags on, I twitch,  
I grimace and I jerk, as I wage a silent battle against the ticks and pops of Tourette’s Syndrome.  I 
say to myself: “I know I’m a good person. I know I’m a good person. I won’t mention your 
husband’s beer belly,” but then, before I know it, out it slips: “beer belly! Beer belly! Beer belly! 
BEER BELLY!” In my horror I knock over a bottle of wine and stain your new dress. I fully 
understand that I have done something wrong by offending my friend’s husband, but I couldn’t help 
it. Morse takes the position that a  mentally abnormal cause is merely a cause. “Whether a 
predisposing factor is produced by a mental disorder or by some other ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ cause 
makes no difference to whether the agent is responsible.  A cause is just a cause, and causation per 
se is not an excuse.”
311 It may be that Morse has conflated the fact that an action is fully attributable 
to an agent with moral responsibility.
312
Morse goes on to argue that control impairments are better understood as defects in the 
capacity for rationality. There is certainly a sense in which Goldstein’s urge to “push, shove or 
sidekick,” stems from a mental abnormality that we can understand, roughly, as a defect in  
rationality.  On the other hand, the jurors who convicted him of second degree murder didn’t think 
so.  In People v. Andrew Goldstein, Andrew Goldstein pled not guilty by reason of insanity.
  The disruption caused by offending your husband, 
knocking over a bottle of wine and staining your new dress is fully attributable to me, but my 
blameworthiness is diminished to the extent that my outburst was caused by a neurological 
condition that is beyond my control.   
313
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prosecutors established that Goldstein knew that what he was doing was wrong and Goldstein 
conceded as much:   
Prosecutor: Well, did you expect that she would go off the   
                    platform?  
             Goldstein: No. No. No. No. I would never push anybody off   
                                the tracks.  
Prosecutor: Because you know it’s wrong.  
Goldstein: Yeah.314
 
  
Even if Morse is right, and defenses based on a loss of control really are better understood as 
defects in the capacity for rationality, juries are unlikely to appreciate that subtlety.  Instead jurors are 
more likely to understand their duty as applying the letter of the law, which means not reading a 
control defense into an insanity defense without clear textual support.  In New York, the absence of 
a volitional impairment standard has clear implications for the insanity defense; as a result, Andrew 
Goldstein was found guilty, and indeed blameworthy, for the death of Kendra Webdale.  However, 
the absence of volitional element would also have implications for an outpatient commitment 
statute.  Without it, states would not have the power to reach someone like Andrew Goldstein.   
A further objection to the control impairment argument concerns the degree to which a 
person must lack the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, and whether we 
can reliably distinguish those who unable to conform their conduct to the law from those who are 
merely unwilling to order their conduct within the law.
315  Volitional impairment arguments fell out 
of favor in the early 1980s when John Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Regan.
316
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Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity owing in part to testimony that he was 
delusional and unable to control his behavior.  In the aftermath of the Hinckley trial, the American 
Psychiatric Association advocated abolishing the volitional impairment test, on the ground that 
psychiatrists were unable to provide reliable testimony on self-control.
317  Others noted the absence 
of an objective methodology for determining volitional impairment.
318
What should we make of these claims? In Crane Justice Breyer conceded that the Court did 
not give the term “lack of control” a precise meaning, nor could it.
  
319  In cases where the 
defendant’s ability to control his or her behavior is at issue, “inability to control,” will not be 
demonstrable with mathematical precision.”
320  On the other hand the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) has developed a set of guidelines for experts to use when determining whether a sex offender 
has “serious difficulty” controlling his or her behavior.
321
                                                 
317 Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983)(adding “[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably 
no sharper than that between twilight and dusk”).  
  Under the BOP guidelines relevant 
evidence might include—a risk assessment placing the defendant in a high risk category; offending 
while under supervision; engaging in offenses when likely to get caught; statements of intent to 
reoffend; an admission of difficulty controlling behavior; or general self-regulation problems in 
social settings. Similarly, in outpatient commitment cases, courts might consider evidence leading to 
a prior hospitalization.  For example, Andrew Goldstein’s psychiatric record documents several 
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instances in which Goldstein swung or punched at others without provocation. And on more than 
one occasion before the death of Webdale, Goldstein complained of hearing voices and being 
unable to control his arms.
322
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When our primary concern is one of self-regarding harm, I have argued that a court order to 
participate in outpatient treatment requires a finding of incompetence.  In its current form, Kendra’s 
Law does not require a judicial finding of incompetence and as a result, Kendra’s Law is needlessly 
overbroad.  If, however, we are concerned about harm to others, a court order to participate in 
outpatient treatment may be appropriate for people with mental illnesses who are unlikely to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct, or otherwise unable to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  By not limiting assisted outpatient treatment orders to people with mental 
illnesses who are unlikely to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or unable to control their 
behavior, Kendra’s Law intrudes on the purview of the criminal justice system, a result clearly 
disfavored in Hendricks and Crane.   
An approach of this kind is likely to raise a few objections.  The first is that my emphasis on 
competence to refuse treatment stems from an overvaluation of autonomy.  Others will argue that I 
have misunderstood, or at least too narrowly understood, what it means to respect autonomy.  We 
can respect autonomy, not only by respecting competent treatment decisions, but also by 
intervening to preserve autonomy.  However, arguments along these lines provide a dangerous 
justification for outpatient commitment and are ripe for potential abuse.   
Second, an approach that restricts compulsory mental health treatment to those who are 
incompetent to make treatment decisions, or otherwise incompetent to bear the burdens of the 
criminal law, would place many people with serious and persistent mental illnesses beyond the scope 
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of court ordered treatment.  However, even the best studies on outpatient commitment have shown 
that a court order to participate in treatment only adds value when combined with a high level of 
outpatient services, on the order of three or more visits per month.
323  On the ground, providers 
have also indicated that outpatient commitment works primarily by placing an order on the provider 
to render services.
324  Other studies have shown that there may be effective alternatives to outpatient 
commitment including assertive community treatment, intensive case management and supported 
housing.
325
 
  There is a place for Kendra’s Law but it requires adequate resources to ensure that 
effective services are available and further amendment to protect the liberty interests of the mentally 
ill.     
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CHAPTER 3  
 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, DRUG TESTING AND THE LAW:  
A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
In 2011 three dozen states considered bills that require applicants to pass a drug test before 
they qualify for income assistance through the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program 
(TANF).
326  Several state legislators have also proposed bills that would require applicants to pass a 
drug test in order to qualify for food stamps, public housing, home heating assistance and 
unemployment benefits.
327  To date, eight states condition public assistance benefits on passing a 
drug test, including—Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee and 
Utah.
328  Proposals to condition public assistance on passing a drug test have also appeared in 
Congress.  At the federal level, the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 authorizes 
states to condition unemployment benefits on passing a drug test and to deny unemployment 
benefits to anyone who fails a drug test.
329
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House and Senate, would require all 50 states to deny TANF assistance to anyone who tests positive 
for illegal drugs and to anyone convicted of a drug-related crime.
330
Although most states require a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use before conducting a 
drug test, Florida and Georgia do not. Both states require a drug test for all TANF applicants 
irrespective of drug history or current suspicion of illegal drug use.  In Florida, Governor Scott has 
emphasized the unfairness of asking taxpayers to subsidize illegal drug use.  In a statement to the 
press, Scott put it this way: “While there are certainly legitimate needs for public assistance, it is 
unfair for Florida taxpayers to subsidize drug addiction.”
   
331  He continued: “This new law will 
encourage personal accountability and will help to prevent the misuse of tax dollars.”
332  In Missouri, 
Representative Ellen Brandom, echoed Scott’s concerns: “We should discourage drug use and not 
reward it.”  She continued: “Working people today work very hard to make ends meet, and it just 
doesn’t seem fair to them that their tax dollars go to support illegal things.”
333
While support for drug testing has largely focused on the unfairness of asking taxpayers to 
subsidize illegal drug use, supporters have also invoked other government interests in drug testing, 
including a state interest in providing an incentive for people to get off drugs.  In Georgia, the State 
Legislature has said that an important purpose of the new law is to reduce the danger that children 
will be exposed to drugs in the home.
   
334
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have asserted a state interest in preventing drug-related child abuse, as well as a state interest in 
identifying TANF recipients for whom substance abuse might present a barrier  to employment.
335  
In addition, both Florida and Georgia have asserted a state interest in not funding the public health 
and crime risks associated with drug use.
336  In response, critics maintain that drug tests are 
needlessly intrusive and unfairly single out the poor for a drug test.
337
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Supreme 
Court has long held that a drug test constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  In the legal debate surrounding drug testing and public assistance, the question is 
whether drug tests are unreasonable as a matter of constitutional law.   Under the special needs 
doctrine, the Supreme Court has said that a drug test may be reasonable without an individualized 
suspicion of drug use when governments confront “special needs beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.”
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  In Chandler v. Miller, the Supreme Court articulated a strong public safety rationale 
for the special needs doctrine.  In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court held that 
“where the risk to public safety is substantial and real,” suspicionless searches may be reasonable, 
but where “public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the 
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suspicionless search no matter how conveniently arranged.”
339  Yet, subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions have stretched to construe the government interest in a suspicionless search as falling 
within the scope of the public safety exception, while also suggesting that the special needs doctrine 
might encompass government interests beyond a government interest in public safety.
 340
Following Chandler, this paper will argue that absent a genuine threat to public health or 
public safety, proposals to condition public assistance on passing a drug test without individualized 
suspicion of drug use are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  Part I will provide a brief 
overview of TANF and state efforts to condition public assistance on passing a drug test.  Part II 
will discuss the evolution of the special needs doctrine.  Part III will present a public health 
approach to the special needs doctrine.  As a discipline, public health concerns the health and 
longevity of populations.
    
341  Importantly, public health values empirical analysis, often based on 
epidemiological data, rather than an examination of legal precedent.
342
   
  To that end, Part III will 
present a framework for risk assessment to guide a special needs analysis under Chandler.  Part III 
will also argue that even if the Supreme Court were to recognize special needs beyond a genuine 
threat to public health or public safety, policies that result in withholding public assistance benefits 
from people who abuse illegal drugs are unlikely to accomplish many of the states’ objectives and are 
instead likely to make many social problems much worse.   
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I.  TANF: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES 
 
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PWRORA) 
ended the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program (AFDC) and replaced it with TANF 
(Temporary Assistance to Needy Families).
343  The overarching purpose of TANF is to move 
recipients of public assistance from welfare to work.  With few exceptions, PWRORA requires 
TANF recipients to find at least part-time work within two years.
344  PWRORA mandates at least 20 
hours of work per week for parents with children over age 6, and it impose a lifetime limit of no 
more than sixty months on the receipt of federal aid, with a state option for a shorter lifetime 
limit.
345  States receive TANF block grants and are required to use those funds in a manner 
reasonably calculated to accomplish any one or more of the four TANF program goals: (i) assisting 
needy families so that children can be cared for in their homes; (ii) reducing the dependency of 
needy parents by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (iii) preventing out-of-wedlock 
pregnancies; and, (iv) encouraging the maintenance and formation of two-parent families.
346
Federal and state laws limit TANF to low income families in which the household includes a 
minor child or a pregnant woman.
  
347
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three in 2011 and $44,700 for a family of four).
348  Although income assistance is one of the primary 
benefits of participation in TANF, the average cash benefit varies widely from state to state, ranging 
from $750 for a single parent of three in New York to $170 in Mississippi.  In Florida, the average 
benefit was $303 in 2011 and $280 for a family of three in Georgia.
349
 
   
 
A.  DRUG TESTING AND THE STATES  
 
i.  REASONABLE SUSPICION  
 
PWRORA authorizes, but does not require, drug testing as a condition of assistance through 
TANF.
350  In the handful of states that have enacted a drug testing requirement, most require 
“reasonable cause” or “reasonable suspicion” of drug use before conducting a drug test.
351  In 
Arizona, TANF applicants are asked to complete a recent drug use questionnaire.
352  Applicants who 
admit that they have used drugs are required to pass a urine test before receiving benefits.  Those 
who fail the urine test are TANF-ineligible for one year.  Not surprisingly, very few applicants tend 
to disclose drug use.  Since 2009, when drug testing began in Arizona, only 16 applicants out of 
64,000 have admitted drug use and 931 applicants failed to submit the form.
353
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Given the obvious limitations of screening by self-report, most states rely on case managers 
and substance abuse counselors to recognize the signs of drug use.  In Missouri, the Department of 
Social Services screens TANF applicants and recipients for drug use and conducts a test when it has 
reasonable cause to suspect drug use based on the screen.
354 Any applicant or recipient who tests 
positive for drugs is TANF-ineligible for a period of three years, unless he or she successfully 
completes a treatment program.
355  In Missouri, TANF applicants who test positive for drugs have 
the option to retain their benefits on the condition that they enroll in a substance abuse treatment 
program for six months and do not test positive for drugs, while participating in the program. 
During that time, the Department of Social Services retains the right to conduct drug tests at 
random and for cause. If the person tests positive for drugs a second time, he or she is TANF-
ineligible for three years.
 356
 
    
 
ii.  SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING  
 
In May 2011 the Florida State Legislature passed HB 353, a law that requires all new TANF 
applicants to pass a drug test before they qualify for benefits.
357  Under HB 353, applicants who test 
positive for drugs are ineligible for TANF-funded cash assistance for one year following the date of 
a positive drug test.
358
                                                                                                                                                             
 
  Applicants who test positive for drugs would remain eligible for other TANF 
programs including food stamps and child care.  In Florida, TANF applicants bear the initial costs 
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of their drug tests, which usually range from $25 to $45.
359  Applicants who test negative for drugs 
receive a reimbursement through their initial TANF benefit.  If a person tests positive for drugs, he 
or she can reapply for TANF benefits upon successful completion of a treatment program offered 
by a qualified provider.
 360  An applicant who tests positive for drugs a second time would be TANF-
ineligible for three years.
361  If a parent tests positive for drugs, he or she can appoint a payee to 
receive benefits on behalf of the child.
362
Since Florida enacted HB 353 in May, several others states have passed suspicionless drug 
testing requirements including Georgia, Tennessee and Oklahoma.  In April 2012, the Georgia State 
Legislature adopted the Social Responsibility and Accountability Act.
     
363  According to the 
Legislature, the purpose of the statute is to ensure that TANF funds are used for their intended 
purposes, to protect children from drug use in the home and to assist adults who are addicted to 
drugs.
364  Like HB 353, the Social Responsibility and Accountability Act directs the Department of 
Human Services to administer a drug test to every applicant for TANF assistance, and to deem any 
person who fails a drug test ineligible for benefits.
365
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   If an applicant tests positive for drugs, he or 
she would be TANF ineligible for one month, and for longer intervals following every subsequent 
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positive drug test.  Similarly, Tennessee and Oklahoma require a drug test when anyone applies for 
TANF.
366
 
   
 
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
 
The Supreme Court has long held that a drug test constitutes a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.
367
The right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.
  But when does a search become unreasonable? The Fourth Amendment 
provides:  
368
 
    
One school of thought maintains that searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless supported 
by a warrant and probable cause, or one of a few limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. For 
adherents to the warrant preference rule, individualized suspicion is a bedrock requirement of 
reasonableness.
369 An alternative view maintains that the Warrant Clause and Reasonableness Clause 
are independent, and the Fourth Amendment contains “no irreducible requirement” of 
individualized suspicion.
370
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constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a 
government search depends on the totality of the circumstances.
371
For many years, a long line of Fourth Amendment cases held that a reasonable government 
search requires a warrant, probable cause or an exception to the warrant requirement.
   
372  And yet, as 
Justice Scalia has observed, on the Supreme Court, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has “lurched 
back and forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness 
alone.”
373 To the regret of many Fourth Amendment scholars, the Court has begun to jettison the 
categorical protection of warrant requirement in favor of a general reasonableness requirement.
374
 
  
For now, however, the rule continues to be that a reasonable government search requires a warrant 
or an exception to the warrant requirement.  Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court has addressed 
government drug testing policies under the special needs exception to the warrant requirement.  Part 
II.A. discusses the evolution of the special needs doctrine.   
 
A.  THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE  
 
The Supreme Court departed from the warrant and probable cause requirements for the first 
time in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco.
375
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  In doing so, the Court began to lay the 
groundwork for the special needs doctrine.  Camara began when housing inspectors entered Roland 
Camara’s apartment building to conduct a routine inspection of the building for violations of the 
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city housing code.  When inspectors asked Camara for permission to enter his apartment, Camara 
refused on the ground that the inspectors lacked a search warrant, and without probable cause to 
believe that a violation of the housing code existed, Camara argued that the inspection would violate 
his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
376
In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that while housing safety 
inspections constitute a significant intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests, requiring housing 
inspectors to obtain a warrant would “frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.”
   
377 
Nor were suspicionless inspections unreasonable for want of probable cause to believe that a 
particular building contained violations of the housing code.  Traditional probable cause would have 
required facts sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a crime either 
had been or was being committed.  So construed, probable cause would have precluded 
suspicionless building inspections. To Justice White and members of the majority, the problem 
could be resolved by redefining probable cause in terms of reasonableness. “In determining whether 
a particular inspection is reasonable—and thus in determining whether there is probable cause to 
issue a warrant for that inspection—the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms of the 
reasonable goals of code enforcement.”
378  On one side of the balance were the interests of the 
government in identifying hazardous conditions that might present a danger to the public.  On the 
other side of the balance were the individual interests in privacy.  To the majority, suspicionless 
housing inspections involved a “relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.”
379
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inspections were not searches of the person, nor were they geared toward the discovery of criminal 
evidence.
380
Throughout Camara, the Court asserted that the government interest in public health and 
public safety justified a departure from the warrant requirement and traditional probable cause:   
 
 
Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect dwelling 
places…is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a 
power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards 
necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts.  The need for preventive action 
is great, and city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection 
to its health officials….381
 
 
The Supreme Court invoked a similar argument several years later in New Jersey v. T.L.O. T.L.O. 
began when a high school teacher discovered two girls smoking in a lavatory.
 382   The teacher took 
both girls, one of whom was T.L.O., to the principal’s office.  When T.L.O. denied that she had 
been smoking, and claimed that she did not smoke at all, the vice principal demanded to see her 
purse.  Upon opening her purse, he noticed a pack of rolling papers, and upon further inspection, he 
observed further evidence of drug use: a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, 
several one-dollar bills, and an index card listing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money.
383
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The vice principal turned the evidence over to the police and T.L.O confessed that she had been 
selling drugs at school.  T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the vice principal 
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proceeded without probable cause, and the warrantless search of her purse violated the Fourth 
Amendment.
384
In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that the search of T.L.O.’s purse 
was not unreasonable.  Once again Justice White argued that the touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness, and whether a search is reasonable depends on both the context in 
which it takes place and balancing the interests at stake.
   
385  Striking the balance in favor of schools, 
the Court concluded that a warrant requirement would “frustrate” the school’s interest in 
maintaining swift discipline.  Nor would a valid Fourth Amendment search require probable 
cause.
386  The report that T.L.O. had been smoking in the lavatory was enough to provide the vice 
principal with a “reasonable suspicion” that her purse contained cigarettes, and thereby render the 
search of T.L.O.’s purse consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
387 Citing Terry v. Ohio, Justice 
White suggested that a “reasonable suspicion” of wrongdoing is a lower standard than probable 
cause, but more than an inchoate suspicion or “hunch.”
388  Instead, a reasonable suspicion of 
wrongdoing requires “specific and articulable facts.”
389
Justice Blackmun wrote separately in concurrence to underscore that while the Court had 
recognized limited exceptions to the probable cause requirement, it had done so only when 
confronted with a “special need” for greater governmental flexibility:   
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Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement 
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its judgment for that of the 
Framers.390
 
  
According to Justice Blackmun, the Framers had already balanced the interests at stake and decided 
that a search is unreasonable unless supported by a warrant and probable cause.  Only when the 
warrant and probable cause requirements are impractical are courts permitted to substitute their 
judgment for that of the Framers.  To Justice Blackmun, elementary and secondary schools 
presented a quintessential need for greater governmental flexibility—teachers cannot maintain 
discipline if they are required to obtain a warrant before searching a student, nor can we expect 
teachers to make quick on-the-spot decisions about probable cause.
391
Following T.L.O., the Court invoked the special needs doctrine for the first time in O’Connor 
v. Ortega.
   
392  In  Ortega, a plurality of Justices held that it was not unreasonable for a hospital 
investigative team to enter the office of a public employee and seize several items from his desk 
without a warrant and without probable cause.  In an opinion by Justice O’Connor, the plurality held 
that “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement” would make the warrant and 
probable cause requirements impracticable when government employers investigate office 
misconduct.  Although public employees do not lose their Fourth Amendment rights merely 
because they work for the government instead of a private employer, “the operational realities of the 
workplace” can make some expectations of privacy unreasonable.
393
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unduly burdensome.
394  Moreover, if employers were required to establish probable cause before 
conducting an investigation, the delays could result in “irreparable damage” to the public interest.
395
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute that permitted probation 
officers to search the home of a probationer without a warrant, as long as the officers had 
“reasonable grounds” to believe that the search would reveal contraband.
   
396 Based on a tip from a 
police detective, plainclothes police officers and probation officers searched Griffin’s apartment 
where they found a handgun that provided the basis for his conviction on a subsequent weapons 
offense.  In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that states have a “special need” to 
supervise probationers and the officer’s tip provided reasonable grounds for the search.  As it had in 
Camara, the Court also emphasized the government interest in public health and public safety.  The 
purpose of the statute was to ensure that “probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and 
that the community is not harmed by the probationer being at large.”
397  Moreover, probation 
officers are employees of the State Department of Health and Human Services who were required to 
provide counseling with wellbeing of their “client” in mind.
398  The Court also reiterated its 
unwillingness to impose a warrant or probable cause requirement if doing so would frustrate 
important governmental interests or otherwise pose a threat to public safety.
399
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In T.L.O., Ortega, and Griffin, the Supreme Court upheld searches of property based on a 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.  In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives, and its companion case 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Supreme Court turned its attention to drug tests 
without a suspicion of drug use.  In Skinner, the Supreme Court upheld regulations promulgated by 
the Federal Railroad Administration that required drug and alcohol testing for railroad employees 
who were involved in a major train accident, without a warrant and without suspicion that a 
particular employee might have been intoxicated.
400 The Supreme Court held that not unlike the 
government interest in maintaining discipline in schools or supervising probationers, the 
government interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees constitutes a special need 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement.
401  The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) was 
able to provide extensive evidence that workplace intoxication was a serious problem in the railroad 
industry.
402  The FRA was also able to provide evidence that railroads were only able to detect a 
small number of violations when they relied on supervisors to observe employees in the past.
403
Nor were the federal regulations unreasonable for lack of  individualized suspicion.  Writing 
for the Court, Justice Kennedy underscored that while the Supreme Court has usually required some 
measure of individualized suspicion before conducting a search, “a showing of individualized 
suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable.”
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In  limited circumstances, where the privacy interests at stake are minimal, and 
where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be 
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be 
reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.405
 
  
The Court concluded that even though urine tests constitute a search, the intrusions on privacy were 
limited. Federal regulations did not require employees to furnish samples under direct observation, 
and railroad employees have a diminished expectation of privacy by virtue of their participation in 
an industry that is heavily regulated to ensure safety.
406
In Von Raab, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulations that required a drug test for all 
employees in the United States Customs Service who applied for a promotion to a position that 
involved the interdiction of illegal drugs, or to a position that required employees to carry a firearm, 
or handle classified materials.
  
407  In contrast to the Federal Railroad Administration, however, the 
Customs Service was unable to provide any evidence that illegal drug use was a serious problem 
among its employees. Yet to describe the drug testing program as unreasonable given the lack of 
evidence regarding a drug problem was, for Justice Kennedy, to hold “an unduly narrow view of the 
context in which the Service’s testing program took place.”
408 Instead the Court alluded to the 
national war on drugs: “The Customs Service is our Nation’s first line of defense against one of the 
greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population. We have adverted before to 
the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics.”
409
                                                 
405 Id.  
 To that 
 
 
406 1418. 
 
 
407 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
 
 
408 Id. at 673-74. 
 
 
409 Id. at 668. 132 
 
end, the Court characterized the government interest as “compelling.”
410 The Court also held that 
customs agents on the frontlines of drug interdiction have a diminished expectation of privacy.
411  
Given the “extraordinary safety and national security hazards” that would arise if the Customs 
Service were to promote illegal drug users to positions that required them to carry a firearm or 
interdict controlled substances, the drug testing policy was not unreasonable.
412
Several years later the Supreme Court revisited suspicionless drug testing in the context of 
public schools.  In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Supreme Court upheld a policy that 
required student athletes to submit to random drug testing as a condition of participation in 
interscholastic athletics.
    
413  According to the trial court, the school district implemented the policy in 
response to a noticeable increase in drug use and disciplinary problems among students, particularly 
student athletes.
414   Based on testimony from teachers and school administrators, the trial court 
found that “a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic 
athletics, was in a state of rebellion” and “[d]isciplinary actions had reached ‘epidemic 
proportions.”
415  Not only would drug use increase the risk of sports-related injury, but school 
administrators feared that in their small community on the edge of town, drug use by student 
athletes could create a “role model effect,” thereby fueling drug use among other students.
416
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The Supreme Court held that drug testing was not unreasonable under the circumstances, 
even without individualized suspicion of illegal drug use.  The Court, per Justice Scalia, asserted that 
the Fourth Amendment does not impose an “irreducible requirement” of individualized suspicion.
417 
Instead the ultimate measure of constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.
418 
Justice Scalia noted that in contrast to members of the general public, schoolchildren are required to 
submit to routine screenings, vaccinations, and physical exams; and therefore, children have a 
diminished expectation of privacy within the school environment.
419  Moreover, “[b]y choosing to 
‘go out for the team’” student athletes “voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even 
higher than that imposed on students generally.”
420 On the other hand, the Court characterized the 
government interest in deterring illegal drug use among schoolchildren as “important—indeed, 
perhaps compelling.”
421
In 1997, after an uninterrupted line of cases upholding searches under the special needs 
doctrine, the Supreme Court struck down a Georgia law that required candidates for public office to 
pass a drug test as a condition of placement on the state ballot in Chandler v. Miller.
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the certification requirement, Georgia asserted a state interest in ensuring fitness for office.
423  The 
government also argued that illegal drug use would undermine public confidence in elected officials, 
and compromise the ability of elected officials to discharge their public functions, particularly their 
ability to enforce anti-drug laws.
424
However, in an 8-1 opinion, Justice Ginsburg held that Georgia’s certification requirement 
did not fit within the “closely guarded category” of permissible suspicionless searches.
   
425  Notably 
absent from the government’s case was “any indication of a concrete danger demanding departure 
from the Fourth Amendment’s main rule.”
426  While evidence of a concrete danger was not 
indispensible given Von Raab, evidence of a genuine problem would at least “shore up” the assertion 
of a special need.
427 “What is left” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “is the image the State seeks to project.  
By requiring candidates for public office to submit to a drug test, Georgia displays its commitment 
to the struggle against drug abuse.”
428  However, the state interest in setting an example is more 
“symbolic” than substantial within the meaning of the special needs doctrine.
429
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 In Chandler the 
Court defined the term substantial as a government interest that is both “important enough to 
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override the individual interest in privacy” and “sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth 
Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.”
430
The Court also indicated that a reasonable suspicionless search requires evidence of a 
genuine threat to public safety:  
   
 
We reiterate too, that where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket 
suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as “reasonable” –  for 
example, searches now routine at airports….But where, as in this case, public safety is 
not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes suspicionless searches no 
matter how conveniently arranged.431
 
  
Five years later, the Supreme Court also struck down a state statute that authorized drug tests for 
maternity patients suspected of cocaine use without the patient’s consent and without a warrant in 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston.
432  Hospital administrators, police officers and local officials crafted the 
policy in response to a noticeable increase in cocaine use among patients who were receiving 
prenatal treatment.
433  Patients who tested positive for cocaine were referred to a substance abuse 
clinic for treatment.  If patients tested positive a second time, or if they missed an appointment with 
a substance abuse counselor, the police were notified immediately and patients were arrested.
434
                                                 
430 Id. at 318. 
  The 
government conceded that the threat of law enforcement allowed the hospital to leverage patients 
into treatment; however, the government defended the policy on special needs grounds.  Even if the 
policy incorporated the threat of law enforcement, ultimately, the policy was designed to serve non-
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law enforcement ends, namely protecting the pregnant women and their children.
435  In an opinion 
by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court held that the searches were unreasonable and 
indistinguishable from a general interest in crime control.  Even if the ultimate goal had been to get 
women into substance abuse treatment, the extensive involvement of law enforcement in the 
development of the program, and its day-to-day administration, suggested that “the immediate 
objective” of the program was to secure evidence for a criminal proceeding.
436
Since Chandler, it now appears that at least a handful of Justices have retreated from a strong 
public safety rationale for the special needs doctrine.  In Earls v. Pottawatomie County, the most recent 
special needs case, a four-justice plurality described public safety as only a “factor” in a special needs 
analysis.
  
437  In Earls, the plurality upheld a policy that required all middle and high school students to 
consent to an initial drug test, as well as random drug testing, and testing on reasonable suspicion, as 
a condition of participation in any extracurricular activity.  While the policy upheld in Vernonia only 
applied to student athletes, the policy at issue in Earls  required drug testing for students who 
participated in any extracurricular activity, including nonathletic activities such as Future Farmers of 
America, the Academic team, the show choir or the marching band.
438
                                                 
435 Id. at 81. 
  In an opinion by Justice 
Thomas, the plurality held that the school policy was not unreasonable, even without evidence that 
illegal drug use was a serious problem in Pottawatomie schools.  Justice Thomas reiterated that 
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public schoolchildren have only a diminished expectation of privacy, and the government had a 
strong interest in eliminating drug use, particularly among schoolchildren.
439
 
   
 
i.  PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the constitutional questions that arise when states 
condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug test.  However in Wyman v. James, the Supreme 
Court upheld a similar provision that required AFDC recipients to accept scheduled home visits by a 
caseworker as a condition of receiving benefits.
440  In Wyman, the Court held that home visits by an 
AFDC caseworker were not searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and even if 
they were, home visits were not unreasonable.  Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun argued that 
when states distribute federal and state tax dollars through their social welfare programs they are 
“fulfilling a public trust,” and as such, states have an “appropriate and paramount interest” in 
ensuring that public dollars reach their intended beneficiaries.
441  Moreover, the reasonableness of 
the government’s interests, as well as the voluntary nature of applying for AFDC, worked together 
to diminish the privacy rights of Mrs. James.
442
 
   
 
a.  LOWER COURT DECISIONS  
 
Yet, despite Wyman, lower courts have consistently invalidated efforts to condition public 
assistance on passing a drug test.  In Marchwinski v. Howard, a federal district court struck down a 
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pilot program that authorized random suspicionless drug testing for all TANF recipients in 
Michigan.
443  Under the pilot program, TANF recipients who tested positive for a controlled 
substance in selected counties were required to participate in a substance abuse treatment program 
or risk losing their benefits.  In support of the program, Michigan asserted a state interest in moving 
TANF recipients from welfare to work, as well as a state interest in protecting children from abuse 
and neglect in the homes of TANF recipients.  Relying heavily on Chandler, the district court held 
that the state interest in identifying potential barriers to employment does not constitute a special 
need. The district court heard arguments for Marchwinski in 2000, before Earls.  Without Earls, the 
district court read Chandler to limit the special needs doctrine to circumstances in which states are 
faced with a genuine threat to public safety.  Nor was the district court persuaded that a state interest 
in preventing child abuse and neglect constituted a special need.  Instead, the court reasoned that 
insofar as the TANF program was not designed to address child abuse and neglect, the state could 
not advance these interests as a special need.
444
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court 
erred in holding that only a public safety interest can qualify as a special need.
   
445  Instead, the proper 
standard was whether the State of Michigan demonstrated a special need “of which public safety is 
by one consideration.”
446
 
 Given Earls, the court readily concluded that suspicionless drug testing 
would advance a host of state interest, related and unrelated to public safety:  
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We think it is beyond cavil that the state has a special need to insure that public 
moneys expended in the [TANF Program] are used by recipients for their intended 
purposes and not for procuring controlled substances—a criminal activity that not 
only undermines the objectives of the program but directly endangers both the 
public and the children the program is designed to assist.447
 
  
The court noted additional public safety interests including a state interest in protecting children in 
the TANF program from child abuse, as well as a state interest in protecting the public from crime 
associated with drug trafficking.
448  However, a year later, the Sixth Circuit agreed to rehear 
Marchwinski en banc.  On appeal, the full 12-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit deadlocked on the 
Fourth Amendment issue, 6-6.  As a result, the appellate court upheld the initial district court 
opinion, thereby striking down drug testing for TANF applicants in Michigan.
449
In November 2011, a Florida district court issued a preliminary injunction against the 
Florida Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), temporarily halting the Department’s 
ability to condition TANF benefits on a suspicionless drug test in Lebron v. Wilkins.
   
450  In its defense, 
the State argued that drug testing TANF applicants furthered a number of state interests, foremost 
among them a state interest in ensuring that public funds reach their intended beneficiaries.
451
                                                 
447 Id. at 336. 
  
Second, by providing low-income children with cash assistance, the State stepped into the role of 
economic provider, thereby acquiring a duty to protect minor children from drug abuse in the home.  
Third, a drug testing requirement would allow DCFS to identify drug-related barriers to 
employment, thereby furthering the overarching mission of TANF: economic self-sufficiency.   
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Fourth, the “public health” and “crime risks” associated with the drug epidemic are well known; and 
the State asserted a paramount interest in not funding that epidemic as well as its associated “public 
ills.”
452
In an opinion by Judge Mary Scriven, the district court rejected each of those claims 
primarily on the ground that the State failed to provide concrete evidence of rampant illegal drug use 
among TANF recipients in Florida.  Well before enacting HB 353, the Florida Legislature directed 
DCFS to conduct a pilot study to determine whether TANF applicants are more likely to abuse 
drugs, and whether that abuse impacts employment and their use of social services.  The pilot study 
found that roughly 5% of TANF applicants tested positive for drugs, a rate far less than the 
prevalence of statewide drug use in Florida, estimated at 8.13%.
  
453  Moreover, those who tested 
positive for drugs during the pilot study were just as likely to work and just as likely to use social 
services as those who tested negative for drugs.
454  Second, between July 2011 and November 2011, 
when drug testing began, only 2% of TANF applicants tested positive for drugs.
455  Nor was the 
court persuaded that refusal to take a drug test after being deemed otherwise eligible should be 
considered a “drug related denial,” since there were any number of reasons that a person might not 
take a drug test—inability to pay for testing or lack of transportation—and the State was unable to 
provide any evidence about the why applicants failed to take a drug test.
456
                                                 
452 Id. at 21. 
  Finally, Judge Scriven 
rejected the State’s contention that data on the nationwide prevalence of drug use might have any 
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probative value on the question before the court—namely the prevalence of illegal drug use among 
TANF applicants in Florida.
457   Applying the Chandler “concrete danger” rule, the court concluded 
that Florida failed to provide evidence of a “concrete danger” among the class of citizens it sought 
to test.
458
What should we make of the court’s reasoning in Lebron? Even if illegal drug use among 
TANF applicants does not present a genuine threat to public safety, it is not at all clear that statistics 
on the nationwide prevalence of illegal drug use among TANF recipients are utterly lacking in 
probative value.  Below I want to suggest that a public health perspective, along with some basic 
principles of risk assessment and epidemiology, can help courts determine whether states have met 
their burden to establish a special need.   
  
 
 
III.  A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE  
 
In a widely cited and influential report, the Institute of Medicine defined public health this 
way: “Public health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be 
healthy.”
459  In contrast to general medicine, public health concerns the health of populations rather 
than individuals. Where traditional legal reasoning relies on non-empirical methods, such as 
analogical reasoning and statutory interpretation, public health practice relies on empirical evidence. 
and epidemiological data.
460
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  From a public health perspective, the key questions in the debate 
surrounding drug testing and public assistance are these: what do we know about the prevalence of 
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illegal drug use in the target population? What do we know about addiction? How will these policies 
impact the health of substance abusers and the people around them? 
Since Justice Blackmun first outlined the broad strokes of the special needs doctrine in 
T.L.O., the content of a special needs analysis has changed.  Current approaches to the special needs 
doctrine on the Supreme Court reflect its increasing emphasis on the Reasonableness Clause.  In 
order to determine the reasonableness of a special needs search, courts will now balance several 
factors—(i) the government interest in a search; (ii) the nature and intrusiveness of the search; (iii) 
the effectiveness of the search; and (iv) the individual interest in privacy.  In keeping with the 
original intent of the special needs doctrine, courts will also ask whether the government interest in a 
suspicionless search is sufficiently divorced from a general state interest in law enforcement.   
Part III will propose a public health approach to the special needs doctrine.  In Chandler, a 
strong majority of Justices held that a reasonable suspicionless search requires evidence of a genuine 
threat to public safety.  To that end, Part III.A. will propose a simple framework for risk analysis. 
Part III.B. will turn to the nature and intrusiveness of a special needs search. From a conventional 
Fourth Amendment perspective, questions about the intrusiveness of a search concern who will 
receive test results, whether positive tests will be turned over to law enforcement, and ultimately, 
whether the search falls within the scope of the special needs doctrine.  From a public health 
perspective, however, the important issues have little to do with the Ferguson problems that arise 
when the fruits of a special needs search are turned over to law enforcement.  Instead, the important 
questions concern the possibility that sharing information with law enforcement might be associated 
with an adverse effect on the health of illegal drug users and the people around them.  Part III.B. 
will argue that by deterring people who use illegal drugs from seeking public assistance, states could 
actually increase the risk that children who are in abusive homes will go undetected.   143 
 
Since Vernonia, the Supreme Court has explicitly addressed effectiveness as an element of a 
reasonable special needs search.  Yet, courts tend to assume that drug tests are reasonably likely to 
accomplish their objectives.
461
Part III.D. will consider the individual interest in privacy.  Courts may well conclude that the 
privacy interests implicated by suspicionless drug tests are negligible.  However, Part III.D. will 
show that suspicionless drug tests implicate more than the individual interest in privacy.  A large 
literature on social epidemiology has shown that encounters with the law can be a powerful marker 
of social status, with implications for our health.   
  Instead, Part III.C. will argue that courts should assume a more 
aggressive posture when evaluating the effectiveness of a search under the special needs doctrine.  
Although drug testing would allow states to effectively identify illegal drug users in their public 
assistance programs, withholding public assistance benefits as penalty for illegal drug use will do very 
little to help people stop using drugs.  Pushing drug users out of the social safety net could have an 
adverse impact on population health by driving an already marginalized group further underground. 
Part III.C. will propose that the current approach to the special needs doctrine is faulty in one 
further respect—the failure to incorporate the least intrusive alternative requirement into the special 
needs doctrine.  Although the Supreme Court has consistently said that the Fourth Amendment 
does not require governments to adopt the least intrusive means to accomplish their objectives, 
without incorporating the least intrusive alternative requirement into the special needs doctrine, 
special needs searches are needlessly overinclusive.  
 
A.  THE GOVERNMENT INTEREST  
 
In Chandler, the Supreme Court held that a lawful suspicionless search requires a genuine 
threat to public safety:  “We reiterate, too, that where the risk to the public safety is substantial and 
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real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable” but where “public 
safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no 
matter how conveniently arranged.”
462
 
 From a public health perspective, we can understand risk as a 
composite of two factors—the probability of a harm, and the magnitude of the harm if it were to 
occur.  In this paper, I will use the term probability of the harm unconventionally to refer to the 
probability that an adverse event such as illegal drug use will occur.  By magnitude of the harm, I 
mean the nature and severity of the harm if it were to occur.  In the latter category, I will include 
harms associated with illegal drug use such as the misuse of taxpayer dollars to purchase illegal 
drugs, harms to drug users themselves, and harms to others such as child abuse and neglect.   
 
i.  THE PROBABILITY OF THE HARM  
 
1.  NATIONAL ESTIMATES  
 
Most nationally representative estimates of illegal drug use in the United States have found 
that roughly 1 in 5 TANF recipients report illegal drug use at some point during the past year.
  463   
These findings also appear to be consistent over time. Using 1994 ’95 data from the National 
Household Survey of Drug Abuse (NHSDA), Jayakody and colleagues found that 21 percent of 
TANF recipients reported use of an illegal drug during the past year, compared to 13 percent of 
non-recipients.
464
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  Excluding marijuana, about 10 percent of TANF recipients reported use of some 
other illegal drug during the past year, compared to 7 percent of non-recipients, however, as the 
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researchers caution these differences were not statistically significant.
465  Similarly, using 2002 data 
from the National Survey of Drug use and Health—the successor to the NHSDA—Pollack and 
colleagues found that 22.3 percent of TANF recipients ages 18-19 reported illegal drug use during 
the previous year compared to 12.8 percent of women who did not receive TANF benefits.
466
Still, as opponents of drug testing will argue, not all studies based on nationally 
representative data suggest that approximately 1 in 5 recipients of public assistance use illegal drugs.  
In 2002, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) reported that 
the prevalence of past month illicit drug use among people in households receiving cash assistance 
through TANF was somewhat higher than the prevalence of drug use among non-recipients: 11.5% 
compared to 7.2%.
  
467  Nor did the study find twofold gaps in the prevalence of illegal drug use 
among recipients of public assistance.  The prevalence of past month illicit drug use among 
recipients of public assistance—not limited to TANF—was somewhat higher, though by not much:  
9.6% compared to 6.8%.
468
 
 
2.  STATE ESTIMATES  
 
For opponents of drug testing, findings from state experiments with drug testing also cast 
doubt on claims that roughly 1 in 5 TANF recipients use illegal drugs.  In October 1999, Michigan 
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implemented mandatory drug testing for TANF recipients.
469  Under the  statute, all TANF 
recipients were required to pass a urine test as a condition of assistance.  Between October and 
November 1999, when drug testing ended under an injunction, 258 TANF recipients were tested for 
drugs.  Of those 258 recipients, 21 (8.1%) tested positive.  Of those who tested positive, 18 tested 
positive for marijuana alone, and 3 tested positive for “hard drugs” including cocaine and 
amphetamine.
470 The rate of illegal drug use detected among TANF recipients in Michigan was also 
comparable to the 1999 prevalence of drug use within the state population as a whole (7.1%) leading 
opponents to argue that states like Michigan are wrongly singling TANF recipients out for a drug 
test.
471
What should we make of these claims? First, we might worry that findings from states like 
Michigan fail to provide a valid estimate of drug use among TANF recipients.  Since drug testing 
proposals are well advertised, opponents of drug testing cannot rule out the possibility that although 
most TANF recipients do not use drugs, those who do use illegal drugs either refrained from doing 
so prior to taking the test, or simply elected not to apply for benefits.  In Florida, the pilot study for 
HB 353 found that 5% of TANF applicants tested positive for drugs; however, as the researchers 
readily concede, the study suffered from a number of methodological problems.
   
472
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(SASSI) were asked to take a drug test.  A false positive rate of 7% would mean that the SASSI failed 
to identify 335 individuals as potential candidates for a drug test; however, since the SASSI screens 
for both alcohol and drug abuse, we cannot know how many of those 335 individuals might have 
tested positive for drugs.
473
In Lebron, Judge Scriven concluded that Florida could only provide evidence that somewhere 
between 2 and 5 percent of TANF applicants have used illegal drugs, and therefore the government 
failed to demonstrate a “concrete danger” of illegal drug use among TANF recipients.  However, 
owing to enrollment bias and deterrent effects, findings from pilot studies and early testing probably 
underestimate the actual prevalence of illegal drug use among TANF applicants in Florida.  Even if 
the prevalence of illegal drug use among TANF applicants in Florida is not as high as 20 or 11 
percent, it seems unlikely that only 2 or 5 percent of TANF recipients have used illegal drugs, a rate 
far below the state average of roughly 8 percent.   
   
In Lebron, the district court also faulted Florida for relying on national estimates of illegal 
drug use and failing to provide robust Florida-specific evidence about the prevalence of drug use 
among TANF applicants.
474  However, from a public health perspective, what we want to know is 
whether findings based on national household surveys of illegal drug use are generalizable to Florida.  
John Monahan and Laurens Walker have shown that questions about generalizability in social 
science bear a close resemblance to reasoning by analogy in the law.
475
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  Just as courts will view 
precedents as “on point” to the extent that they involve similar facts, questions about external 
validity or generalizability concern the degree of similarity between the people under study and the 
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people to whom courts wish to generalize.
476  Moreover, just as courts would not rely on decisions 
that are poorly reasoned, or decisions that have fallen into disfavor, courts can rely on a particular 
piece of scientific evidence to the extent that it has survived the process of peer review, it has 
employed valid research methods, and it is supported by further research.
477
Despite being a coastal state and an entry point for drug smuggling into the United States, 
illicit drug use in Florida closely resembles the national average.  According to the 2002 National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health, 8.84% of Floridians age 12 or older reported use of an illicit drug 
during the past month, compared to a national average of 8.3%.
  
478  Using data from the same 
survey, Pollack and colleagues found that roughly 20 percent of TANF recipients reported illicit 
drug use during the past year.
479
 
  Based on this evidence we can infer that the prevalence of past year 
illegal drug use among TANF recipients in Florida is probably somewhere around 20 percent. 
 
3.  A PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE?  
  
  In Lebron, Florida argued that it could establish a special governmental need for drug testing 
without  evidence of an “overwhelming drug problem.”
480
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  In support of its contention, the 
government relied heavily on Von Raab, where the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless drug testing 
for customs agents involved in drug interdiction, without any evidence that illegal drug use was a 
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serious problem among customs agents.  Likewise in Lebron, the government alluded to Earls, where 
a plurality of the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing for high school students involved in 
nonathletic extracurricular activities, again with very little evidence of illegal drug use among these 
students, but instead on the ground that illegal drug use presents a safety risk for all children, 
“athletes and nonathletes alike.”
481 Writing for the plurality in Earls, Justice Thomas reasoned: it 
would “make little sense” to require school districts to wait for a substantial portion of their school 
body to use drugs before instituting a drug testing program.
482
What should we make of these claims?  As Lawrence Gostin writes, “if there is one article of 
faith in public health,” it is that public health regulation should be based on “risks that are 
significant, not speculative, theoretical or remote.”
   
483 Without a clear understanding of a public 
health hazard, interventions are unlikely to be effective and run a risk of imposing needless 
economic costs and personal burdens.
484  At the same time,  communities will sometimes face 
hazards that are not fully understood, but require immediate intervention nonetheless.
485
The precautionary principle has its origins in environmental health.  A widely cited 
formulation of the precautionary principle can be found in the 1992 United Nations Rio Declaration 
 In public 
health, the precautionary principle provides a principled basis for preventive measures designed to 
protect the public’s health under conditions of uncertainty.    
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on Environment and Development. As formulated by the U. N., and adopted by member states, 
including the United States, the precautionary principle provides:  
 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.486
 
  
The precautionary principle permits policymakers to implement precautionary regulation when there 
are early warning signs that a harm is occurring or is likely to occur, even though the precise causal 
mechanisms of that harm are not fully understood.
487  In environmental health, the precautionary 
principle shifts the burden of proof onto proponents of an activity to demonstrate that the proposed 
activity would not result in a serious or potentially irreversible harm.
488  Absent such evidence, the 
precautionary principle permits preventive regulation geared toward protecting public health.  In 
support of greater precautionary measures, proponents of the precautionary principle often cite 
examples of risks that were underestimated but later turned out to be highly damaging to human 
health, including asbestos, leaded gasoline, and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).
489
What would the precautionary principle imply for the special needs doctrine?  Ordinarily a 
reasonable government search requires a warrant, and if not a warrant, a reasonable search ordinarily 
requires probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.  Nevertheless, as Justice Kennedy 
observed in Von Raab, the traditional probable cause standard may be unhelpful when “the 
Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions” or to detect violations that 
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rarely generate articulable grounds for a search.
490
Although the Supreme Court has been criticized for failing to recognize the many ways in 
which the law can be used as a tool to protect population health, in its special needs cases, the 
Supreme Court appears to have the opposite problem—a tendency to be overly solicitous when 
governments assert an interest in public health or public safety.   A tendency to overemphasize small 
risks to public health led the Court to uphold suspicionless fire safety inspections for householders 
in Camara, and suspicionless drug tests for customs agents in Von Raab.  Before pressing on to 
consider what the precautionary principle might imply for drug testing and public assistance, it may 
be helpful to pause and reconsider the drug testing cases from a public health perspective.   
  We can understand the special needs doctrine as 
an attempt to organize the murky territory between searches falling short of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion but above the Fourth Amendment threshold of unreasonableness.  
In  Von Raab, the Supreme Court cited the “extraordinary safety and national security 
hazards” associated with the promotion of illegal drug users to positions involving drug interdiction 
or to positions that would require them to carry firearms.
491  However, the case for precautionary 
measures fails in Von Raab, owing to the low risk harm.  Above I said that we can understand risk as 
a combination of two factors—the probability of a harm and the magnitude of the harm if it were to 
occur.  Notwithstanding routine exposure to criminal elements and access to valuable sources of 
contraband, the probability of illicit drug use among customs agents was exceptionally low.  
According to the Customs Service, of the 3,600 employees who tested positive for drugs, only 5 
employees—less than 1/10 of 1 percent—tested positive. 
492
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By itself, a low probability of  harm should not lead courts to conclude that the government 
has failed to establish a genuine public health threat. Courts must also consider the severity of a 
harm if it were to occur.  Although the number of airline passengers and pieces of luggage screened 
by the Federal Aviation Administration reaches into the billions, only a few thousand firearms have 
been detected and only a few plans have been successfully hijacked.
493
In contrast to Von Raab, the case for precautionary measures becomes stronger in Vernonia, 
where the Supreme Court upheld suspicionless drug testing for middle and high school students 
who participated in athletic activities.  In Vernonia, the government was able to provide a wealth of 
evidence to support its claims regarding the extent of illegal drug use in Vernonia schools—students 
began to boast about drug use and the inability of school administrators to stop them; teachers 
reported direct observation of student drug use and confiscated drug paraphernalia on school 
grounds.
  Even though the probability 
of an undetected firearm or a successful hijacking is extraordinarily low, the consequences of a false 
negative (a missed firearm or a successful hijacking) would be very high—hundreds of human lives 
lost, countless injuries, and millions of dollars in property damage.   In cases like this one, where the 
severity of harm is great with long-lasting and potentially devastating consequences across 
populations, governments can establish genuine threats to public safety notwithstanding a low 
probability of wrongdoing.  By contrast, the harm associated with failure to interdict a drug 
shipment is fairly low— primarily drug-related morbidity and some mortality.  The combination of a 
near zero probability of harm and the small magnitude of harm greatly undermines the case for 
suspicionless drug testing.       
494
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  Coaches also reported an increase in the number and severity of injuries.  A few 
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students went so far as to form recreational groups around their drug use.  One group, composed 
largely of student athletes, referred to itself as the “Big Elks,” another referred to itself as the “Drug 
Cartel.”
495 The evidence in Vernonia pointed toward a substantial probability of drug use in Vernonia 
schools, as well as among the class of students administrators sought to test.  In contrast to Von 
Raab, where the connection between drug use and population health was highly attenuated and 
speculative at best, in Vernonia the government was able to advance a plausible hypothesis that in a 
small community where interscholastic activities provided the primary source of entertainment, drug 
use among student athletes could fuel a “role model effect,” encouraging other students to use 
drugs.
496  School administrators were able to provide credible evidence that the combination of 
illegal drug use and exercise could result in serious, potentially deadly harms.
497
In contrast to Vernonia, the case for precaution fails entirely in Earls.  School administrators 
were only able to provide minimal evidence of illegal drug use, primarily—testimony from teachers 
who had observed students who appeared to be under the influence of drugs; marijuana cigarettes in 
the school parking lot; and drug paraphernalia found in a car driven by a student member of the 
Future Farmers of America.
  
498
                                                 
495 Id. at 1357.  
 Nor was the government able to provide much in the way of a causal 
connection between illegal drug use and harm.  Quite unlike the students at issue Vernonia where the 
combination of illegal drug use and physical exertion could create substantial health risks, in Earls, 
the plurality upheld suspicionless drug testing for students involved in nonathletic extracurricular 
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activities like show choir and the debate team, where the magnitude of potential harm would be 
comparatively low.   
 
ii.  THE NATURE AND SEVERITY OF THE HARM  
 
1.  TAXPAYER SUBSIDY OF ILLEGAL DRUG USE  
 
What would the precautionary principle imply for drug testing and public assistance? Above 
I argued that the prevalence of illegal drug use among TANF recipients in Florida is probably 
somewhere around 20 percent. However, even if the prevalence of illegal drug use among TANF 
recipients is roughly 20 percent, that would mean that 80 percent of TANF recipients have not 
reported illegal drug use, and yet, as the court pointed out in Lebron, all are required to submit to a 
drug test.
499  There are circumstances in which we might be prepared to tolerate a blanket 
suspicionless search—e.g. a suspicionless search of all airline passengers and their carry-one 
luggage—because even if the probability of the harm is very low, the potential harm is very great.  In 
contrast, to the airplane case, however, the harm associated with a taxpayer subsidy of illegal drug 
use is small—primarily a few thousand in lost taxpayer dollars.  In Florida, it appears that HB 353 
has actually cost taxpayers more money than it has saved.  Florida law requires the state to reimburse 
applicants who test positive for drugs.  According to the Department of Children and Family 
Services, at an average cost of $30 per test, the total reimbursement cost to the state was $118,140.
500
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were far more than the state would have spent on income assistance had it provided benefits to the 
108 people who failed the test.
501
Those who continue to support a drug testing requirement nonetheless offer two replies to 
these findings.  First, the real reason to require TANF applicants to pass a drug test was to ensure 
that taxpayer dollars are spent on “diapers and Wheaties” rather than illegal drugs.
   
502
 
  Without a drug 
test, states cannot be sure that taxpayer dollars will reach their intended beneficiaries.  Second, states 
have a basic interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars are not used to fund an illegal activity.  In 
support of a drug testing law in Oklahoma, Representative Liebmann put it this way:  
Even if it didn’t save a dime, this legislation would be worth enacting based on 
principle….Law abiding citizens should not have their tax payments used to fund 
illegal activity that puts us all in danger.503
 
  
However, to the extent that states rest the case for drug testing on principle, arguments of this kind 
come dangerously close to resting the case for suspicionless drug testing on a symbolic interest, an 
interest forcefully rejected by eight Justices in Chandler.  In response, those who support a drug 
testing requirement might argue, as some have, that “[t]he drug testing law was really meant to make 
sure that kids were protected,” or to make sure that taxpayer dollars reach their intended 
beneficiaries, the latter being a government interest endorsed by the Court in Wyman.
504
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  However, in 
Wyman, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of home visits by a caseworker, not a 
drug test.   
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In Chandler, the Supreme Court held that “the proffered special need” for a drug test must be 
“substantial.”
505  The Court defined the term substantial as a government interest that is both 
“important enough to override the individual interest in privacy” and “sufficiently vital to suppress 
the Fourth Amendment’s normal requirement of individualized suspicion.”
506  Even if the Supreme 
Court were to hold that the special needs doctrine encompasses government interests beyond an 
interest in public safety, the government interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars are used as 
intended falls far short of “substantial” within the meaning of Chandler.   Courts are unlikely to find 
that the government interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars are used as intended is “sufficiently 
vital” suppress the individualized suspicion requirement.  As Justices O’Connor, Souter and Stevens 
argued in their Vernonia  dissent, “[f]or most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless 
searches have generally been considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”
507  Indeed the abuses associated with “general searches” were foremost on the minds 
of the Framers.
508
 
  If the Supreme Court were to hold that the government interest in ensuring that 
taxpayer dollars are used as intended is sufficient to suppress the Fourth Amendment’s ordinary 
requirement of individualized suspicion, doing so would amount to a vast expansion of government 
power.   
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2.  CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT  
 
Supporters of drug testing have also argued that a state interest in preventing child abuse and 
neglect in the homes of TANF recipients constitutes a special need.  In Lebron, Florida connected 
substance abuse among TANF recipients to adverse consequences for their children:      
 
A parent using drugs is less able to care for their children properly (neglect), is 
more likely to actively harm a child (abuse), is less able to procure and maintain 
employment, is more likely to come in contact with the criminal justice system and 
thus be removed from the home, and is more likely to set an inappropriate example 
for children and also provide those children with easier access to drugs (who, thus, 
might more readily abuse illegal drugs).509
 
 
Many studies have shown that parental substance abuse can have a negative impact on children.   
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, between one and two-thirds of 
children who have been reported to child protective services come from families coping with 
substance abuse.
510  Children whose parents abuse drugs often experience a home that is chaotic and 
unpredictable.
511 Children whose parents abuse drugs are also more likely to experience physical 
violence and sexual abuse.
512
                                                 
509 Defendant’s Response, supra note 
 Yet, despite the devastating impact of substance abuse on children, the 
case for suspicionless drug testing is not without it problems.  The special needs doctrine applies 
when governments face special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement.  To the extent 
that states rest the case for suspicionless drug testing on a state interest in protecting children from 
acts of drug-related violence in the home—battery and sexual assault—they have asserted an interest 
in law enforcement.   
451 at 20.   
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What should we say about the case for child abuse as special governmental need from a 
public health perspective?  Although studies have shown that 1 in 5 TANF recipients report use of 
an illegal drug during the past year, there is little evidence to suggest that parents who receive public 
assistance are more likely to engage in acts of drug-related child abuse than others.  Studies have 
shown that parental substance abuse and dependence increase the risk of child abuse; yet, only a 
small percentage of TANF recipients meet the diagnostic criteria for substance abuse or 
dependence.  Using 2002 data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, Pollack and 
colleagues found that less than 5% of TANF recipients satisfied the diagnostic criteria for drug 
dependence.
513
In Lebron, Florida also argued that by providing income assistance to low-income families, 
the state “steps into the role of parent” or “economic provider,” and therefore, the state takes on a 
special responsibility to ensure that TANF funds are not used to subsidize drug use in the home.
   
514 
To that end, Florida relied on Vernonia, where the Supreme Court held that suspicionless drug 
testing policies were not unreasonable given the custodial responsibilities of public schools for 
minor children in their care.
515
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  However, Florida’s reliance Vernonia is misplaced.  In both Vernonia 
and Earls, the Court described the custodial responsibilities of schools with respect to extracurricular 
activities on school grounds or school-sponsored field trips.  In neither case did the Court suggest 
that the custodial responsibilities of schools extend into the home.  Even if states did assume some 
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concern for the wellbeing of children would support a state interest in requiring their parents to pass 
a drug test.   
 
3.  DRUG USE, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH  
 
In their defense, several states including—Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, and 
Florida—note that the federal government conditions TANF funding on a state’s ability to move 
TANF recipients from welfare to work.
516  Since the employers who participate in TANF programs 
are likely to require a drug test—and since illegal drug use undermines employability—states have a 
“special need” to exclude illegal drug users from the program.
517
Nor is there much evidence to support state claims that the handful of TANF recipients 
who do use illegal drugs are likely to loll on welfare rolls for extended periods of time.  According to 
the Department of Health and Human Services,  roughly two-thirds of illegal drug users are 
employed either full time or part time
  Yet, the Supreme Court has never 
suggested that a state interest in securing a steady funding stream constitutes a special governmental 
need.  Nor are courts likely to see government interests of this kind as “substantial” within the 
meaning of Chandler.    
518  The pilot study for HB 353 in Florida found that drug 
users were employed at the same rate as non-users.
519
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  Drug users earned approximately the same 
amount of money as non-users and they did not require more government assistance than non-
335 at 4. 
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users.
520
In Marchwinski v. Howard, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit indicated that the public 
safety risks stemming from crime associated with illegal drug use and drug trafficking are either 
themselves a special need or at least a relevant consideration when determining whether states have 
meet their burden to establish a special need.
  Although studies have shown that drug abuse and drug dependence are associated with 
unemployment, casual or intermittent drug use does not appear to be associated with long periods 
of unemployment.  
521  Picking up this thread in Lebron, Florida counted 
among its special needs the “public health” and “crime risks” associated with the drug epidemic.
522  
To that end Florida asserted an interest in not funding that epidemic and its associated “public 
ills.”
523
 
  Although the public health and crime risks associated with illegal drug use are well known, 
there is little or no evidence that welfare recipients are important contributors to the drug problem. 
Without a genuine threat to public health or public safety, states cannot meet their burden to 
establish a special need.   
 
B.  THE NATURE AND INTRUSIVENESS OF THE SEARCH  
 
Courts will also consider the nature of the search.  Most states have proposed to test welfare 
recipients for drugs using a urine test.  In each of the special needs cases where the Court has upheld 
drug testing policies, urine samples were monitored by “listening for normal sounds of urination,” 
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either behind a closed stall or by standing directly behind the person producing a urine sample, but 
not under direct observation.
524  Consistent with Skinner and Von Raab, Florida law would not 
require laboratories to monitor TANF applicants as they produce urine samples under direct 
observation. Instead Florida law simply instructs the Department of Children and Family Services 
(DCFS) to provide each person with a “reasonable degree of dignity” consistent with the state’s 
interest in obtaining a reliable sample.
525
More difficult questions arise with respect to the intrusiveness of a drug test.  The Supreme 
Court has said that the intrusiveness of a special needs search concerns whether test results are 
disclosed only to a limited class of personnel who have a “need to know” and whether test results 
are turned over to law enforcement.
  Provided that states do not require direct observation of a 
urine sample, and limit testing to illegal drugs, courts are likely to conclude that the privacy interests 
comprised by obtaining a urine sample are negligible.  
526  Courts will also ask whether sharing test results with third 
parties would violate a reasonable expectation of privacy held by the class of persons to be tested.  
At least a few states have considered the possibility of sharing positive drug test results with child 
protective services and law enforcement.  Before a federal district court issued a preliminary 
injunction, temporarily halting Florida’s drug testing program in November 2011, HB 353 allowed 
the Department of Children and Family Services to enter drug test results into a database accessible 
by law enforcement agencies.
527
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Florida Child Abuse Hotline.
528  However, in February 2012, the Florida Department of Children 
and Family Services retreated from its earlier position.  Instead, DCFS has published a new rule, 
indicating that the Department will not report test results to the Child Abuse Hotline, nor will 
DCFS share test results with law enforcement.
529
The Supreme Court has provided uncertain and conflicting guidance as to whether drug test 
results obtained through the special needs doctrine can be shared with law enforcement agencies or 
child protective services.  The following section will argue that courts should prohibit the use of 
special needs evidence in criminal prosecutions. However, even if these provisions are not 
unconstitutional, states should consider the possibility that by driving at-risk parents away from 
public assistance programs, these statutes could actually make it more difficult for child welfare 
agencies to identify children who are risk for abuse and neglect.   
   
 
 
i.  A FOURTH AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVE  
 
In its classic formulation, the special needs doctrine permits suspicionless searches when 
governments confront special needs, “beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”
530 However, 
in its early special needs cases, the Supreme Court appeared untroubled when the fruits of a special 
needs search were used in subsequent criminal proceedings.
531
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  In T.L.O., Justice Blackmun did not 
object when prosecutors charged T.L.O. with juvenile delinquency based on evidence of drug 
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dealing seized from her purse.  Nor did Justice Scalia object in Griffin when police officers searched 
Griffin’s home and prosecutors used a gun seized in that search to charge Griffin with a weapons 
offence.  In Skinner, the Supreme Court also upheld federal regulations that authorized the release of 
drug test results to law enforcement.  However, since there was no evidence that the federal 
regulations were merely a “pretext” for law enforcement, in a footnote, Justice Kennedy indicated 
that the Court would “leave for another day” the hard questions that would arise if prosecutors were 
to use evidence from a special needs search in a criminal prosecution.
532
Despite T.L.O., Skinner, and Griffin, in its more recent special needs cases, the Supreme 
Court has also suggested that handing test results over to law enforcement officials would impugn 
an otherwise valid administrative scheme.  In Von Raab, Vernonia and Earls, the Justices underscored 
that test results were not disclosed beyond the limited class of personnel who had a need to know, 
nor were test results used for punitive or disciplinary purposes.
    
533 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
Supreme Court struck down state regulations that permitted drug tests for obstetrics patients, 
without their consent and without a reasonable suspicion of drug use, owing to the excessive 
entanglement of law enforcement in the creation and execution of the policy.  In an opinion by 
Justice Stevens, the Court distinguished the ultimate purpose of a special needs search from its 
immediate objectives: “While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get the women 
in question into substance abuse treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches 
was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal.”
534
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with detailed instructions on chain of custody, the range of possible charges for drug use, and the 
logistics of police intervention all pointed toward the conclusion that the program in question was 
“specifically designed” to gather admissible evidence for a criminal prosecution.
535
In Ferguson, Justice Stevens indicated that the “critical difference” between the hospital drug 
testing policy on the one hand, and previous special needs cases on other, was that in each of the 
previous cases, the special need for drug testing was “divorced from the State’s general interest in 
law enforcement.”
   
536 In Vernonia, for example, the Court held that the School District instituted a 
drug testing policy for “distinctly nonpunitive purposes,” namely protecting student athletes from 
drug-related injury and deterring illegal drug use among students.
537  In Skinner, the Court held that 
Federal Railroad Administration required drug tests to prevent train accidents and fatalities, “not to 
assist in the prosecution of employees.”
538
At times proponents of drug testing have alluded to state interests that appear to be 
distinguishable from a general state interest in law enforcement, for example, a state interest in 
ensuring that taxpayer dollars reach their intended beneficiaries, or eliminating drug-related barriers 
to employment.  Nonetheless, throughout the debate surrounding drug testing and public assistance, 
states have largely rested the case for drug testing on a state interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars 
are not used to subsidize illegal drug use.  In Lebron, Florida put it this way:  
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[T]he government has spent untold resources over the last thirty years fighting the 
“war on drugs.” Surely, then, the government has a paramount interest in not 
funding the drug epidemic and its associated public ills.539
 
  
To the extent that states have asserted an interest in not funding illegal activity, opponents of drug 
testing might argue that states have failed to demonstrate that the primary purpose of drug testing is 
to further a valid non-law enforcement interest.  However, notwithstanding Ferguson, the Supreme 
Court has also said that a lawful suspicionless search may serve multiple purposes, including a state 
interest in law enforcement.  In New York v. Burger, the Court confronted the mirror image of 
Ferguson—the  primary purpose of the search was administrative, but authorities also discovered 
evidence of criminal conduct in the process.
540  Ironically, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the 
Supreme Court upheld a New York statute designed to prevent auto theft by authorizing the police 
to conduct suspicionless searches of automobile junkyards.  According to Justice Blackmun, what 
lower courts failed to realize was that “a State can address a major social problem both by way of an 
administrative scheme and through penal sanctions.”
541 Penal laws and administrative regulations 
may aim toward the same “ultimate purpose” even if the regulatory goals of an administrative search 
are narrower.
542 The Court added that auto theft was a “serious social problem” and New York had 
a “substantial interest in regulating the vehicle-dismantling industry because of this problem.”
543
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remand, the fruits of the search were used to prosecute Burger for criminal possession of stolen 
property.   
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Appealing to Burger, supporters of drug testing might argue that a valid administrative search 
may have the same ultimate purpose as the penal law—namely, combating illegal drug use—even if 
its regulatory goals are narrower—weeding illegal drug users out of public assistance programs.  
Moreover, the fruits of that search can also be used in a criminal prosecution.  As Justice Blackmun 
argued in Burger, a valid administrative scheme does not become unconstitutional merely because an 
officer discovers evidence of a crime in addition to a violation of the administrative statute itself.
544
In Ferguson, Justice Stevens attempted to reconcile the tension between the hospital drug 
testing policy and Burger by proposing that where the individual interest in privacy is “particularly 
attenuated” or where the discovery of criminal evidence is “merely incidental to the purpose of the 
administrative search,” the search may fall within the scope of the special needs doctrine.
  
Nor is evidence garnered from that search inadmissible.  
545  
Although the Supreme Court has long held that a lesser expectation of privacy attaches to 
commercial property and other “closely regulated industries,” in what sense was discovery of stolen 
auto parts in “merely incidental?”  The statute authorized police officers to search junkyards for 
stolen vehicles, in an effort to combat what the Burger Court itself described as a “serious social 
problem in automobile theft.”
546
The Court’s attempt to explain away the discovery of stolen auto parts as “merely 
incidental,” and thereby salvage the holding in Burger, goes to a longstanding dilemma in the special 
needs doctrine—in what sense must a special need lie “beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement?”  In Ferguson, the Court attempted to answer that question by emphasizing that the 
immediate objective of the hospital drug testing policy was to generate evidence that would be 
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admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
547
The problem with such a holding is that it ignores the central premise of the special needs 
doctrine—namely, that suspicionless searches are permissible when governments confront special 
needs “beyond, the normal need for law enforcement.” Suppose that in an effort to better serve 
dual-system clients, TANF programs, child protective services and law enforcement agencies begin 
to work closely with one another.  Suppose further that the TANF program asks one of their clients 
to take a drug test based in part on information obtained from child protective services and law 
enforcement.  Both Burger and Griffin suggest that a positive test result would be admissible in court.  
Yet, the problem with a rule that allows information gained through a special needs search to be 
used in a criminal prosecution is that doing so opens a large and tempting back door for prosecutors 
to circumvent garden variety Fourth Amendment protections.
  The Court also highlighted the excessive 
involvement of law enforcement officers in both the creation and day-to-day administration of the 
policy.   In contrast to Ferguson, there is little evidence that the “immediate objective” or “primary 
purpose” of imposing a drug testing requirement on public assistance is to generate evidence for a 
criminal proceeding.  Nor is there evidence of an excessive entanglement between public assistance 
programs and law enforcement.  To that end, courts might well conclude that the primary purpose 
of requiring TANF recipients to pass a drug a drug test is administrative; therefore, evidence of 
illegal drug use is admissible in a criminal prosecution under Burger.  
548
                                                 
547 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86.  
  Given the possibility for abuse, 
courts should instead adopt a prophylactic rule that would bar prosecutors from using evidence 
obtained through a special needs search in a criminal case.   
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Finally, when assessing the intrusiveness of a special needs search, courts will also ask 
whether sharing information with third parties violates a reasonable expectation of privacy held by 
TANF recipients.  In Ferguson, Justice Stevens noted that the hospital policy involved a “far more 
substantial” invasion of privacy than previous special  needs cases since the policy would have 
allowed hospital officials to disclose test result to law enforcement officials without the knowledge 
or consent of their patients.
549  In a hospital setting the reasonable expectation of privacy held by 
most patients  is that hospitals will not share their lab results with third parties without their 
consent.
550  In contrast to Ferguson, however, Florida’s drug testing policy requires TANF applicants 
to acknowledge that test results collected to determine TANF eligibility will be reported to the 
Florida Abuse Hotline “for review to initiate an assessment or an offer of services.”
551
 
  Although 
disclosure agreements like this one would inform TANF applicants of possible information sharing 
with third-parties, a typical applicant might suspect that the purpose of sharing their drug test results 
with the Florida Abuse Hotline is to facilitate a referral for substance abuse treatment and for their 
benefit only, rather than relaying information to child protective services, and certainly not to law 
enforcement agencies.  With only minor corrections to disclosure policies, courts are likely to 
conclude that sharing information with third parties does not intrude upon a reasonable expectation 
of privacy held by most TANF recipients.   
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ii.  A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE  
 
From a conventional Fourth Amendment perspective, the central questions with respect to 
the nature and intrusiveness of a search are whether drug testing furthers a valid non-law 
enforcement interest, and whether sharing test results with third parties would violate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy held by public assistance recipients.  However, from a public health 
perspective, the important questions are far different.  Instead, the important questions concern the 
impact of drug testing requirements on the health of illegal drug users and the people around them.  
A public health approach would keep two considerations in mind.  First, regulations to protect the 
public’s health will often involve risk-risk tradeoffs.  Such tradeoffs occur when interventions 
designed to decrease one risk, simultaneously increase another.
552
Requiring public assistance recipients to pass a drug test would decrease the risk that 
taxpayer dollars are used to fund illegal drug use.  On the other hand, if parents are at all concerned 
that they might test positive for drugs, then sharing positive test results with child protective services 
or law enforcement could deter parents from applying for public assistance for fear that they might 
lose custody of their children or face incarceration. Paradoxically, by driving at-risk parents away 
from social services, policies designed to protect children could actually increase the risk that 
children who are in abusive homes will go undetected.   
  Second, a public health 
perspective, particularly a population-level perspective, would consider the likely health impacts of 
drug testing requirements on people who use illegal drugs, as well as likely “spillover effects” on 
their minor children and the communities around them.  
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Qualitative studies on pregnant women who use illegal drugs suggest that sharing test results 
with law enforcement may discourage women from seeking necessary assistance.
553
 
  A study by the 
U.S. General Accounting Office found that for  drug dependent women, the fear of legal 
repercussions can be a potent barrier to medical care:  
Drug treatment and prenatal care providers told us that the increasing fear of 
incarceration and losing children to foster care is discouraging pregnant women 
from seeking care. Women are reluctant to seek treatment if there is a possibility of 
punishment.  They also fear that if their children are placed in foster care, they will 
never get their children back.554
 
 
Anticipating such problems, most states would allow parents who test positive for drugs to appoint 
a third party beneficiary to receive benefits on behalf of a minor child.  However, parents may be 
reluctant to disclose their need for a third-party beneficiary to a friend or family member.  According 
to the Florida Department of Children and Family Services, the number of TANF applications has 
declined since drug testing began in July 2011, suggesting both that HB 353 has had its intended 
deterrent effect, but also that TANF applicants who use drugs have not enrolled their children in 
TANF through third-party beneficiaries.
555
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C.  EFFECTIVENESS  
 
Courts will ask whether laws that condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug test 
are “reasonably likely” to achieve their objectives.  Although several states have passed laws that 
require TANF applicants to pass a drug test before they qualify for benefits, state laws differ from 
one another in important ways.  In Florida and Georgia, state laws require all TANF applicants to 
pass a drug test before they qualify for assistance.  In Arizona, Missouri and Utah, state laws require 
a reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use before TANF programs can require a drug test.  Although 
a few states like Missouri would allow TANF applicants who test positive for drugs to retain their 
benefits on the condition that they participate in a substance abuse treatment program, Florida and 
Georgia would not.   
Eventually all states would suspend assistance to someone who continues to test positive for 
drugs.  Part II.B.c. will argue that although some suspicionless drug testing policies are likely to 
identify TANF recipients who use illegal drugs,  policies that deny public assistance benefits to illegal 
drug users are unlikely to advance many of the states’ other objectives, including encouraging the 
transition from welfare to work, and preventing child abuse.  The following section will also argue 
that the Supreme Court should incorporate a least intrusive alternative requirement into the special 
needs doctrine.  Without a requirement to seek the least intrusive alternative special needs searches 
are needlessly overinclusive.   
 
 
i.  TAXPAYER SUBSIDY OF ILLEGAL DRUG USE  
 
The Supreme Court has been of two minds about the role of effectiveness in a special needs 
analysis.  In Von Raab, the Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that requiring a drug test as a 
condition of promotion in the Customs Service was unreasonable since employees could schedule 172 
 
the date of the drug test and presumably abstain from illegal drug use in advance of the test.
556  
Justice Kennedy reasoned that drug addicts would be unable to abstain from drugs, even for a 
limited period of time, and in any event, the amount of time that it would take for a particular drug 
to become undetectable in the system varies widely from person to person, and that information 
would likely remain unknown to the employee.
557  However, several years later in Chandler, the 
Supreme Court struck down suspicionless drug testing as a condition of placement on the Georgia 
state ballot, reasoning that Georgia’s certification requirement was “not well designed to identify 
candidates who violate antidrug laws.”
558 As Justice Ginsburg remarked, drug tests scheduled by the 
candidate were “no secret” and the government failed to explain why ordinary law enforcement 
mechanisms were insufficient to identify illegal drug users “should they appear in the limelight of the 
public stage.”
559
From a public health perspective, regulations that burden individual interests in privacy are 
only justified when they are reasonably likely to accomplish their public health goals. However, 
requiring TANF applicants to pass a drug test on their initial application for benefits will fail to 
identify the small number of TANF applicants who do in fact use drugs.  Not unlike the drug tests 
at issue in Von Raab and Chandler, HB 353 would require a onetime drug test as part of an initial 
application for TANF benefits, and as in Chandler, the date of a drug test to be scheduled by the 
TANF applicant is “no secret.”  States like Florida have failed to explain why most TANF applicants 
would be unable to abstain from illegal drug use long enough to avoid detection.  Of those public 
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assistance recipients who have reported illegal drug use during the past month or year, most report 
use of marijuana.
560  Marijuana is not a highly addictive substance, and for most people, the 
metabolites of marijuana become undetectable through urine analysis after 10 days.
561  A small 
number of public assistance recipients have reported use of “hard drugs” like cocaine and 
methamphetamine.
562  Although highly addictive, the metabolites of these drugs are detectable in the 
system for only a few days.
563
As in Chandler, state statutes that would require new TANF applicants to complete a 
scheduled drug test are not well designed to identify applicants who have violated antidrug laws, but 
what about random drug testing?  In Marchwinski v. Howard, Michigan proposed to combine an initial 
drug test for TANF applicants with random drug testing for current TANF recipients.
  Most TANF applicants, save for those who are prohibitively addicted, 
would be able to pass a scheduled drug test.   
564
 
  Random 
drug testing would allow states to identify TANF applicants who have used illegal drugs; however as 
I argued above, courts are unlikely to see a state interest in ensuring that taxpayer dollars reach their 
intended beneficiaries as “substantial” within the meaning of Chandler.    
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ii.  DRUG USE AND EMPLOYMENT   
 
Proponents of drug testing have also argued that statutes like HB 353 are designed to 
address government interests beyond merely identifying potential misuse of taxpayer dollars, for 
example—a state interest in giving people an incentive to get off drugs or encouraging the transition 
from welfare to work.  What should we make of these claims? In 1997 Congress eliminated 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for people with a primary diagnosis of drug addiction.
565  Not 
unlike HB 353, the purpose of eliminating SSI benefits for people with a primary diagnosis of drug 
addiction was to encourage substance abusers to take responsibility for their illegal drug use.  And 
not unlike HB 353, an important purpose of the federal benefit termination was to address a public 
perception that providing federal disability benefits to drug addicts only enabled their illegal drug 
use.
566
Without employment, many former SSI beneficiaries turned to TANF and state emergency 
relief, resulting in cost-shifting onto states and local governments.  A longitudinal study of former 
SSI beneficiaries found that within 2 years of benefit termination, 20 percent of former beneficiaries 
reported income assistance from other public programs including TANF, general assistance, and 
veterans’ benefits.
  Although some former SSI beneficiaries were able to secure stable employment, many others 
were not.  
567  Another study found that after 4 years, nearly 40 percent of former SSI 
beneficiaries in Northern California reported TANF or general state assistance as their primary 
source of income.
568
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TANF or general assistance also reported an increase in their utilization of mental health services.
569
It may be that those who were able to complete the transition from federal disability benefits 
to work were among the least impaired.  A Chicago study found that when compared to former 
beneficiaries who were able to secure even marginal employment of at least $500 a month, former 
disability beneficiaries who remained unemployed or underemployed were 5 times more likely to be 
drug dependent and 6 times more likely to be psychiatrically impaired.
  
The federal experience suggests that if states were to withhold public assistance benefits from people 
who fail a drug test, or from those who are unable to complete a substance abuse treatment 
program, the cost of these policies may be passed onto others, or felt downstream, in other parts of 
the social safety net.  
570  Those who were unable to 
secure employment were also more likely to be dependent on cocaine or heroin, and far less likely to 
have any means of social support save for friends, family members or possibly resorting to illegal 
activities.
571
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  Although states vary in the penalties attached to a positive drug test, studies like this 
one suggest that for those who are the most vulnerable, the most bereft of resources—and therefore 
most likely to contribute to the public health and crime risks associated with the drug epidemic—
removing public assistance benefits without further social support is more likely to exacerbate the 
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A few states like Missouri have proposed a middle ground.  In Florida TANF applicants 
who test positive for drugs are ineligible for income assistance through TANF, with no option to 
retain their benefits while participating in a treatment program. However, in Missouri, TANF 
applicants who test positive for drugs have the option to retain their benefits on the condition that 
they enroll in a substance abuse treatment program for six months and do not test positive for drugs 
while participating in the program.
572  Anyone who tests positive for drugs a second time would be 
TANF ineligible for three years. In Florida, TANF applicants who test positive for drugs would be 
ineligible for income assistance, but remain eligible for other benefits like food stamps and child 
care.  In Missouri, however, TANF recipients who test positive for drugs a second time would lose 
access to all of their TANF benefits—temporary cash assistance, food stamps, child care, and other 
state programs, partially funded through TANF.
573
Sooner or later many, if not most, people who are required to participate in a substance 
abuse treatment program will relapse.
  
574  From a public health perspective, the question is whether 
the loss of public assistance benefits will provide an effective incentive for them to stop using illegal 
drugs.  For some casual drug users, the possibility that they might lose their TANF benefits might be 
enough to stop, but for those are drug dependent, the answer is probably not.  Decades of research 
on addiction have shown that prolonged drug use can alter the structure and function of the brain.
575
                                                 
572 MO. REV. STAT. § 208.027 (2012). 
  
When areas of the brain involved in reward, memory and inhibition are disrupted, the capacity to 
stopping using drugs is also disrupted, even if continued drug use means the person stands to lose 
 
 
573 MO. REV. STAT. § 208.027 (2012). 
 
 
574 A. Thomas McLellan et al., Drug Dependence a Chronic Medical Illness, 284 J. THE AM. MED. ASS’N. 1689 (2000). 
 
 
575 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF 
ADDICTION (2010).  177 
 
everything that he or she once valued.
576
 
  The result is that negative incentives like threatening public 
assistance recipients with the loss of benefits like income assistance, public housing, or 
unemployment programs probably won’t provide an effective incentive for them to stop using 
drugs.  There is also the further concern alluded to above—namely, that if states push drug addicts 
out of public assistance programs, the costs of doing so may be felt by others.   
 
iii.  CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT  
 
Supporters of drug testing argue that these policies are justified by a state interest in 
combating drug-related child abuse and neglect.  Yet, as I argued above, if parents are even remotely 
concerned that they might test positive for drugs, sharing test results with law enforcement could 
deter parents from applying for public assistance for fear that they might lose custody of their 
children or face incarceration.  By driving at-risk parents away from social services, states could 
actually increase the risk that children who are in abusive homes go undetected.  
However, denying public assistance benefits to parents who use illegal drugs could create 
additional problems for low-income children, even apart from communication with law 
enforcement.  A study of welfare recipients in Chicago found that substantial declines in welfare 
income, problems with utility assistance, food shortages and eviction threats all significantly 
increased the risk of child welfare involvement.
577
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  Without income assistance, most parents will lack 
sufficient resources to secure basic household needs, thereby putting their children at risk.  As one 
woman in the study put it, welfare income provides her “stable money,” the money she and her 
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children rely on when a part-time job does not last for more than a few months, or when an 
employer cannot provide more than a few hours of work.
578
Although most state proposals would allow parents who test positive for drugs to continue 
receiving food stamps or child care services in an effort to insulate children from the impact of 
welfare sanctions on their parents, these safeguards are likely to be inadequate.  A 2002 study on 
welfare reform found that welfare sanctions resulting in a loss of income significantly increased the 
risk that children faced food insecurity, even when families continued to received food stamps.
   
579  
For most people, the average monthly food stamp benefit of $4.46 per day, $1.48 per meal, does not 
provide enough money to buy healthy food.
580  A large literature on nutrition has shown that 
micronutrient deficiencies at an early age are associated with a wide variety of  adverse outcomes for 
children, ranging from impaired cognitive development and poor school performance to chronic 
disease and increased susceptibility to infection.
581
 
  The result is that although states have adopted 
drug testing requirements largely in an attempt to sanction adults who use illegal drugs, withholding 
public assistance benefits from parents could inadvertently harm their children.   
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iv.  THE LEAST INTRUSIVE ALTERNATIVE  
 
Proposals to condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug test are unlikely to 
achieve many of the states’ objectives. However, even when policies are well designed and 
reasonably likely to accomplish their objectives, they may still impose unacceptable burdens on 
individuals rights nonetheless.
582  In  public health, the requirement to seek the least intrusive 
alternative instructs officials to adopt policies that achieve their objectives as well or better than 
possible alternatives, while imposing the fewest burdens on individual interests.
583
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently said that the Fourth Amendment does 
require governments to adopt the least intrusive alternative.  In Earls, Justice Thomas flatly asserted 
that a reasonable government search does not require an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, 
and to that end, nor does the Fourth Amendment require governments to seek the least intrusive 
alternative.
 
584
Whatever one might think about the relationship between the Reasonableness Clause and 
the Warrant Clause, we can understand the requirement that the government adopt the least 
intrusive means of accomplishing its objectives as a fundamental element of what it means for a 
government search to be reasonable.  If the government can accomplish its objectives as well or 
   The categorical rejection of the least intrusive alternative requirement issued by the 
plurality in Earls  reflects a larger and longstanding debate about the relationship between the 
Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.  Justice Thomas, an 
adherent to the Reasonableness school of thought has long defended the position that the Warrant 
Clause does not inform the Reasonableness Clause; therefore, the Fourth Amendment does not 
require an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.   
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better through means that impose fewer burdens on personal rights and freedoms, a more intrusive 
method would be patently unreasonable.
585
At times the Supreme Court has suggested that the problem with incorporating a less 
intrusive alternative requirement into the special needs doctrine is that it would be too difficult for 
courts to imagine less intrusive alternatives to the proposed government program.  In Earls, Justice 
Thomas added that “[t]he logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise 
insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers.”
  Without incorporating a least intrusive alternative 
requirement into the special needs doctrine, government searches may be overinclusive, sweeping 
far more people than necessary under the ambit of regulation.  In this case, since the vast majority of 
people who receive public assistance from the government do not use illegal drugs, requiring all of 
them to take a drug test would be vastly overinclusive, with little or no public health gain.   
586
 
 Why should that be 
the case? Even if the Supreme Court were reluctant to incorporate the least intrusive alternative 
requirement into its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence generally, that fact alone should not 
discourage the Court from adding a least intrusive alternative requirement to the special needs 
doctrine.  Incorporating a least intrusive alternative requirement into the special needs doctrine 
would not require courts to hypothesize potential less intrusive alternatives.  Instead, not unlike 
other areas of the law in which courts engage in a least intrusive alternative analysis, governments 
should bear the burden to demonstrate that its objectives could not be achieved as well or better 
through less intrusive methods.  
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1.  SUSPICION-BASED DRUG TESTING  
 
In Earls, a plurality of the Court insisted that the Fourth Amendment does not require 
consideration of less intrusive alternatives.  In Chandler, however, the Supreme Court alluded 
approvingly to idea that the a reasonable search under the special needs doctrine might require 
governments to seek the least intrusive means to accomplish their objectives.  Justice Ginsburg 
strongly suggested that Georgia ought to explain why an appearance in the “limelight of the public 
stage” would not suffice to apprehend addicted candidates for public office and the failure to 
provide such an explanation was a constitutionally relevant consideration.
587  In the same way, the 
Chandler  majority contrasted the circumstances of candidates for public office—subject to relentless 
scrutiny by their peers, the public, and the press—to that of the customs agents at issue in Von Raab 
for whom it would not have been feasible to subject their behavior to the kind of day-to-day 
scrutiny that is the norm in an ordinary office environment.
588  The very strong suggestion emerging 
from Chandler is that when government actors are able to detect drug related impairment without a 
drug test, blanket suspicionless drug tests are “not needed” and inappropriate.
589
In contrast to the customs agents in Von Raab, welfare recipients are subject to constant 
scrutiny.  Most states require regularly scheduled home visits as a condition of receiving welfare 
benefits, and regularly scheduled appointments with case managers to review eligibility for benefits 
and progress toward employment.
   
590
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programs to identify drug-related impairment, without subjecting all welfare recipients to a drug test, 
Chandler suggests that blanket suspicionless drug tests for all welfare recipients may be unreasonable.   
Instead, most states require a reasonable suspicion of drug use before conducting a drug test.  
A few states require TANF applicants to complete a survey or recent drug use questionnaire.
  591   
However, since few applicants disclose illegal drug use, most states rely on case managers to 
recognize the signs of drug use—eyes that appear red, glazed or unable to focus, slurred speech, and 
poor coordination.  While drug testing based on a reasonable suspicion of drug use rests on surer 
Fourth Amendment grounds, from a public health perspective, suspicion-based approaches are not 
without their problems.  Although there are some classic signs of drug use, courts have at times 
looked favorably upon factors with questionable value—being unusually tired, or unusually active; 
excessive meticulousness or an unusually messy appearance; changes in behavior, even showing up 
late or unusually early for an activity.
592
Yet, however imperfect, policies that require a reasonable suspicion of drug use are 
preferable to a regime of blanket suspicionless drug testing for all welfare recipients.  By itself being 
unusually tired, or even unusually messy or disheveled does not (or should not) create a reasonable 
suspicion of drug use.  However, when taken together with some of the indicators described 
above—eyes that appear glazed, or unusually fixed, poor coordination and slurred speech—certain 
  If courts permit such a wide range of factors to create a 
reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use, unscrupulous case managers could easily use the pretense of 
reasonable suspicion of drug use to harass unpopular clients.  Requiring case managers to request a 
drug test when they have reason to believe that their clients are using drugs could also undermine 
the trust between caseworker and client.    
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signs such as an particularly disheveled appearance and unusual sluggishness can create a reasonable 
suspicion of illegal drug use. Under such circumstances, we have less reason to worry about abuse.  
Policies that offer people who test positive for drugs the opportunity to participate in a substance 
abuse program can also mitigate some of the harmful effects of suspicion-based testing on the 
caseworker client relationship.     
 
 
D.  THE INDIVIDUAL INTEREST IN PRIVACY  
 
i.  A FOURTH AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVE  
 
Finally, courts must consider the individual interest in privacy. From a conventional Fourth 
Amendment perspective, the central question with respect to the privacy interests of welfare 
recipients is whether drug testing intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.  The Supreme 
Court has appealed to a variety of factors in order to determine whether an expectation of privacy is 
reasonable.  At times, the Supreme Court has suggested that whether a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy depends upon his or her relationship with the state.  In Griffin the Supreme 
Court held that although a probationer’s home is protected by the Fourth Amendment, the 
supervisory relationship between the probationer and the State permits “a degree of impingement 
upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.”
593 The Supreme 
Court has also said that voluntary participation in a closely regulated industry can diminish an 
otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy.
594
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 Extending that logic to schoolchildren in Vernonia 
and Earls, the Court held that not unlike “adults who choose to participate in a ‘closely regulated 
industry’” children who participate in extracurricular activities, voluntarily subject themselves to a 
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greater degree of regulation than others.
595  Moreover, public school children are subject to countless 
school rules and public health regulations, in addition to the rules governing their extracurricular 
activities, all of which work to diminish their expectations of privacy.
596
Still, arguments along these lines are vulnerable to a few objections.  In both Vernonia and 
Earls, the Court based its decision on the custodial responsibilities of public schools when children 
are entrusted to their care.
  Applying the logic of 
Vernonia  and  Earls, courts might conclude that public assistance recipients voluntarily subject 
themselves to a higher degree of regulation than others, and therefore  enjoy a diminished 
expectation of privacy.   
597  In a strongly worded conclusion, the Court limited its decision to 
public schoolchildren and “caution[ed] against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will 
readily pass muster in other contexts.”
598
The Court took a similar approach in Skinner and Von Raab.  In both cases,  the Supreme 
Court asserted that an otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy can be diminished by a 
 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Chandler v. 
Miller  casts considerable doubt on the role of voluntariness when determining individual 
expectations of privacy.  In Chandler, the Supreme Court held that blanket suspicionless drug testing 
of all candidates for state office violated the Fourth Amendment, even though candidates seeking 
public office did so voluntarily.  Instead, Chandler  suggests that whether individuals have a 
diminished expectation of privacy depends in large part on the strength of the government interest 
in a search.  
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compelling government interest in public safety.  In Skinner, the Court concluded that the privacy 
expectations of railroad employees were diminished by virtue of “their participation in an industry 
that is heavily regulated to ensure safety,” notably, “a goal, dependent in substantial part, on the 
health and fitness of covered employees.”
599 Likewise with respect to the customs agents at issue in 
Von Raab, that Supreme Court concluded that since “successful performance of their duties depends 
uniquely on their judgment and dexterity,” customs agents “cannot reasonably expect to keep from 
the Service personal information that bears directly on their fitness.”
600
Taken together, Chandler, Von Raab, and Skinner suggest that what matters is whether the 
government has demonstrated an “important” or “substantial” interest in requiring all public 
assistance recipients to pass a drug test.  Even if the government interests at stake are more than 
symbolic, the government interest in saving a few thousand in taxpayer dollars probably does not 
rank as substantial or important within the meaning of Chandler.   To the extent that the government 
has failed to demonstrate a substantial or important interest in requiring all public assistance 
recipients to pass a drug test, courts should conclude that the government interest in a suspicionless 
drug test is not sufficiently vital to outweigh the individual interest in privacy. 
   
 
 
ii.  A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE  
 
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that while the Fourth Amendment protects 
reasonable expectations of privacy,  the reasonable expectations of privacy held by citizens are not 
the only interests the Fourth Amendment protects.
601
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and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.”
602 At times the Court has instead underscored the 
dignity and liberty interests implicated by a blanket search.  Famously remarking upon prohibition 
era laws aimed at concealed transportation of liquor in Caroll v. United States, Chief Justice Taft 
added: “it would be intolerable and unreasonable” if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop 
every automobile on the highway, “and thus subject all persons to the inconvenience and indignity 
of a search.”
603
In the same way, embracing a public health perspective would lead courts toward a broader 
understanding of Fourth Amendment values.  As Scott Burris and Ichiro Kwachi have argued, law 
may be a powerful social determinant of health.
   
604  Burris and Kwachi posit two relationships 
between law and public health.   First, the law may play a role in creating and maintaining the social 
structures that influence population health such as adequate housing, workplace safety, income 
inequality and stable employment.
605  The law might also act as a pathway along which social 
determinants impact population health.  Drawing from the literature on procedural justice, Burris 
and Kwachi argue that encounters with the law can be a “powerful psychosocial experience” 
through which “low socioeconomic status is reinforced and driven home.”
606
Ethnographic studies on welfare point toward similar conclusions. Describing her 
experience with a local welfare office, one woman in Appalachian Ohio put it this way:  
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Well, I feel cheap when I walk in there.  I feel that everybody’s looking at me and 
like she ain’t got no job, she’s dirty, and I just feel worse when I go in there and 
come out than I did going in there.   
 
Another added:  
 
They act like they own us. [Researcher:] How does that make you feel? It makes me 
feel real low.607
 
  
It may be that encounters like this one have implications for our health.  In a well-known study of 
British civil servants, Michael Marmot found that lower positions in the occupational hierarchy were 
associated with greater risk for coronary heart disease.
608  Differences in access to health care could 
not explain the social gradient in health since all of the civil servants who participated in the study 
had universal access to health care.  The study also found that risk factors such as smoking, high 
blood pressure, and high cholesterol levels accounted for less than one third of the gradient in 
mortality due to coronary heart disease.
609  Instead, researchers believe that low social status and low 
control at work, common among employees who occupy lower rungs of the occupational hierarchy, 
could explain their greater risk for coronary heart disease.
610
Further research supports the hypothesis that low social status can affect our health through 
the impact of stress on the cardiovascular system and the immune system. Repeated exposure to 
stressful events or failure to shut off the stress response efficiently can create wear and tear on the 
body, contributing to what social epidemiologists refer  to as “allostatic load.”
   
611
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cumulative burden of daily stressors can wear down the cardiovascular and immune systems, leading 
to diabetes, obesity, hypertension and greater susceptibility to infection.
612
What might these findings imply for the Fourth Amendment? What might they imply for the 
special needs doctrine? From a public health perspective, the Fourth Amendment protects more 
than our interests in privacy.  By shielding us from the indignities of a government search, the 
Fourth Amendment protects our health.
  
613  The literature on social epidemiology suggests that the 
harms associated with suspicionless drug testing include more than the fleeting embarrassment of 
providing a urine sample while a lab technician “listens for the normal sounds of urination,” and 
inspects the sample for tampering.  Instead the problem may be the way in which degrading 
treatment “gets under the skin.”
614
 
   
IV.  THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE  
 
Proposals to condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug test raise a Fourth 
Amendment question and courts are likely to analyze these statutes under the special needs doctrine.  
However, as a conditional benefit, these policies also implicate the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, and in doing so unearth a longstanding puzzle in constitutional law.   Although neither the 
states nor the federal government are under an obligation to provide public assistance benefits, may  
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the government provide public assistance on the condition that the recipient waive or surrender a 
constitutional right? Notwithstanding the power of government to withhold valuable benefits 
absolutely, the Supreme Court has limited the power of governments to provide benefits 
conditionally.  To that end, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine limits the power of government 
to condition benefits on the waiver of a constitutional right.   
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine emerged in the nineteenth century through a series 
of cases on incorporation.  By the late 1950s, the Court turned its attention to individual rights.  Part 
IV.A. provides an overview of seminal decisions in which the Supreme Court has considered the 
implications of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine for public assistance benefits and individual 
rights. Section IV.B. applies the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to drug testing and public 
assistance, with special attention to how the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures might complicate the unconstitutional conditions problem. 
 
A.  UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS CASES 
 
i.  CONDITIONS OVERTURNED   
 
The Supreme Court applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to individual rights for 
the first time in Speiser v. Randall.
 615   In Speiser, the Supreme Court struck down a California statute 
that required WWII veterans to swear loyalty to the state as a condition of receiving a tax 
exemption. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court held that denying a tax exemption to 
veterans who refused to sign a loyalty oath would in effect “penalize” the claimants for engaging in 
proscribed speech, or “coerce” them into refraining from disloyal speech.
616
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deterrent effect of the denial was no different than if the state were to issue a “fine” against 
proscribed speech.
617
In  Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court held that South Carolina could not deny 
unemployment benefits to a woman who refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith, 
without burdening her interest in free exercise and violating the First Amendment.
   
618  The Court 
conceded that the pressure on Mrs. Sherbert was at best indirect. No criminal statute compelled 
Mrs. Sherbert to work on Saturdays.  However, as Justice Brennan wrote: “if the purpose or effect 
of a law is to impede the observance…of religion,” then “that law is constitutionally invalid even 
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.”
619
In Sherbert, the Court alluded to three justifications for a more searching review.  First, the 
pressure on Mrs. Sherbert to forgo the practice of her religion was “unmistakable.”
  In doing so, the Court began to 
answer a question left unanswered in Speiser, namely—how can a condition that we are free to accept 
or reject actually “burden” or “impinge upon” protected First Amendment interests? 
620  By 
conditioning unemployment benefits on acceptance of Saturday work, South Carolina presented 
Mrs. Sherbert with an impossible choice—follow the basic precepts of her religion and forego 
benefits on the one hand, or accept work and violate her religious beliefs on the other.
621
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 Second, 
the conditional denial “threatened to produce a result which the State could not command 
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directly.”
622  Third, forcing Mrs. Sherbert to choose between her religion and unemployment 
benefits, “puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of her religion as would a fine 
imposed against appellant for Saturday worship.”
623 Even though criminal law did not require Mrs. 
Sherbert to accept Saturday work, the coercive and deterrent effects were such that the Court would 
require South Carolina to come forward with a compelling state interest to justify the burden on free 
exercise.  In its defense South Carolina argued that the statute was justified by a state interest in 
deterring fraudulent religious claims.  The Court found no evidence of fraud, and more importantly, 
even if there had been fraud, South Carolina failed to demonstrate that less restrictive means could 
not have achieved the government’s objectives.
624
Several years later the Court turned directly to public assistance benefits in Shapiro v. 
Thompson.
   
625  In Shapiro, the Court struck down state statutes, as well as a statutory provision in the 
District of Columbia, that denied welfare benefits to residents who had not resided in their state or 
district for at least one year immediately preceding their application for welfare.  The Court, per 
Justice Brennan, held that the statute created an invidious distinction between residents who had 
resided within the district for a year or more, and those who had been there for less than a year.  He 
added: “On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class is denied 
welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of families to obtain the very means to subsist—
food, shelter, and other necessities of life.”
626
                                                 
 
  The District of Columbia asserted a compelling state 
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interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of public assistance programs as well as administrative 
interests in budget planning and minimizing the risk of fraud.
627  However, the Shapiro Court rejected 
both claims, and paid little if any attention to the alleged administrative interests.  Even if the state 
had acted on a compelling governmental interest in minimizing fraud, the Supreme Court held that 
there were “less drastic means” available to minimize the risk.
628
In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, the Supreme Court also struck down an Arizona 
statute that conditioned nonemergency medical assistance at the county expense on residence within 
the state for at least the preceding 12 months.
 
629  In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the Court 
clarified the deterrence and penalty rationales in Shapiro.  Although the Court would consider 
whether a durational residence requirement deterred the right to travel, proof of actual deterrence 
was unnecessary.
630  Instead a residence requirement would trigger the Shapiro compelling interest 
test if it includes “any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of the right [to travel].”
631  
The Court took Shapiro to stand for the proposition that a “denial of the ‘basic necessities of life” 
constitutes a penalty on the right to travel.  To Justice Marshall, medical care was as much a basic 
necessity of life as welfare.
 632
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Like Speiser and Sherbert  before it, in Memorial Hospital the Court left the term “penalty” 
undefined, and instead hinted at when a condition might rise to the level of a penalty.  First, Justice 
Marshall distinguished the “basic necessities of life” at issue in Shapiro from other instances in which 
the Court has upheld a one year in-state residence requirement as condition of receiving lower in-
state tuition.  In doing so, Marshall suggested that the essential nature of medical care contributed to 
the willingness of the Court to characterize its denial as a penalty.
633 Importantly, Justice Marshall 
added: “[w]hatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis….governmental 
privileges and benefits necessary to basic sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater 
constitutional significance than less essential forms of governmental entitlements.”
634
 
  In other 
words, whether or not a condition that would deny nonemergency medical care constituted a 
“penalty” within the meaning of Shapiro, the fact medical care is a basic necessity has been reason 
enough for courts to review a potential denial with heightened scrutiny.  
i.  CONDITIONS UPHELD  
 
In Sherbert and its progeny, as well as Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, the Supreme Court struck 
down the offending statute on the ground that it penalized or deterred the exercise of a fundamental 
right.  In the abortion funding cases—Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae—the Court seemed to move 
away from the penalty rationale. In Maher, the Supreme Court held that equal protection does not 
obligate states to pay for nontherapuetic abortions simply because they elect to pay for the expenses 
associated with childbirth.
635
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  In Harris, the Court held that the federal government is not required to 
pay for medically necessary abortions, even though it funds other medically necessary services, 
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including childbirth.
636  In both cases, the Court reasoned that “[a] refusal to fund protected activity 
without more cannot be equated with the imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.”
637
Several years later, in Lyng v International Union, the Court upheld an amendment to the Food 
Stamp Act that prevented households from becoming eligible for food stamps if members of the 
household were on strike.
  
638  The Court thought it “exceedingly unlikely” that any more than a few 
workers might leave their families or their unions in order to increase the amount of food going to 
their households.
639  Even if the Amendment had pressured the associational rights of at least some 
strikers, the Constitution does not provide an entitlement to funds that might be necessary to realize 
the exercise of those rights.
640
In Dandridge v. Williams, the Supreme Court also upheld a Maryland statute that limited the 
absolute dollar amount AFDC families could receive to no more than $250 per family, per month, 
regardless of family size or need.
  
641
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  Where Shapiro and Memorial Hospital implicated a fundamental 
right to travel, the AFDC limitation implicated no such right, and the Court held that the statute was 
rationally supportable on any number of grounds, among them—a state interest in promoting 
gainful employment and family planning; a state interest in allocating public funds to as many 
families as possible; and a state interest in maintaining some degree of equity between welfare 
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recipients and wage earners.
642  Through Justice Stewart the Court acknowledged “the dramatically 
real factual difference” between the impoverished circumstances of persons seeking public 
assistance and other instances in which the Court applied rational basis review, but found no reason 
to apply a more rigorous standard.
643
Finally, in Wyman v. James the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute that authorized 
home visits by an AFDC caseworker on the theory that home visits were not searches within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and even if they were, home visits were not unreasonable.
  
644  
The Supreme Court also touched upon the unconstitutional conditions problem that arises when 
governments condition public assistance benefits on the surrender of a Fourth Amendment right.  
In a sharply worded opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that Mrs. James certainly had a “right” to 
refuse home visits, but doing so would simply result in a termination of benefits, and “nothing of a 
constitutional magnitude” was involved.
645
 
  If anything, to the Wyman majority, Mrs. James was the 
one who appeared to be unreasonable:  
What Mrs. James appears to want from the agency that provides her and her infant 
son with the necessities of life is the right to receive those necessities upon her own 
informational terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge for imposing 
those terms and to avoid questions of any kind.”646
 
   
To Justice Blackmun and members of the majority, the circumstances confronting Mrs. James were 
analogous to that of a taxpayer who refuses to furnish proof of a deduction.  The taxpayer would be 
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fully within his “right” not to produce proof, but doing so would result in “a detriment of the 
taxpayer’s own making.”
647
 
  
 
B.  DRUG TESTING AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS   
 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine limits the power of government to condition 
benefits on the waiver of a constitutional right.  When analyzing unconstitutional conditions claims, 
courts will usually begin by asking whether the condition “burdens” or “impinges upon” protected 
interests.  If so, courts will require the government to demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly 
tailored to a compelling governmental interest.  If not, courts will sustain the regulation with 
evidence of a rational relationship between means and ends.  Before addressing those questions 
however, the Fourth Amendment may present a unique set of concerns.  Unconstitutional 
conditions problems arise when governments attempt to condition benefits on the waiver of a 
constitutional right.  What might that imply for the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures?  Must a plaintiff alleging a violation of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine first establish that her Fourth Amendment rights have been violated before 
courts will proceed and consider her unconstitutional conditions claim? 
In  Sanchez v. San Diego County, the Ninth Circuit considered and promptly rejected an 
unconstitutional conditions challenge to a government regulation that required welfare recipients to 
submit to a home “walk through” as a condition of participation in a county welfare program.
648
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Having established that home visits were reasonable, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs 
could not prevail on their unconstitutional conditions claim, since the Fourth Amendment only 
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prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
649
Consider Luis Lebron.  Like anyone else Mr. Lebron has a Fourth Amendment right to 
refuse unreasonable searches and seizures.  Before Mr. Lebron walks into a Florida TANF office 
and signs on the dotted line, his bundle of Fourth Amendment rights includes the right to refuse a 
suspicionless drug test.  In order to determine the reasonableness of a government search, courts 
will weigh competing governmental and individual interests.  Absent an extraordinarily compelling 
or weighty government interest—I have in mind something like an extraordinary public health 
threat—Florida could not order all Floridians to submit to a drug test, including Mr. Lebron.  Nor, 
under garden-variety circumstances could Florida criminalize the failure to submit to a drug test.  
The result is that ex ante TANF applicants have a Fourth Amendment right to refuse a drug test and 
statutes like HB 353 in Florida offer them an opportunity to exchange some part of that right for 
public assistance benefits.   
  The difference between the Ninth Circuit approach 
on the one hand and the plaintiff’s position on the other raises a hard question about how we should 
view Fourth Amendment rights for the purposes of an unconstitutional conditions analysis.  Should 
we begin with plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights ex ante, viewing the government as proposing to 
trade some part of those rights for valued benefits? Or should we consider the scope of the 
plaintiff’s rights ex post, viewed in relationship to a particular government program?  
The same was true in Speiser.  The First Amendment prohibits the State of California from 
abridging freedom of speech.  The result is that WWII veterans have a First Amendment right to 
engage in disloyal speech. Why? With very few exceptions, the government does not have a 
compelling interest in imposing prior restraints on speech.  In Speiser, California offered veterans an 
opportunity to exchange their First Amendment right to engage in disloyal speech for a tax 
exemption.  Had the Supreme Court adopted the Ninth Circuit approach in Speiser, Justice Brennan 
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would have required WWII veterans to demonstrate that they have a First Amendment right to 
engage in disloyal speech and  receive a tax exemption, before addressing the unconstitutional 
conditions problem.   
Ordinarily however, the Court considers the scope of the plaintiff’s rights ex ante, without 
reference to the particular government program in question.  In Sherbert, the Court began by 
describing the scope of Mrs. Sherbert’s First Amendment interest in free exercise.  Justice Brennan 
explained that while the Court had rejected challenges to regulation of religious conduct when that 
conduct posed a substantial threat to public safety, Mrs. Sherbert’s First Amendment objection to 
Saturday work fell beyond the reach of government regulation.
650  Bearing the scope of Mrs. 
Sherbert’s First Amendment interest in mind—truncated only by the prior balance of government 
and individual interests—the Court then considered whether disqualifying Mrs. Sherbert for 
unemployment benefits imposed a burden on her interest in free exercise.  Concluding that it did, 
the Court then asked whether the regulation was narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental 
interest.
651
If courts were to adopt the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez, doing so would 
mean that courts will inevitably prune the of scope of Fourth Amendment protection twice—once 
since the plaintiff’s ex ante bundle of Fourth Amendment rights is not absolute (like Mrs. Sherbert, 
Mr. Lebron’s ex ante bundle of Fourth Amendment rights has already been limited by case law); and 
a second time, when courts balance the plaintiff’s residual Fourth Amendment interests in privacy 
against the government interest in a suspicionless search, all before reaching the unconstitutional 
conditions problem, if at all.   
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The approach taken in Sanchez is also inconsistent with the function of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine. Although we commonly refer to “unconstitutional conditions claims,” the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not itself a legal claim that can be addressed on its own once 
the underlying First or Fourth Amendment questions have been resolved. Instead, the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine changes the level of review attached to a First or Fourth 
Amendment claim, permitting courts to review conditional benefits under heightened or strict 
scrutiny when they would otherwise receive only deferential or passing review.  Given the function 
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, courts should not require plaintiffs to establish that a 
constitutional right has been violated, before addressing the unconstitutional conditions problem.  
Courts should instead ask whether the government program in question burdens or 
impinges upon the plaintiff’s ex ante bundle of Fourth Amendment rights.  However, even if there is 
a viable Fourth Amendment right in play, determining the existence of that right only marks the 
beginning of an inquiry into the unconstitutional conditions problem.  The important question is 
this—would requiring public assistance recipients to  pass a drug test, without individualized 
suspicion of drug use, unduly “burden” or “impinge upon” their Fourth Amendment interests in 
privacy?  
Despite the importance of these questions, the principle tools the Court relies upon to 
answer them are hopelessly indeterminate.  Following the logic of Speiser, Sherbert, and Shapiro would 
lead courts to ask whether policies that condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug test 
are best understood as a “penalty”  on claimants for exercising their Fourth Amendment rights, or 
better understood as a mere “non-subsidy” of Fourth Amendment rights.  On the one hand, courts 
could easily conclude that these conditions amount to no more than a mere non-subsidy.  Even if 
claimants have a Fourth Amendment right to refuse a drug test, Maher and Harris stand for the 
proposition that “without more,” refusal to fund a protected activity cannot be equated with the 200 
 
imposition of a “penalty” on that activity.  Following Lyng and Dandridge, courts may conclude that 
while claimants certainly have a Fourth Amendment right to refuse a drug test, the Constitution 
does not obligate governments to subsidize the exercise of that right.  Nor does the Constitution 
shield claimants from the resulting economic hardship. On the other hand Lyng and Dandridge rest 
uncomfortably with Shapiro and Memorial Hospital, where the Court affirmed that the denial of a 
“basic necessity of life” can be tantamount to the imposition a penalty on the exercise of a 
fundamental right.   
In Maher and Harris the Supreme Court concluded that the mere refusal to fund a protected 
activity cannot be equated the imposition of a penalty on that activity.  Yet, in both cases, the Court 
recognized that a distinct constitutional question would arise if governments were to condition 
public assistance on the surrender of a constitutional right.  In Maher, Justice Powell emphasized that 
Connecticut merely limited Medicaid payments to medically necessary abortions, leaving indigent 
women free to exercise their right to abortion using private funds.  In dicta he indicated that had 
Connecticut denied welfare benefits to otherwise eligible women merely because they exercised their 
right to an abortion, the circumstances would have been very different—and analogous to the facts 
of Shapiro, under which a penalty analysis might have been appropriate.
652 Likewise in Harris, Justice 
Stewart concluded that states are not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions, but added: 
“[a] substantial constitutional question would arise if  Congress had attempted to withhold all 
Medicaid benefits from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that candidate had exercised 
her constitutionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy.”
653
                                                 
652 432 U.S. 464, 474 n.8 (1977). 
 Importantly, Justice Stewart 
indicated that the latter would be analogous to Sherbert, where the Court held that a state may not 
 
 
653 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980).  201 
 
withhold unemployment benefits from a claimant who would otherwise be eligible for benefits “but 
for” the fact that she is unwilling to work on her Sabbath.  
In both cases, the Court indicated that the conclusions reached in Maher and Harris might 
not apply when governments condition benefits on the surrender of a constitutional right.  The 
Hyde Amendment did not require Medicaid recipients to waive their right to an abortion, and to that 
end, courts might reasonably conclude that the circumstances of Lebron bear a closer resemblance to 
Sherbert or Speiser.  In Speiser, the Supreme Court held that withholding tax exemptions from WWII 
veterans who refuse to waive their First Amendment right to engage in disloyal speech would be no 
different than imposing a fine on that speech.  In the same way, courts may conclude that denying 
public assistance benefits to someone who asserted their Fourth Amendment might not to take a 
drug test is no different than imposing a fine on that conduct.  As in Sherbert and Speiser, concluding 
that the condition is no different than fine would not be enough to invalidate the statute, but it 
would be enough to trigger strict scrutiny.   
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
However popular, policies that require applicants for public assistance to pass a suspicionless 
drug test are probably unconstitutional.  Without a genuine threat to public health or public safety, 
states cannot meet their burden to establish a special need.  I have argued that a public health 
approach can guide a special needs analysis under the Fourth Amendment.  One might respond that 
such “policy approaches” fall beyond the scope of constitutional interpretation, and threaten to 
return the Supreme Court to a time when judges struck down statutes merely because they were 
“unwise, improvident or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”
 654
                                                 
654 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970). 
 Yet, the Supreme 
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Court itself has said that a reasonable suspicionless search must address a genuine threat to public 
safety.  To that end, the unequivocal direction of the Supreme Court in Chandler  supports the value 
of a public health perspective.  Proposals to condition public assistance benefits on passing a drug 
test also run afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  
I have also argued that withholding public assistance benefits from illegal drug users could 
make many social problems much worse.  We know that public assistance programs like TANF 
provide a valuable opportunity to identify people with substance abuse problems and get them into 
treatment.  A 2006 study on women and substance abuse found that low-income women who used 
illegal drugs and continued to receive cash assistance through TANF were more than twice as likely 
to receive substance abuse treatment when compared to low-income women who also used illegal 
drugs but did not receive cash assistance.
655  Decades of research on addiction also point toward 
harm reduction methods as the approach most likely to lead to lasting reductions in drug use.
656
Finally, for most low-income women who receive public assistance, child care concerns, 
transportation problems, poor academic skills, and language barriers are perhaps more common and 
present more important obstacles to full-time employment than illegal drug use.
   
657
                                                 
655 Harold A. Pollack & Peter Reuter, Welfare Receipt and Substance Abuse Treatment Among Low-Income Mothers: The 
Impact of Welfare Reform, 96 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 2024 (2006). It may be that programs like TANF provide an 
important source of funding for treatment. See e.g. CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL STATISTICS & QUALITY, SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN, HHS NO. (SMA) 11-4658, RESULTS FROM THE 2010 
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE & HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS (2011) (among those who 
reported substance abuse treatment at a specialized facility during the past year 29.2 percent reported using their 
Medicaid benefits, but 35.6 percent reported using public assistance other than Medicaid). 
  Despite our 
current focus on substance abuse and welfare, given the real problems facing low-income families, 
states must look elsewhere.   
 
 
656 Jason Kilmer et al., Reducing Harm Associated with Illicit Drug Use: Opiates, Amphetamines, Cocaine, Steroids and Other 
Substances in HARM REDUCTION PRAGMATIC STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK BEHAVIORS 212 (G. Alan Marlatt 
et al., eds., 2nd ed. 2012).  
 
 
657 Lisa R. Metsch & Harold A. Pollack, Welfare Reform and Substance Abuse, 83 MILLBANK Q. 65, 71 (2005).  
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APPENDIX 1  
 
AOT HEARING INSTRUMENT 
 
 
1.  Hearing #:  ___     2.  Hearing Date: ____/ ____/ ____        3. Time:  _______     
 
4.  County: _____________  5.  Location                               6. Judge _________________ 
             Hospital      (1) __               
             Courthouse (2) __             
 
     
 
Respondent  
       7.  Race/ Ethnicity   8. Gender    9. Respondent does not        10. Res. waives              
            Black    (0) __                      Male    (0)  __                    contest AOT                      right to appear 
            Latino   (1) __       Female (1) __               No contest  (0)  __                     No  (0) __ 
            White    (2) __                         Contest       (1)  __        Yes  (1) __  
            Asian     (3) __                 
            Other   (4) __       
 
 
PETITIONER 
 
      11.  Petitioner:              
  __ (1) person with whom respondent resides     __ (5) treating or supervising psychiatrist   
  __ (2) parent/ spouse/ sibling         __ (6) treating psychologist  
  __ (3) hospital director           __ (7) director of community services  
  __ (4) director of any agency (other than hospital)              __ (8) parole or probation officer   
            providing services to respondent       __ (9) other  
 
      12. Hospital Discharge  ?          13. Initial or Renewal?  
__ (0) No                    __ (1)  Initial  
__ (1) Yes                  __ (2)  Renewal  
 
14. Current AOT request?                 
  ___________  
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      15.  Diagnosis:  
__  (A)  Schizophrenia          
__  (B) Schizoaffective Disorder  
               __  (C) Substance Abuse Disorder  
 __   (D) Bipolar Disorder  
 __   (E)  Depression  
 __   (F)  Not specified 
 __   (G)  Other  
 
16.  Unlikely to survive safely in community b/c:  
        __  (1)  Medication noncompliant 
              __  (2)  Lacks stable residence  
               __  (3)  History of homelessness  
 __ (4)  History of multiple hospitalizations  
   __ (5)  Poor self care (eat/dress/clean)  
 __ (6)  Other: __________________ 
 __ (7)  Not specified  
 
17.  Petitioning for AOT based on two or more hospitalizations  or instances of service in a 
correctional setting in the last 36 months?  
__ (0) No   
__ (1) Yes   
__ (2) N/A Renewal  
         17a. If yes, how many hospitalizations or instances of service? _____ 
       17b.  Dates 205 
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  Episode 1: __________    Episode 3: _________     
   Episode 2: __________    Episode 4: _________ 
 
18.  Petitioning for AOT based on one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward self or others, 
or threats of, or attempts at, serious physical harm to self or others within the last 48 months?  
__ (0) No   
__ (1) Yes   
__ (2) N/A Renewal  
 
Episode 1
 
:  
18a.  Date of harm, threat or attempt  
               ____/ ______/ _______ 
 
18b.    Nature of Harm    
__ (1) Physical harm to self       __ (6) Threat to self and others             
__ (2) Physical harm to others      __ (7) Threat to self with no action   
__ (3) Physical harm to self and others     __ (8) Threat to others with no action  
__ (4) Physical harm to animal       __ (9) Threat to self and others with no action          
__ (5) Threat to self with action       __ (10) Other: _______________________203 
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19.  Respondent is unlikely to participate voluntarily as a result of mental illness 
__  (0) does not mention  
__  (1) nature of diagnosis   
__  (2) failed to participate voluntarily in past  
__  (3) other _______________________________ 
         ______________________________ 
         ______________________________ 
 
20. Respondent needs AOT to prevent relapse or deterioration which would be likely to result in 
serious harm to self or others  
__  (0) does not mention  
__  (1) relapse has led to harm to self or others in the past  
__  (2) Other ______________________________ 
         ______________________________ 
         ______________________________ 
 
21.  Respondent is likely to benefit from AOT  
__ (0) does not mention  
__ (1) has benefited from treatment in the past  
__ (2) other ______________________________ 
       ______________________________ 
       ______________________________ 
 
22. AOT is the least restrictive alternative  
__ (0) does not mention  204 
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__ (1) respondent has not complied with voluntary treatment in the past  
        __ (2) other ______________________________ 
                          ______________________________ 
                          ______________________________ 
 
23. Other arguments in favor of petition:   
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
24. Treatment Plan  
__ (0) does not mention  
__ (1) medication  
__ (2) supervised housing 
__ (3) ACT team  
__ (4) individual therapy  
__ (5) group therapy   
__ (6) substance abuse treatment 
__ (7) toxicology screen  
__ (8) Other ____________________ 
 
 
RESPONDENT 
 
28. Respondent objections?  
__ No  (0) 
__ Yes (1)  
  Objection 1  __________     O/S    Objection 2   __________     O/S       
  Objection 3   __________     O/S     Objection 4  __________     O/S        205 
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15.  Does attorney for respondent cross examine examining psychiatrist?   
__ No  (0) 
__ Yes (1)  
__ N/A no psychiatric testimony (2)  
 
16.  Challenge criteria for AOT?  
__ (0) No   
__ (1) Mental illness  
__ (2) Unlikely to survive safely in the community  
__ (3) Noncompliance was significant factor  
           resulting in hospitalization  
__ (4) Noncompliance was a significant factor  
           resulting in one or more serious acts of violence  
__ (5) unlikely to participate voluntarily in outpatient treatment  
__ (6) needs AOT to prevent relapse or deterioration which would  
          be likely to result in serious harm to self or others  
__ (7) respondent is likely to benefit from AOT  
__ (8) AOT is the least restrictive alternative  
 
 
17.  Argue for other less restrictive alternatives?   
 __ No  (0) 
__ Yes (1)  
 
18.  Other arguments against granting petition:   
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JUDGE 
 
19.  Decision     20. Stated basis for decision?  
__ (0) deny           __ (0) not stated  
__ (1) grant           __ (1) stated  
 
21.  Points of emphasis:  
__ (1) mental illness (severity of)  
__ (2) unlikely to survive safely in the community  
__ (3) noncompliance has resulted repeated hospitalization in the past  
__ (4) noncompliance has been a significant factor resulting in one or more serious acts of  
         violence toward self or others  
__ (5) respondent is unlikely to participate in outpatient treatment voluntarily  
__ (6) respondent needs AOT to prevent relapse which would be likely to result in serious harm  
          to self or others  
__ (7) respondent is likely to benefit from AOT  
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ATTORNEYS  
INTERVIEW  INSTRUMENT  
 
 
Date: ___/____ /____  (MM/DD/YY)        County: ______________________ 
Attorney Interview #: _____           
 
Interviewer: The purpose of this study is to learn more about AOT hearings. This interview is completely confidential. I will not 
use your name in any writings, discussions or lectures produced based on this material. This interview is expected to take 
approximately 30 to 45 minutes.  If you decide you want to stop at any time, just let me know. Do you have any questions before 
we start? OK. I’ll start the recording now. 
 
I will now ask you a few questions about your background.  
1.  How many years have you been in practice as an attorney?  _______ 
 
2.  How long have you represented clients in assisted outpatient treatment hearings? ______ (years) 
 
3.  During that time, approximately how many AOT cases have you argued? ______  
 
3a.  Approximately, how many AOT cases have you argued in the last 3 months ______ 
 
4.  Aside from AOT hearings,  do you represent other clients in other cases involving mental health law?  
 
__ (0) No  
__ (1) Yes  
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4a. If so, how many non-AOT clients do you have? ______  
 
4b. What kind of cases are they? __________________________________________________ 
       _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Interviewer: Now, I am going to ask you a few questions about  your preparation for AOT hearings.  
 
5.  How many open AOT files do you usually have at one time? ________  
 
6.  In a typical week, how many clients do you represent in AOT hearings?  _________ 
 
7.  In a typical week, do you meet with AOT clients to discuss their case before their hearing begins?  
     __ (0) No  
     __ (1) Yes  
        7a.  How long does that meeting usually last? _____ (minutes)  
7b.  How long before the hearing does that meeting usually take place? _____ hours  _____ days  
7c.  Is that the only meeting you have with your client before their hearing?  
     __ (0) no  
     __ (1) yes  
 
8.  On average, in minutes, how much time do you spend on each of the following:i
a)  preparing for an AOT hearing :  ________  (minutes)  
  
b)  discussing the case with your client: ________ (minutes)  
c)  reviewing medical records: ________ (minutes)  209 
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d)  interviewing clinicians: _______ (minutes)  
e)  interviewing other witnesses: _______ (minutes)  
f)  other activity in preparation for an AOT hearing: _____ (minutes)  
 
9.  How many days after an AOT petition has been filed are you notified that you will represent the 
respondent? _____ 
 
10. Kendra’s Law requires a hearing no more than three days from the time an AOT petition is filed. 
Does that give you enough time to prepare for most AOT hearings?  
__ (0) No  
__ (1) Yes  
 
        10a.  If not, how many days after filing an AOT petition should the hearing take place?  _____  
 
11.  The vast majority of assisted outpatient treatment are granted. What problems do your clients 
encounter when trying to demonstrate that they no longer need AOT?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Can you recall a case where a judge denied the petitioner’s request for AOT? Without divulging 
confidential information, what seemed to make the difference? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
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13. What do you think of the AOT Program?  What are the strengths of the program? What are the 
weaknesses?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Interviewer: Now I am going to ask you a few questions about your clients, and your role as an attorney.  
 
14. Many clients consent to AOT, often as a way to get out the hospital.  Are there other reasons that 
might explain why people tend to consent to AOT?   
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
15.  Of course, not everyone consents to assisted outpatient treatment. Why do your clients sometimes 
ask you to challenge AOT?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15a. Of those clients who have asked you to challenge AOT, how often have you suspected that  
       the client actually needed to be in assisted outpatient treatment?  
   
       [Instruction: read prompts]  
 
  __ (1) always   
__ (2) very often   
__ (3) often  
__ (4) sometimes  211 
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__ (5) rarely  
    __ (6) never  
 
  15b. In those instances, how did you proceed?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Interviewer:  Finally, I want to ask a question about the professional responsibilities of attorneys whose clients are mentally ill.  
 
16.  Attorneys whose clients are mentally ill face a well know dilemma. Should they advocate zealously on their 
clients’ behalf, just as they would in any other criminal or civil case?  Or should attorneys pursue a collaborative 
approach focused on the “best interests” of their client?A collaborative or “best interests” approach could mean pursuing 
court ordered treatment  (whether the client wants treatment or not) when the client is clearly mentally ill and their 
capacity to make treatment decisions is clearly in question. What do you think? How should attorneys proceed?  
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
17. Is there anything else you think I should know?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
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JUDGES  
INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT  
 
Date:   ___/ ___/ ___ (MM/DD/YY)          County: _____________________ 
Judge Interview #:  _____             
 
 
Interviewer: The purpose of this study is to learn more about how judges are implementing Kendra’s Law. This interview is 
completely confidential. I will not use your name in any writings, discussions or lectures produced based on this material. This 
interview is expected to take approximately 45 minutes. If you decide you want to stop at anytime, just let me know. Do you 
have any questions before we start? OK. I’ll start recording now.   
 
 
1.  How many years have you been an attorney?  _______ 
 
2.  How many years have you been a judge?  _______ 
 
3.  When did you begin hearing petitions for AOT?  _____ (year)  
 
4.  How many AOT petitions do you hear each week?  _______  
 
5.  Aside from petitions for AOT, each week, do you hear other cases involving mental health law?  
 
__ (0) No  
__ (1) Yes  
 
5a.  If so, how many cases do you hear each week? ______  
 
5b.  What kind of cases are they? _________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Interviewer: Now I am going to ask you a few questions about the time you spend reviewing AOT petitions.  
 
6.  On average, how many petitions do you read each day? _______  
 
7.  On average, how much time do you spend reviewing each petition?  ________ (in minutes)   
 
8.  In a typical week, how many days do you have to review petitions before each hearing? _______ 
 
9.  In a typical week, what percentage of AOT petitions and affirmations do you read all the way 
through before the hearing starts?  ______ 213 
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Interviewer: Now I’m going to ask you a few questions about the criteria for AOT 
 
10. As you know, Kendra’s Law requires “clear and convincing” evidence that the respondent meets the 
criteria for AOT, however, the term clear and convincing evidence is undefined in the statute. How 
do you define the term clear and convincing evidence?  
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
11. How do you determine whether the petitioner has established clear and convincing evidence that the 
respondent meets the criteria for AOT? What are some of the things that you usually look for?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
12. Is your decision primarily based on evidence in the written record or evidence presented during the 
hearing?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
   
  10a. Interviewer: ask why decision is primarily based on one source of evidence or another. What  
         problems, if any, are there with the less relied upon source of evidence? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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13. What are the hardest issues you face as a judge when you are deciding AOT cases? Is there a 
particularly hard case that sticks out in your mind? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
14. The vast majority of petitions for assisted outpatient treatment are granted. But of course, not all 
AOT petitions are granted. Can you recall a case in which the petitioner failed to demonstrate clear 
and convincing evidence?   If so, why was the petitioner’s evidence lacking?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Interviewer: Now I am going to ask you a few questions about AOT hearings. 
 
15. How would you describe your role as the judge during an AOT hearing?  
 
Probes: What do we have judges during AOT hearings? What function do they serve?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
16. How would you describe the role of a clinician during an AOT hearing? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
17. How would you describe the ideal relationship between the judge, as the ultimate decisionmaker, and 
the clinician, as an expert witness, in the court?  215 
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______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. How confident are you in the ability of clinicians to determine whether the subject of an AOT 
petition meets the criteria for AOT? How influential are their recommendations?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
19. How would you describe the role of an attorney during an AOT hearing?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
19a.  When an attorney is representing a person with a mental illness during an AOT hearing is it  
appropriate for the attorney to argue against AOT zealously (assuming the respondent does not want to 
be in AOT) just as he or she would during a garden variety civil or criminal case?  
 
 Probes: are there any important differences that attorneys should keep in mind?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
20. What problems, if any, do you see with the AOT hearing process?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
20a.  Does the AOT hearing process give you the information you need to make sound decisions?  216 
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______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
20b.  Does the AOT hearing process adequately ensure that respondents receive a fair hearing?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
20c.  Do you see any opportunities to strengthen the process?  
 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
21. Is there anything else you think I should know?  
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Consent Form for Research Participation:   
 Judges and Attorneys  
 
 
Protocol Title: Kendra’s Law: An Empirical Study of Assisted Outpatient Treatment Hearings  
Principal Investigator:  Candice Player, Esq., M.Phil.  
Version Date:  May 2011  
 
 
About this consent form 
Please read this form carefully.  This form provides important information about participating in 
a research study.  As a prospective research participant, you have the right to take your time in 
making decisions about participating in this research.  If you have any questions about the 
research or any portion of this form, please ask.  If you decide to participate in this research 
study you will be asked to sign this form.  A copy of the signed form will be provided to you for 
your record.  
 
What is the purpose of this research?  
The purpose of this research is to learn more about assisted outpatient treatment (AOT) hearings. 
This study will include a series of interviews with AOT recipients, judges and attorneys. You 
have been asked to participate in this research so that we can learn more about how judges and 
attorneys understand their role in AOT hearings, and what problems if any they perceive in the 
AOT hearing process.  
 
How many people will take part in this research study?  
Fifteen judges and twenty attorneys and will be asked to participate in this study.  
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What will I do in this research?   
If you decide to volunteer, you will be asked to participate in one interview.  The interview will 
take approximately 45 minutes.  During this interview, I will ask you several questions about 
AOT hearings.  With your permission, I will tape record the interview.  I will not ask you to state 
your name on the recording. 
 
What are the risks and possible discomforts?   
The primary risk is that despite my efforts to keep your interview responses confidential, 
someone might gain access to them.  I will do my best to make sure this doesn’t happen, and 
your name will not be on the interview recording or the typed-up version of our interview.  
 
How will you protect my confidentiality? What happens to the information 
you collect?  
Your responses to interview questions will be confidential. I will not tell anyone  that you 
participated in this study or what you said in the interview.  The interview will be transcribed.  I 
will keep an electronic copy of both the interview and the transcript in a password protected file.  
Your name will not be attached.  Hard copies of all forms, including this informed consent 
document, and all interview notes will be kept in a locked file that only I can access. I will store 
hard and electronic copies of these records for 7 years.  
 
I will use the information you give me for my dissertation. It may be used as the basis for articles 
or presentations in the future. I won’t use your name or information that would identify you in 
any publications or presentations. 
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Are there any benefits from being in this study?  
Study participation involves no direct benefits to you.  You will help us learn more about AOT.  
 
Will I get paid for participating in this study?  
You will not be paid for your participation in this study.  
 
Can I end my participation in this research early?  
Your participation is completely voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time.  If 
you want to stop, just tell me. 
 
If I have any questions or concerns about this research, who can I talk to?  
If you have questions or concerns about this research, you can contact me, Candice Player, at 
(718) 490-4240, or via email: cplayer@fas.harvard.edu 
 
If you wish to speak to someone not directly involved in this research about your rights as a 
research subject, please contact Jane Calhoun, Harvard University Committee on the Use of 
Human Subjects in Research, 1414 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 234, Cambridge, MA  02138.  
Phone:  617-495-5459.  E-mail: jcalhoun@fas.harvard.edu 
 
Agreement: 
 
I have discussed with __________________________________ the above procedures, explicitly 
pointing out potential risks or discomforts.  I have asked whether any questions remain and have 
answered these questions to the best of my ability.  
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_______   ______________________  
  (date)     (investigator's signature)  
 
The nature and purpose of this research have been sufficiently explained and I agree to 
participate in this study.  I understand that I am free to withdraw at any time without any penalty. 
 
 
Signature: _____________________________________  Date: __________________ 
 
Name (print): __________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 